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Abstract 
 
The fertility transition in nineteenth century Europe is one of economic history’s 
greatest puzzles. There is no consensus in the literature on the causes of this ‘fertility 
revolution’. Following a critical review of the empirical and theoretical literature, 
this thesis re-examines the economic correlates of the fertility decline through the 
analysis of two new datasets from England and France. For the first time, the 
relationship between wealth and fertility can be studied over the period of the 
fertility transition. Clear patterns are discovered, namely a strong positive 
relationship pre-transition which switches to a strongly negative relationship during 
the onset of the transition. Family limitation is initiated by the richest segments of 
society. I then introduce a simple model which links fertility and social mobility to 
levels of economic inequality. I argue that parents are motivated by relative status 
concerns and the fertility transition is a response to changes in the environment for 
social mobility, where increased mobility becomes obtainable through fertility 
limitation. This hypothesis is tested with the new micro data in England and France. 
Fertility decline is strongly associated with decreased levels of inequality and 
increased levels of social mobility. The analysis finds strong support for the role of 
changes in inequality and the environment for social mobility as central factors in 
our understandings of Europe’s fertility transition. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Section 1.1: Background 
 
Today’s fertility levels are a small fraction of their potential maximum. Biologically, 
a healthy woman could give birth to more than 15 children if she married early 
enough and made no attempt to avoid pregnancy. Historically, human societies 
have never maximised fertility, but have restricted it through access to marriage1. 
However, within marriage, historical demographers have failed to find 
unambiguous evidence for significant fertility limitation before the demographic 
transition of the 18th and 19th centuries (Cleland and Wilson 1987 p.12). During the 
demographic transition, in conjunction with a decline in mortality, fertility within 
marriage fell sharply. For the first time, fertility control was practised on a wide 
scale. This process remains mysterious and poorly understood despite intense 
research over the past century. The demographic transition is ‚a phenomenon in 
need of an explanation‛ (Mace 2000 p.7). Why did fertility decline? This is the 
subject of this thesis. The dramatic change in reproductive behaviour from regimes 
of ‘natural fertility’ to the exercise of conscious control over family size has been 
justifiably termed ‚the fertility revolution‛ by Easterlin and Crimmins. They 
emphasise the importance of the analysis of this transition;  
 
‚Because of inadequate knowledge of the causes of the fertility revolution, it is not 
possible to predict the onset and pace of fertility’ decline in today’s developing 
countries or to formulate effective policies to slow population growth‛ 
(1985 p.3). 
 
Fertility is not only a personal choice. It has major macro economic impacts 
too. First, let us consider its influence on a country’s population level. As of April 
2009 the world’s population stood at slightly over 6.7 billion people. By 2050, the 
UN estimates, this number will have increased by nearly 40% to 9.2 billion (U.S. 
Census Bureau (2009). However, the rate of growth between different regions of the 
world will vary greatly. Changes in the distribution of the world population will 
                                                
1 e.g Culture or traditions resulting in a high average age at marriage and a high proportion of the 
population never marrying, such as the European marriage pattern. 
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ultimately lead to dramatic swings in the locus of global political and economic 
power. The recent economic growth and rise of China to superpower status, and the 
relative decline of Western Europe can partially be attributed to the underlying 
population base. The three demographic constituents of population growth, 
mortality, fertility and net migration, will determine the growth rate and level of the 
population of different regions of the world. Of these constituents, it is fertility 
which has the greatest influence upon a country’s population growth rate. The 
Population Reference Bureau states ‚small changes in childbearing trends today 
have huge implications for future population size‛ (2004 p.4). To illustrate 
empirically the importance of a country’s fertility rate to its population size, I will 
compare the experience of England and France, 1850-1912. 
 
In 1850 the population of France dwarfed that of her neighbour, England 
and Wales, holding almost exactly double the number of men, women and children. 
Over the following 62 years, the gap closed to a remarkable extent, where the 
population of England grew to 90% of that of France. Table 1.1 reports the 
constituent factors in the population growth rates for England and Wales, and 
France, 1850-1913 
 
Table 1.1: The Determinants of Population Change, England and France, 1850-
1913 
 
Crude 
Birth 
Rate 
Crude 
Death 
Rate 
Net 
Migration 
% 
Population 
1851  
Population 
1913  
Change 
% 
 (Average rate per year) (Millions) (Millions)  
England and 
Wales 
32.15 19.65 -1.03 17.80 36.30 103.93% 
France 23.99 22.24 0.40 35.60 39.70 11.52% 
Source: Rothenbacher, 2002. 
 
Despite losing an average of 1% of her population per annum through 
migration, the population level in England and Wales was expanding rapidly. In 
France, despite of a 0.4% gain in net migration per year, population is almost 
stagnant. Mortality differences were relatively negligible. The crucial constituent is 
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fertility. The crude birth rate was 34% higher in England and Wales compared to 
France. Population growth in France was miniscule compared to the population 
explosion in England and Wales, whose percentage growth rate over the period was 
nearly 10 times that of France. These changes alter the economic, political and 
cultural power balances between countries.  
 
Returning to today’s world, the higher fertility rates of the developing 
nations will contribute most to world population growth over the next half century2. 
Fertility in the developed world is far lower, and many developed countries, 
particularly in Europe, have fertility rates below that necessary to replace the 
population. Without migration, these countries are shrinking. The executive 
summary of the European Population Forum pointed out that current low fertility 
trends, which will result in future population and labour force decline, ‚call into 
question sustainable development in Europe‛ (Macura et al. 2004 p.279).   
 
The underlying demographic trends are resulting in a continuous rise in the 
dependency ratio3 in Europe. As many European pension provisions are financed 
from current taxation, increases in the dependency ratio will mean that a greater 
proportion of governmental budgets are spent on these welfare transfers. Today, 
European governments face large, increasing and unsustainable commitments to 
their aging populations. There are three policy options available. Firstly, 
governments can introduce policies which stimulate the fertility rate. Secondly, 
governments can introduce policies to attract migrants of working age. If these 
options are not taken, the government must either act to cut welfare expenditure 
(e.g. raise the retirement age, cut payment amounts) or increase taxation (Population 
Reference Bureau 2004 p.28). 
 
Europe’s below replacement fertility rates have come as a surprise to most
                                                
2 ‚It is almost certain that all future population growth will occur in the developing regions of the 
World‛ (Population Reference Bureau 2004 p.4). 
3 The ratio of the non-working to the working population. This ratio ‚is projected to rise sharply over 
the next 50 years‛ (Lee 2003 p.183).  
demographers, many of whom expected fertility to level off at, or near to, 
replacement (Bongaarts 2002 p.419). On a global front, Europe’s demographic share 
is expected to drop from 12% to 7%, a decline of 96 million, between 2000 and 2050 
(Macura et al. 2005 p.279 (executive summary)). On current trends, Europe is 
vanishing. Adolphe Landry4 attributed the declines of the Greek and Roman 
civilisations to depopulation (Kirk 1996 p.363). Caldwell’s recent survey of ancient 
Roman demography concludes that population was stationary. However, he does 
point to evidence that the Roman upper classes ‚significantly‛ restricted their 
fertility, an ancient precedence to a modern phenomenon (Caldwell 2004 p.12).  
 
Table 1.2: The Total Fertility Rate by the Level of Human Development, 2005 
Level of Human  
Development 
HDI 
GDPpc 
PPP 
US$ 
0e  
Education 
Index5 
Total 
Fertility 
Rate6 
Net 
Reproduction 
Rate7 
High 0.897 23,986 76.2 0.922 1.8 0.75 
Medium  0.698 4,876 67.5 0.738 2.6 1.22 
Low  0.436 1,112 48.5 0.515 6.0 1.83 
Source: UNDB 2007/2008,  
 
Table 1.2 reports the total fertility rate, and also the net reproduction rate, for 
the world, categorised by the level of human development. Countries are 
categorised as being having high, medium or low levels of human development 
based upon their relative ranking in terms of the human development index (HDI). 
The HDI score is calculated on income per capita, life expectancy and an education 
index. The component measures of HDI are also listed in table 1.2. The level of 
fertility is differentiated by the level of development on this global scale. Countries 
with high human development have low fertility; countries with low human 
development have high fertility. Countries with medium HDI levels have fertility 
rates in the middle range. What accounts for this variation in global fertility levels? 
                                                
4 An early proponent of demographic transition theory, which is discussed in section 1.3. 
5 This is the education component of the HDI. It is combination of adult literacy (2/3rds) and the 
combined general enrolment ratio. 
6 For 2000-2005. 
7 The net reproduction rates are sourced from UN 2008, and refer to level of development based upon 
income per capita alone. 
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The perceived wisdom is that these countries are at different stages of their 
demographic transition. Fertility is lower in more developed countries because the 
fertility transition occurred for them earlier than anywhere else. 
 
We still do not know why fertility declined in Europe. ‚The reduction in 
fertility accompanying modernisation poses a scientific puzzle that has yet to be 
solved‛ (Kaplan et al. 1995 p.326). This thesis asks ‚why did fertility decline?‛ To 
answer this, I will re-examine the economic explanations for the world’s first 
fertility transition by generating individual level fertility and economic data for two 
European countries, England and France.  
 
The rest of this chapter is comprised of five sections. Section 1.2 discusses the 
fertility transition pattern and reports some empirical evidence for the European 
case. Section 1.3 introduces and explores demographic transition theory. Section 1.4 
reviews the findings of the European Fertility Project, the largest empirical study of 
the question and section 1.5 details the research questions and findings of each 
chapter in this thesis. Section 1.6 Concludes this chapter. 
 
Section 1.2: The Fertility Transition 
 
Figure 1.1 charts the development of the net reproduction rate for the World, by 
level of development, for 1950-2050. For the post 2000 years, the ‘medium variant’ 
projections are used. The net reproduction rate (NRR) is the average number of 
daughters that a hypothetical cohort of women would bear if they lived their lives 
generating the age specific fertility and mortality rates of a specific year. As the NRR 
is a fertility measure which factors in mortality, it must be considered the most 
realistic estimate of realized fertility. As stated in the last section, the principal 
reason for the contemporary variation in world fertility is that different groups of 
countries are at earlier or later stages of their fertility transitions.  
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The global historical record shows that regions typically experience a 
transition from high to low fertility levels, where a clear break from past trends is 
observed and fertility never returns to pre-transitional levels. Beginning in Europe 
in the 19th century8, fertility transitions have been observed throughout the world 
over the past century, with many developing countries experiencing declining 
fertility more recently, as figure 1.1 illustrates. Some countries, mainly in sub-
Saharan Africa, still have high fertility levels, but these are also projected to decline 
over the next few decades. The focus of explanations for fertility behaviour has been 
on these transitions. However, this process remains poorly understood and 
inadequately explained despite over 50 years of concentrated interest from 
demographers, economists and sociologists. Demography, as a discipline 
‚consequently suffers from a sense of malaise caused by our apparent inability to 
explain one of the most important demographic phenomena in human history‛  
(Hirschman as quoted by Mason 1997 p.446). 
 
Figure 1.1: Net Reproduction Rates for the World, by level of Development, 1950-
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8 However, fertility decline in France preceded the rest of Europe by over a century (18th century). 
9 This graph is similar to one presented in Lee (2003 p.184), but uses the net reproduction rate rather 
than the total fertility rate.  
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The empirical character of the world’s first demographic transition has been 
documented in great detail. In general, both birth and death rates declined from a 
range of 30–40 per thousand to less than 10, and life expectancy rose from a range of 
25-35 to 75-80 (Livi-Bacci 1997 p.113). Fertility decline was near universal 
throughout Western Europe in the late 19th century, and as the European Fertility 
Project (EFP) revealed, there were a remarkable concentration of provinces in 
Europe experiencing an almost simultaneous onset of fertility transition. There were 
also huge outliers however, with Ireland experiencing much later decline (about 
1929), and the anomaly of early French fertility decline (dated as 1800 by Knodel 
and van de Walle, but almost certainly earlier (Knodel and van de Walle 1986 
p.394).  
 
The decline in mortality, which started in North Western Europe about 1800, 
has been attributed to less frequent epidemics and famines, innovations in 
preventative medicine and improved personal hygiene (certainly related to the 
diffusion of the germ theory of disease) (Livi-Bacci 1997 p.94, Lee 2003 p.170, Kirk 
1996 p.362). Public health measures such as better sanitation and drainage systems 
as well as improved welfare services also contributed significantly to the mortality 
decline, as did improvements in communications enabling greater dissemination of 
these advances to more remote regions. These were largely the result of the rapid 
rise of incomes in the period, and it was infant mortality which declined the most 
(Baines 1998 p.161). Income growth led to better fed populations, and in particular, 
improved nutrition during childhood. The empirical association of height and 
childhood nutrition suggests that this factor is important in lifelong susceptibility to 
disease (e.g. a stronger organ system) (Lee 2003 p.171). Another period of mortality 
decline began after World War II, linked to the discovery and use of sulpha drugs 
and anti-biotics (Schofield and Reher 1991 p.1). 
 
In general terms, the decline of mortality in Europe was followed by the 
decline in fertility10.  By 1900 most of Europe was experiencing fertility decline, or 
                                                
10 Which came first is discussed later in this chapter. 
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about to. This was a ‚gradual and geographically varied process‛, where both levels 
and trends of decline were different across Europe (De Santis and Livi-Bacci 2001 
p.100). The index of marital fertility ( gI ) and the infant mortality rate (per 1000 
births) is plotted for 17 European countries in figure 1.2. gI  is a standardised 
measure of fertility and is calculated a proportion of the maximum observed human 
fertility. The Hutterites, an Anabaptist group who married early and practised no 
form of birth control have an gI  equal to one. An gI  value greater than 0.7 is 
considered a rough threshold of a non fertility controlling population, and this 
threshold is represented in figure 1.2 by a solid horizontal line (Wetherell 2001 
p.590). In practice this means that the population in question has recorded marital 
fertility levels which are 70% of the level we would expect of the Hutterites. In 
figure 1.2, gI  is represented by a solid line and is referenced by the left y axis, infant 
mortality by a dashed line (referenced by the right y axis). Infant mortality is the 
lower line in all graphs. 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the decline in fertility of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
England and Wales, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland. All of these countries show a clear downward trend towards the 
end of the 19th century. In the French case, fertility has declined long before the start 
year of the graph, 1850.  For Finland, Iceland, Ireland, and Italy, sustained decline in 
fertility does not occur before 1913, at least in this simple visual inspection. The 
exercise of plotting fertility against the infant mortality rate also reveals a variety of 
patterns in the countries of Europe. Level differences are enormous. Comparing 
Norway and Ireland with Germany and Italy, we see huge level differences in the 
index of marital fertility and the infant mortality rate. Further, for those countries 
where fertility decline has started, for instance Belgium, England and Wales and 
France, there is no downward trend in infant mortality.  
 
As Alter put it, in regards to Europe’s fertility decline ‚there is a mosaic of 
levels and trends‛ (1992 p.21). 
 
 19 
Figure 1.2 : Fertility and Infant Mortality in Europe, 1840-1913 
 
Source: Own calculations and Rothenbacher 2002.
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Section 1.3: Why did fertility decline?  
 
Almost all theories and explanations of Europe’s fertility decline can be categorised 
as being either ‘innovation diffusion’ or ‘adaptation’11. The ‘innovation diffusion’ 
hypothesis states that declining fertility rates represent a new behaviour, a result of 
new knowledge (about contraception, for example) or changes in culture or 
attitudes that make fertility control acceptable on moral grounds. The ‘adaptation’ 
hypothesis states that fertility control is primarily influenced by couples' reactions 
to changes in economic and social circumstances (for example rising incomes and 
declining infant mortality rates) (Bonneuil 1997 p.2). Through this, high pre-
transitional fertility is seen as couples’ rational response to economic and social 
conditions, just as falling fertility is seen to reflect couples rational assessment of the 
changing costs and benefits of having children.  
 
Perhaps the most influential theory of the interaction of the economy and the 
population is that forwarded by the Reverend T.R. Malthus in his ‚Essay on the 
Principle of Population‛ (first published in 1798). Malthus’ ideas are still highly 
controversial today. Essentially, Malthus argued that the growth rate of the 
population was dependent on the food supply, and this relationship was kept in 
equilibrium via the preventative check, which acted through fertility, and the 
positive check, which acted through mortality. Using annual variations in grain 
prices as a proxy for variations in the real wage (and therefore the standard of 
living), Galloway states ‚fertility was highly sensitive to grain price fluctuations in 
most of pre-industrial Europe‛ (1988 p.298). For England and France, Weir found 
‚evidence of a connection between the economy and marital fertility‛ for the period 
1740-1789 (Weir 1984a p.39). More recently, Anderson and Lee, using statistical 
methods which factor in the endogenity of population dynamics and the economy, 
have found that their estimates of the effect of wage variation on fertility, for 1540 to 
1870, were  ‚substantially stronger‛ than previous estimates (2002 p.212). However, 
this is a short run relationship, Anderson and Lee state ‚very little of the long-term 
                                                
11 A categorisation first forwarded by Carlson (1966).  
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variation in either fertility or mortality appears to be explained by variations in 
wages‛ (2002 p.212)12. 
 
 However, Malthusian theory offers no explanation for the systematic 
decline of European fertility in the late 19th century, and the demographic transition 
is often characterised as the escape of Europe from the ‘Malthusian trap’. Without 
the fertility transition, the material gains from the industrial revolution would have 
been dissipated, and population would have grown extraordinarily large. 
Something fundamental in people’s fertility preferences changed. This new 
behaviour, the practice of deliberate family limitation within marriage, was not 
foreseen by Malthus.  
 
In the first half of the 20th century, demographers such as Thompson (1929), 
Landry (1934) and Notestein (1945), and others developed ‘demographic transition 
theory’. Notestein (1945) categorised countries into three stages of demographic 
transition based upon the growth rate of the population – a high growth potential 
(where both birth and death rates are high), a transitional growth regime (where 
mortality decline precedes fertility decline) and an incipient decline regime (where 
both mortality and fertility have declined) (pp.42-48).  Underlying demographic 
transition theory is the hypothesis that prosperity, urbanisation and modernisation 
are the causal agents of the decline of fertility in Europe. The reduction of heavy 
mortality, and in particular, infant mortality, coupled with drastic changes in the 
social and economic climate through modernisation, significantly altered peoples’ 
motives and tendencies regarding family size. The ubiquitous demographic 
transition theory schema is illustrated in figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the time trend of the three demographic transition theory 
variables: fertility, mortality and ‘modernisation’. High and erratic pre-
                                                
12 There is a rich literature on the validity of Malthus’ ideas. The field is controversial and is still, two 
centuries later debated furiously. Some recent studies include Crafts (2009), Mokyr and Voth (2009) 
and Clark (2007). An earlier but fascinating analysis of homeostasis in human population is that of Lee 
(1985). 
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Figure 1.3: Demographic Transition Theory 
 
 
transition mortality rates (and by extension infant mortality rates) require societies 
to maximise their fertility in order to survive. Health and welfare improvements, 
induced by modernisation, have an immediate impact upon mortality. However, 
fertility remains high, and the society experiences a high rate of population growth. 
Eventually, fertility falls into equilibrium with mortality, as demand for children 
adjusts with a lag to the sudden increase in supply. The theory is still a major 
teaching tool in many demography textbooks. It is intuitive, and appears to make 
sense. However, not only is it regularly attacked for not being a proper theory, it has 
also failed to match the empirical record. 
 
Demographic transitions theory’s inherent vagueness means that there very 
few testable hypotheses. One of these is the hypothesis that infant mortality decline 
will always predate fertility decline. Inspecting the mosaic of patterns in figure 1.2, 
the relationship is less than obvious. Amazingly, taking Europe as a single entity 
and correlating the infant mortality and fertility data used in figure 1.2, yields a 
surprisingly low correlation coefficient of 0.054. This suggests strongly that the
causal mechanism emphasised by DT theory sheds little light on intra European 
demographic differentials. 
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In order to provide an empirical confirmation of demographic transition 
theory at a more disaggregated level than the national level series, Ansley Coale 
initiated the Princeton Project on the history of European Population (also known as 
the European Fertility Project (EFP). The EFP published eight books and seven 
summary journal articles between 1968 and 1986, with the oft cited summary 
volume ‘The Decline of Fertility in Europe’ concluding the series13. The initial spark for 
the project came from the PhD thesis of William Leasure, who had discovered that 
the fertility decline in Spain did not fit the description of demographic transition 
theory (Coale and Watkins 1986 preface). Along with his collaborators, Coale’s 
objective was to investigate Europe’s fertility decline through the collection and 
analysis of fertility measures at the level of ‘provinces’ – the many hundreds of 
counties, departments, and cantons in Europe. The study is regarded by many as 
the ‚definitive study‛ of Europe’s fertility transition (Kirk 1996 p.366). 
 
Regarding the description of the fertility transition, the central findings of 
the project were that (1) Marital fertility decline was the predominant influence on 
the fall in overall fertility from 1870-1930, (2) Once the decline started (as signified 
by a 10% drop in marital fertility), it continued to decline and (3) Excluding France, 
59% of the provinces of Europe began their fertility transition during the decades of 
1890–1920 (Watkins 1986 p.431-43). The EFP was also able to confirm and document 
the ‚marriage boom‛ in Western Europe (as observed by Hajnal in 1953). The 
proportion married rose significantly and rapidly between 1870 and 1960 (Watkins 
1986 p.335). Malthus viewed access to marriage as the primary determinant of 
fertility and the fertility transition can be interpreted as ‚a shift in the mechanism of 
population control from restriction of marriage to limitation of childbearing within 
marriage‛ (Alter 1992 p.14). 
                                                
13 The references, with the country under study in parentheses, are: Books: Livi Bacci 1971 and 1977 
(Portugal and Italy respectively), Knodel 1974 (Germany), van de Walle 1974 (France), Lesthaeghe 1977 
(Belgium), Coale and Anderson 1979 (Russia), Teitelbaum 1984 (Great Britain and Ireland) and Coale 
and Watkins 1986 (summary volume). Papers: Livi Bacci 1968 (Spain), Siampos and Valaoras 1971 
(Greece), Demeny 1972 (Austria-Hungary), Forrest 1975 (Austria), Mosk 1978 (Denmark), van de Walle 
1980 (Switzerland) and Matthiessen 1984 (Denmark).  
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Section 1.4: The EFP and Demographic Transition Theory 
 
A central prediction of demographic transition theory is the decline of mortality 
before fertility. Were couples’ responding rationally to a changing expectation of net 
family size? If this was the case, the data should show a clear and significant 
positive relationship between infant mortality and fertility. In other words, as the 
expected family size from a certain number of births increases, parents should 
adjust their fertility downwards in order to account for this new mortality 
environment. The results of the EFP’s multiple studies detected no strong patterns 
in the relationship between these variables. For Belgium, Lesthaeghe found a 
negative effect for the language areas of Wallonia and Flanders (1977 p.200). For 
Great Britain and Ireland, Teitelbaum states ‚my analyses revealed essentially no 
statistical relationship between the level of infant mortality (and child mortality as 
well) and the decline of marital fertility‛14 (1984 p.215). For Germany, Knodel noted 
‚it appears that the usual description of the demographic transition which 
postulates a prior decline in mortality<as an initiating cause of the fertility decline 
does not fit the facts in Germany‛ (1974 p.185)15. Demeny (1972) found that the 
extremely high infant mortality rates of Austria-Hungary did not hinder a full 
fertility transition16 (1972 p.172).  
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, there was no relationship between 
fertility and infant mortality at the national level in Europe during the demographic 
transition17. In the EFP’s summary volume Francine van de Walle states ‚at the 
provincial level, correlations are sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker than at 
the national level, but they are not always in the expected direction‛ (van de Walle 
1986 p.220). Table 1.3 summarises the provincial level associations and highlights 
the variety of patterns in the infant mortality-fertility relationship in Europe at this 
                                                
14 In fact, marital fertility declined before infant mortality declined in most English counties (Watkins 
1986 p.436). 
15 Fertility declined before infant mortality declined in Germany. However, they did decline together 
with striking simultaneity in some areas, and in Germany as a whole (Knodel 1974 p.181). 
16 He did find an association within his subregions however (1972 p.172). 
17 A point also made by Francine van de Walle (1986 p.220). 
 25 
time. Concluding, Watkins states that the ‚battery of tests‛ undertaken by the EFP 
showed ‚little association between fertility and infant mortality during the 
demographic transition18 (Watkins 1986 p.436).  
 
Table 1.3: The Provincial Level Correlation of Infant Mortality and the index of 
marital fertility in Europe 
Country 1870 1900 1930 
Belgium  0.575***  
Denmark -0.134 -0.677** -0.025 
England and Wales 0.090 0.174 0.614** 
France 0.007 0.281** 0.31** 
Germany 0.545** 0.219* 0.473** 
Netherlands 0.634* 0.798** 0.91** 
Norway 0.327 -0.409* 0.166 
Russia  0.399**  
Spain  0.110  
Sweden 0.126 -0.027 0.523** 
Switzerland -0.038 0.209 0.557** 
Total 0.156** 0.383 0.078 
*** 
** 
* 
Significant at the 0.001 level 
Significant at the 0.01 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
Source: Van de Walle 1986 p.221  
 
Demographic transition theory is built upon the stylized impression that 
modernisation (broadly defined) is a causal force of fertility decline. The EFP failed 
to uncover the mortality trigger for this switch in behaviour. Perhaps fertility acted 
in direct response to socioeconomic developments? The EFP was designed to detect 
this pattern in Europe’s provinces. For Germany, Knodel failed to find any 
threshold level of economic development that was associated with fertility decline, 
although he did find a ‚moderately close‛ association between the level of 
socioeconomic development and the decline of fertility (1974 p.244). Demeny’s 
study of Austria-Hungary  found diverging associations between modernisation 
                                                
18 Van de Walle questions the very origin of the assumption that there ever was a relationship between 
the declines of infant mortality and fertility (1986 p.231). Some of the EFP author suggested that the 
appropriate variable should be child, and not infant, mortality. The decline in child mortality preceded 
the decline in infant mortality and thus would have acted to shift parents supply function upwards. 
Knodels data support this hypothesis (Knodel 1986 p.346). Unfortunately, this hypothesis was not 
systematically tested as part of the EFP (Watkins 1986 p.448).  
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and the fertility decline; ‚in the Austrian lands, fertility decline does seem to fit the 
conventional picture of demographic transition as a process associated with 
urbanization, industrialisation, and their various correlates‛ (1972 p.169). 
Remarkably, fertility decline in Hungary, an undeveloped and poor region of 
Europe, ‚originated and developed in and among the peasantry‛ (Demeny 1972 
p.169). In addition to the lack of a socioeconomic trigger for the fertility decline in 
Austria- Hungary, cultural factors were not strong indicators of reduced decline 
either; ‚identical behaviour was generated in a variety of greatly differing cultural 
environments‛19 (Demeny 1972 p.171).  
 
Elsewhere, the EFP’s results were similarly confusing. In relation to Belgium, 
Lesthaeghe write; ‚the strong relationship between the rate of the marital fertility 
decline and the index of industrialization-urbanization indicates that modernisation 
of the occupational structure was indeed a forceful agent in the process of fertility 
reduction‛ (1977 p.224). However, Lesthaeghe concludes that because of the 
heterogeneous fertility-modernisation reactions across Europe, there was no 
economic threshold at which fertility decline would be initiated. Rather, it was the 
interaction of economic growth and cultural change, and in particular 
secularisation20, which sparked the fertility transition in Belgium. Concluding, 
Lesthaeghe states in Belgium ‚fairly early economic and social transformations 
coincided with and were partly responsible for an early breach in ethical and 
religious barriers; a relatively low level of secularization was sufficient to release the 
mechanisms that would bring fertility down‛ (1977 p.231). However, for Spain, 
Livi-Bacci noted that fertility control and reduction took hold in a society which was 
‚strongly Catholic both in affiliation and observance‛ (1968a p.101). Further, Livi-
                                                
19 For instance, the leaders of fertility decline in the Transdanubian region were the Protestant 
Hungarians, in the Banat region it was the German Roman Catholics and in Krasso Szoreny it was the 
Romanian Greek Orthodox population (Demeny 1972 p.170). 
20 Through analysing the regional variation in the non-Catholic vote and computing the correlation 
coefficient between the level of secularisation and the index of marital fertility, 1880-1910 (resulting in 
values of 0.8-0.9) (1977 p.43). His multivariate analysis found a strong and significant association 
between secularization and fertility also (1977 p.213). However, secularization was only available for 
one year, 1910, so the explanatory power of secularisation as causal in the time trend of Belgian fertility 
decline is limited. This is also an example of how cross sectional variation may be confused for time 
series trends, see the discussion on Birch’s Critique of the Innovation/Diffusion Hypothesis in section 
2.4, chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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Bacci states ‚the usual demographic explanations of fertility decline do not fit the 
Spanish experience‛21 (1968c p.532). For Britain and Ireland, Teitelbaum argues 
‚cultural variables<generally explain less of the variance in marital fertility than do 
socioeconomic measures taken on their own‛22 (1984 p.216). The most significant 
variables in his analysis were proportion urban, proportion voting conservative, 
proportion in manufacturing, female labour force participation and basic literacy. 
Place of birth had relatively small effects, as did an index of ethnic diversity and the 
proportion Catholic (1984 p.189).  
 
The EFP could not detect the theorised strong modernisation-fertility decline 
patterns in the provincial level data. These associations were either weaker than 
expected or non-existent. This finding led many of the EFP authors to the belief that 
the fertility decline was not an adaptation, but a result of a process of ‘innovative 
diffusion’. In other words, the fertility transition was cultural in origin, not 
economic. Many of the EFP authors pointed to their empirical findings that culture 
and linguistic heritage, and secularisation, was of greater importance than any 
socioeconomic variable, in understanding the timing of the decline of fertility in 
Europe. However, as this review illustrates, there were a variety of trends 
uncovered in each of the separate country monographs. For every case where 
culture mattered more than the economy (e.g. Belgium), we can point to a country 
where the reverse was true (e.g. Great Britain). As noted previously, radical changes 
in culture were not required to initiate the fertility decline in Hungary or Spain. As 
part of the summary volume, Lesthaeghe and Wilson analysed a pooled database of 
the provincial level estimates of fertility alongside proxies for the level of 
secularisation, represented by voting patterns, and the presence of a ‘familial 
intensive’ labour system, represented by the relative size of the agricultural labour 
force. They found strong correlations between the rate of change of marital fertility 
                                                
21 Here he means both cultural and economic explanations: education, secularisation, and 
industrialisation and urbanisation (1968c p.532). 
22 His cultural measures were primarily based upon the composition of the place of births of the 
counties of Britain and Ireland and the 1851 census of Great Britain and Ireland, which recorded 
religious affiliation (1984 p.159). He compared a ‘transitional’ model consisting of only socioeconomic 
measures against a purely cultural model and calculated an adjusted 2R of .697 and .539 respectively 
(1984 p.165). 
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over the transition period and the percentage vote for secularised social-reformist 
political parties23 (Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986 p.281-3). However, the percentage of 
the variance explained by their secular variable was a small fraction of that 
explained by the proportion of the labour force in agriculture24 (table 6.7 in 
Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986 p.288).  
 
A central proposition of demographic transition theory is the idea that rising 
education led to people demanding fewer children. However, the early fertility 
declines in France and Austria-Hungary, initiated by uneducated peasant 
populations, and the relatively late declines of highly literate societies such as 
Sweden indicates that there is no simple casual relationship. Remarkably, Livi-Bacci 
found for Portugal ‚the higher the illiteracy, the lower the fertility and the stronger 
its control‛ (Livi-Bacci 1971 p.122). Generally the EFP authors found positive but 
comparatively weak associations between basic literacy and the fertility transition25, 
in Belgium (Lesthaeghe 1977 p.213), Great Britain and Ireland (Teitelbaum 1984 
p.189), Germany (Knodel 1974 p.234), Austria-Hungary (Demeny 1972 p.172), Italy 
and Spain (van de Walle 1980 p.464)). The most complete investigation of the 
relationship between education and fertility in the EFP was undertaken by van de 
Walle for Switzerland (1980). She was able to go beyond the most basic indicators of 
literacy and use the results of written exams from military recruits for the period of 
the fertility transition (1980 p.464). He found a strong and persistent negative 
association between the level of education and the index of marital fertility in Swiss 
districts in 1888 (1980 p.470). 
   
Another pillar of modernisation and therefore of demographic transition 
theory is the effect of the migration of the rural population to the towns and cities of 
industrialising Europe. The EFP found that fertility decline was earlier and faster in 
                                                
23 For Belgium, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The correlation coefficient 
between the variables ranged from 0.706-0.890 (Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986 p.284). 
24 This result was obtained by comparing the beta coefficients in a simple multiple regression 
framework. Secularisation appears to be more important in Italy and Catholic Germany in this analysis 
(Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986 p.288). 
25 i.e where higher education was associated with lower fertility. 
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the urban areas of Europe for almost every country studied26 (Sharlin 1986 p.249). 
However, the relationships varied between countries and the declines in both 
environments ‚overlapped‛. (Sharlin 1986 p.248). Further, Sharlin comments that 
‚regional variations are always larger than urban-rural differentials‛ (1986 p. 251).  
 
The EFP: Legacy and Judgement 
The primary policy legacy of the EFP was to weaken the link between economic 
development and fertility decline, and strengthen the case for family planning as the 
most effective means to reduce fertility (Alter 1992 p.25). However, the EFP did not 
generate a theoretical breakthrough in our understanding of why fertility declined 
in the first place. The central finding was a negative result for the correlation of the 
central tenants of demographic transition theory. Empirically, cultural and linguistic 
variables were of greater significance than any socioeconomic measure. However, as 
Alter writes, ‚participants in the project have yet to explain what it is about 
linguistic regions that determines the timing of fertility decline‛ (1992 p.21). 
Demographic transition theory has been rejected but it has not been replaced by a 
similar over-arching theory of why fertility declined. As Sharlin, in the EFP 
summary volume states ‚the European Fertility Project has uncovered a series of 
detailed ad hoc arguments, rather than confirmed<general mechanisms‛ (1986 
p.258). Further, Anderson (again from the summary volume) maintains; ‚no fully 
articulated, reformulated theory seems justified yet‛ (1986 p.312).  
 
In the summary volume, Anderson states ‚the findings of the European 
Fertility Project do suggest that behaviour does not change directly and simply as 
the result of differences among individuals on the basis of socioeconomic variables‛ 
(1986 p.312). There are reasons to be hesitant about fully accepting the EFP’s 
conclusions. Firstly, the EFP did not employ a consistent or standardised statistical 
methodology. Watkins points to the ‚simple‛ statistical methods employed in the 
country monographs and notes that ‚more sophisticated techniques may prove to 
be more fruitful‛ (1986 p.439). Secondly, the socioeconomic data collected by the 
                                                
26 The exceptions were France (because the data did not stretch back to cover the onset of the decline) 
and Norway (a result which may be an artefact of the data) (Sharlin 1986 pp.242-245). 
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project were not precise or consistently comparable over time or place. Knodel and 
van de Walle conceded that the socioeconomic measures used by the EFP were 
‚crude and suffer from varying degrees of non-comparability between countries‛ 
(Knodel and van de Walle 1986 p.398). Finally, the aggregate detection of parity 
dependant fertility control is difficult: Knodel, following his micro analysis in the 
summary volume writes:  
 
‚The results also demonstrate that cross sectional or over-time differences in overall 
levels of marital fertility, the type of information typically available from 
conventional sources and relied upon heavily by the European Fertility Project – are 
not always sensitive to differences in the patterns of childbearing indicative of 
parity dependant control‛ (Knodel 1986 p.386) 
 
The error of interpreting individual characteristics from aggregated data is 
known as the ecological fallacy, and the potential bias from this effect is the single 
greatest reason to question the EFP’s conclusions. Many of the EFP authors were 
conscious of the ecological fallacy27. Teitelbaum admits that ‚the ecological nature of 
the data may have obscured some effects‛ (1984 p.212). Knodel statea; ‚The national 
average covers up the diversity found amongst the administrative areas‛ (Knodel 
1974 p.182). Similarly Watkins writes ‚aggregate measures of infant or childhood 
mortality may be misleading‛ (1986 p.437).  Lesthaeghe demonstrates how the 
pooling of the data from Wallonia and Flanders led to a significant positive 
relationship between infant mortality and the index of marital fertility at the 
national level (Belgium). The effect was illusory; when Lesthaeghe tested the two 
regions separately he found ‚no relation whatsoever‛ (1977 p.199). The question 
arises that if these mistaken relationships can be created by amalgamating smaller 
units into larger units, surely any aggregation is potentially erroneous. In other 
words, if the ecological fallacy operates in the aggregation of regions to nations, it 
certainly operates in the collection of individuals into regions.  
 
                                                
27 Some weren’t. In the summary volume, Anderson states ‚The European Fertility Project showed that 
the relation of cultural and regional variables to marital fertility decline cannot be completely 
explained away by spurious association with socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level‛ 
(Anderson 1986 p.311).  
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Table 1.4 Year of Sustained decline in Marital Fertility 
1800s         1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s 1920s 
France 
(before 
1800) 
             
Belgium 
(1882) 
Germany 
(1890) 
Denmark 
(1900) 
Finland 
(1910) 
Ireland 
(1929) 
 
 
Switzerland 
(1885) 
Hungary 
(1890) 
Norway 
(1904) 
Italy 
(1911) 
 
  
England and 
Wales (1892) 
Austria 
(1908) 
Bulgaria 
(1912) 
 
  
Sweden 
(1892) 
 
Spain 
(1918) 
 
  
Scotland 
(1894) 
   
  
Netherlands 
(1897) 
   
Source: Knodel and van de Walle 1979 p.217 
 
In summary, the conclusion of the project concerning the cause of Europe’s 
fertility decline, modernisation, was a negative result. The central relationships of 
the key demographic transition theory variables were weak and statistically 
insignificant. The empirical correlations were inconsistent with the theory. Knodel 
and Van de Walle noted ‚Despite the great diversity of their socio economic 
characteristics, the striking factor that the countries of Europe had in common when 
fertility declined was time itself‛ (1979 p.235). The Princeton project defined the 
start of the decline as a 10% drop in marital fertility ( gI ), and these dates are 
presented in a timeline format in table 1.4. The conclusions to the EFP seem to 
suggest the absence of Ansley Coale’s first pre-condition for fertility decline. That is, 
fertility must be ‚within the calculus of conscious choice28 (Alter 1992 p.22). Alter 
terms this the ‚unthinkability hypothesis‛ (1992 p.22). The empirical evidence 
seemed to support an ‘innovation diffusion’ process rather than a 
rationalsocioeconomic ‘adaptation’. 
 
                                                
28 Along with desiring smaller family sizes and having access to the means of achieving this (Alter 1992 
p.22).  
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Recently, however some scholars have questioned the validity of the EFP’s 
findings. Brown and Guinnane for instance, have discussed in detail serious 
statistical problems in the Princeton project’s methodology and called for 
researchers to ‚press on with new sources and new methods‛ in order to 
understand Europe’s fertility decline (2003 p.26). They demonstrate how a ten 
percent decline in gI  may misdate the early stages of transition, and that it is ‚too 
blunt an instrument to be a reliable indicator of fertility decline‛. Further, they 
illustrate with specific examples how the units used (provinces) in the EFP’s 
analyses were ‚too large and internally heterogeneous‛ (thus making them highly 
susceptible to the ecological fallacy) and the explanatory ‘modernisation’ variables 
used in most European Fertility Project studies were crudely defined, and do not 
support ‚meaningful tests of the role of social and economic change in the fertility 
transition‛ (Brown and Guinnane 2003 p.3-6). These criticisms echo many of the EFP 
authors stated concerns, discussed previously. Brown and Guinnane’s own results, 
using individual level data29, show that fertility declined at a more rapid rate for 
those in high income brackets. The structure of the EFP, through analysing 
aggregated data, was unable to detect these socioeconomic correlates of the fertility 
decline. The casebook is not yet closed on the causal process of Europe’s fertility 
transition 
 
Brown and Guinnane state that the EFP did not find any relationship 
between declining fertility and socioeconomic factors, because it couldn’t - It did not 
have, or use data that was ‚sufficiently general enough to draw appropriate 
conclusions‛ (Brown and Guinnane 2003 p.26). Even some of the EFP’s principal 
authors disagree with the sweeping dismissal of the economic causes of the fertility 
decline. Teitelbaum, for instance, who authored the monograph on the fertility 
decline in Britain, stated in his conclusion that ‚socioeconomic variables have high 
explanatory power‛ in explaining the British fertility decline (1984 p.184). The 
legacy of the EFP is therefore confusing. As commented by Wetherell, ‚economic 
                                                
29 Through examining the raw data from the Polizeimeldbogen (police records) for Munich, 1860 – 1914 
and estimating a regression model. 
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demographers continue to question the EFP’s major finding that economic factors 
were not central to the decline of fertility in Europe‛ (2001 p.591).  
 
 Other Literature on the fertility transition 
The past half century has witnessed the blooming of the field of historical 
demography. In particular the analysis of micro data using the techniques of family 
reconstitution has allowed scholars in this discipline to assess the individual level 
characteristics of historical population processes. As Knodel noted however, ‚most 
of this work has been restricted to periods prior to the onset of the secular decline of 
fertility‛ (1986 p.338). 
 
In the 1950s, Louis Henry pioneered the use of family reconstitution as a 
technique of population analysis. He demonstrated how parish records of births, 
deaths and marriages could yield demographic variables. At INED30, he designed 
and led the family reconstitution study of 39 rural French villages from about 1600-
1800. Unfortunately, the project was not designed with the availability of high 
quality economic information in mind (Weir 1995 p.2). As van de Walle has stated 
‚unfortunately, the population of the parishes usually is not clearly stratified and 
most attempts in finding lags in the dates of fertility decline by socioeconomic 
groups have failed‛ (1978 p.264). 
 
Wrigley and Schofield emulated Henry’s methodology for 26 English 
parishes. They were able to calculate fine demographic measures such as the age 
structure of mortality and age specific marital fertility rates. In addition they were 
able to generate quinquinnial estimates of the English population and vital 
registration series (births, marriages and deaths), the gross and net reproduction 
rate of the population and the age structure from 1541-1871. Wrigley et al. write that 
fertility differentials by occupation were ‚trivial‛ (1997 p.427). They failed to pick 
up any significant differences between agricultural workers, manufacturing workers 
or those engaged in retail and handicraft (figure 1.4). For the analysis of the fertility 
                                                
30Institut national d'études démographiques 
 34 
decline the Wrigley-Schofield database is limited by its termination in 1837, when 
the registrar general began to collect birth and death information. This is a full half 
century before the aggregate decline of marital fertility in England and Wales.  
 
Knodel applied the tools of family reconstitution to Germany. His 
contribution to the EFP summary volume (1986) was an analysis of his dataset of 14 
villages with respect to the fertility transition. He found ‚little consistency‛ in the 
relationship between occupational status and fertility amongst the villages (Knodel 
1986 p.373). After 1850, just before the period of fertility decline, it was farmers who 
reduced their fertility the most (Knodel 1986 p.376). Further refuting demographic 
transition theory was Knodel’s analysis of child mortality and fertility decline where 
he found ‚no consistent association‛ at the village level (Knodel 1986 p.382). 
However, when he disaggregated to individuals and examined the relationship 
between child deaths and children ever born (for couples categorised as 0, 1 or 2 
child deaths) he found a clear negative relationship (Knodel 1986 p.383).  
 
Figure 1.4 illustrates fertility differentials by occupation for the 26 English 
villages in Wrigley et al.’s reconstitution and the village of Grafenhausen in 
Germany from Knodel’s reconstitution. Grafenhausen was the village which 
displayed the most significant fall in marital fertility over the sample period in 
Knodel’s study (1986). The evidence presented in figure 1.4 makes it difficult to 
pinpoint an occupational category as source for Germany’s fertility transition, or to 
detect a forerunner of England’s.  
  
One study to evaluate the individual socioeconomic correlates of individual 
fertility during the period of fertility transition is that of Alter, Nevin and Oris
(2005). Using population registers for three East Belgian areas, they find that the 
relationship between socioeconomic status (as indicated by occupation) and fertility 
changes direction over the course of the fertility transition (2005 p.32). Each ‚act‛ in 
the fertility transition ‚was characterized by important differences between the 
fertility of the poor and the wealthy‛ (Alter et al. 2005 p.2). Pre transition, the poor 
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have lower fertility than the rich, yet during the transition, it is the rich who initiate 
fertility control first (also found in Alter 1988 p.194).  
 
Figure 1.4: Fertility Differentials by Occupation, England and Germany 
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Source: England: Wrigley et al. 1997 p.428, Germany: Knodel 1986 p.374.  
 
  This pattern seems to be universal in historical fertility transitions31 
Schneider and Schneider state ‚it is often the least advantaged social groups which 
lag behind in the transition to a smaller family size‛ (1996 p.272). Yet many family 
reconstitution studies miss this effect (or its full strength) because they use 
occupational class as a proxy for socioeconomic status (e.g. the Henry and Wrigley 
et al. studies discussed previously). The results of the EFP suggest that economic 
variables are poor predictors of fertility control. At the same time, many micro level 
studies find socioeconomic lags in the adoption of fertility control. What the 
literature is missing is an individual level study which links demographic data to 
real economic variables, and analyses the socioeconomic status-fertility relationship 
over the period of fertility transition. This thesis will attempt to fill the gap. 
 
Recent Fertility Declines  
Figure 1.1 in section 1.2 charts the fertility transitions outside of the most developed 
countries which have occurred over the past half century. In general, recent fertility 
transitions have been far more rapid than they were in 19th century Europe. Fertility 
                                                
31 See chapter four of this thesis. 
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decline has taken hold in countries whose development is relatively low and the 
process has been accelerated by effective family planning programmes (see Tsui 
2001 for an overview of the empirical evidence). The same simultaneity observed for 
the decline of fertility in Europe has been mirrored in Latin America’s fertility 
transition (Cleland and Wilson 1987 p.20).  At about the same time as the 
publication of the summary volume of the EFP (1986), the final results of the World 
Fertility Survey32 (WFS) were also being disseminated (see Cleland and Wilson 
1985). The key finding for our understanding of fertility transitions from the WFS is 
the ‚failure to identify any divergence in fertility between familial and non-familial 
economic sectors‛ (Cleland and Wilson 1987 p.20). Further, there was no clear cut 
association between female labour force participation and fertility reduction. 
However, there was a significant association between parent’s education and 
fertility control (Cleland and Wilson 1987 p.22).  
 
Section 1.5: This Thesis: A Summary of the Chapters 
 
The legacy of the EFP may justifiably be summarised as one of intellectual 
confusion. However, scholars are increasingly aware that the way forward is to 
examine fertility at the individual level.  To ‘detect’ the socioeconomic correlates of 
the fertility decline data must be collected which contains useful individual level 
economic variables. The primary contribution of this thesis is the construction and 
analysis of two unique individual level databases for transition era England and 
France. Using the value of a person’s estate at death as an indicator of wealth and 
relative social status, fertility life histories are developed and analysed in detail. 
There are no previous studies of the wealth-fertility relationship for either England 
or France during the period of fertility decline. 
 
In chapter 2, I summarise and discuss some of the most influential 
theoretical models of fertility decline. The microeconomic theory of fertility, and in 
                                                
32 The WFS produced comparable data on fertility and family planning for 66 developing countries 
between 1973 and 1984. For more details and a list of the countries studied see 
http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/wfs/.  
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particular the quantity-quality trade off, is focused upon and compared with the 
non-economic ‘innovation diffusion’ hypothesis. Both approaches are found to be 
missing an important element. In order to explain why fertility decline could be 
initiated for rational reasons, yet display ‘contagion’ like patterns, I introduce some 
insights from the evolutionary biology literature on human fertility. Human’s 
strong inclinations to compete socially for relative position are forwarded as a 
potential explanation for the fertility decline and its empirical characteristics.  
 
To detect these patterns, I argue that we must collect and analyse individual 
level data. Chapter 3 serves as the macro backdrop to the individual level analyses 
in the rest of the thesis.  Using newly constructed annual estimates of the index of 
marital fertility, the microeconomic theory of fertility is tested for its implied macro 
level effects. The theory is found wanting and cannot explain why countries at very 
different levels of income per capita experienced close to simultaneous fertility 
transitions. The chapter serves to emphasise the argument that our understanding 
of the fertility decline can only be advanced with the analysis of individual level 
data with real economic variables. 
 
The fertility life history and wealth at death for 3,000 English testators from 
1800-1920 forms the empirical base for chapter 4. Two large and opposing patterns 
are discovered – a positive association of wealth and net fertility and a negative 
association of occupational status and net fertility. My analysis demonstrates that it 
was the poorest members of the top occupational status classes who restricted 
fertility first in England. This suggests that the decline in fertility may have been 
related to a desire to avoid downward social mobility. Through analysing the 
changing relationship between occupational status and wealth, this hypothesis is 
supported. Chapter 4A extends the testator database back to 1500 and finds an 
earlier demographic transition to the one traditionally associated with the 1890s. 
Around 1800, the ‘super-fertility’ of the rich, which was evident from 1500, declines 
to the level of the poor. This suggests that the origins of the fertility transition are 
earlier than we first thought.  
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The population of four rural villages in France from 1750-1850 is the 
foundation for the analysis in chapter 5. The analysis of French fertility is central to 
understanding Europe’s fertility decline. Through linking the demographic data 
from the enquete Henry to wealth at death data from the tables des successions et 
absences, two distinct patterns are discovered. The wealth-fertility relationship was 
strongly positive in the villages were fertility was high and non declining and 
sharply negative in the villages where fertility was declining. Between the two 
demographic regimes, the wealth-fertility relationship had switched. The analysis 
demonstrates that it was the rich, of the decline villages, who restricted their fertility 
first. To explain this pattern, various hypotheses are tested. The hypothesis that a 
change in the environment for social mobility was behind the fertility decline has 
the greatest explanatory power. Through the analysis of inequality and the 
perseverance of wealth within families in the sample, a strong association is found 
between fertility decline and the environment for social mobility. 
 
The final analytical chapter brings together the conclusions of the earlier 
chapters to propose a simple-status fertility model of fertility decline. Using a 
numerical example, it is demonstrated how changes in key variables can initiate a 
fertility transition. At each stage, the empirical evidence from the thesis is used to 
justify the hypothesis. Following this, the new micro data was analysed together to 
test for the implied patterns of the simple status fertility model. The results show 
that declining inequality, as indicated by the model, is strongly related to the 
presence of fertility decline. Chapter 7 is a conclusion to the thesis. 
 
Section 1.6: Conclusion 
 
It is the early 21st century and global fertility is sharply differentiated by the level of 
socioeconomic development. Everyone agrees that this is due to the variation in the 
onset of the demographic transition in the countries of the world. The developed 
World experienced sustained fertility decline over a century ago, roughly coinciding 
with the onset of the Industrial Revolution. However, scholars have failed to 
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empirically isolate the socioeconomic triggers for this revolutionary adaptation. 
Demographic transition theory has been demolished and has left a huge gap to be 
filled. In his summary of the fertility decline literature, Kirk concedes ‚this review 
may leave an impression of chaos‛ (1996 p.379).  
 
The central research question of this thesis is to ask why fertility declined. To 
do this I have constructed two unique datasets that link individual level 
demographic behaviour to estimates of wealth. Previous research, such as that of 
the EFP (discussed earlier in this chapter), has been heavily criticised for pursuing 
aggregate level analyses with poor quality socioeconomic data. Further, individual 
level studies have used occupational class as a proxy for socioeconomic status. I 
argue that using the value of deceased’s estates is a far better measure of economic 
status.  I intend to contribute to the literature on Europe’s fertility transition by 
presenting and analysing individual level data which covers the span of the 
transition and is linked to real economic variables. In addition to this, I will present 
and test my own hypothesis of the likely reasons why fertility declined. I construct a 
simple status-fertility model, inspired by previous theoretical work in economics 
and evolutionary biology, and test it with the new micro data.  
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical framework for the Analysis 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter provides the theoretical background for the thesis33. The Easterlin-
Crimmins organisational schema is introduced and each component of our 
theoretical understanding of the determination of individual fertility is discussed in 
turn. Namely they are the demand for children, the supply of children and the costs 
of fertility regulation. These elements are discussed with reference to chapter 1’s 
‘adaptation’ and ‘innovation diffusion’ categorisation. Finally, selected insights from 
evolutionary biology are included. This literature forms the basis for a simple 
status-fertility model introduced in chapter six. 
 
Section 2.1 Introduction 
 
A useful unifying structure to categorise theoretical models of fertility is that of 
Easterlin and Crimmins (1985). They have developed the traditional method of 
analysing individual fertility behaviour by inserting a ‚proximate determinants‛ 
analysis, through which basic determinants (such as changes in the economic 
structure) affects fertility not directly, but indirectly through these determinants 
(Easterlin and Crimmins 1985 p.13). For example, modernisation does not in itself 
cause fertility to decline, but rather stimulates the use of deliberate fertility control 
which directly causes a reduction in fertility. 
 
Easterlin and Crimmins further develop this analysis by inserting another 
set of variables between basic and proximate determinants, namely the demand and 
supply for children, and the costs of fertility regulation (1985 p.13). Demand is 
defined as ‚the number of surviving children parents would want if fertility 
                                                
33 Issues relating to gender and family systems are relatively underplayed in this thesis, see Mason 
(2001) and McDonald (2000) for an over view of these issues and how they relate to the fertility 
transition. An interesting paper on the changing relationship between female labour force participation 
and fertility in recent years is that of Rindfuss et al. (2003).  
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regulation were costless‛, supply as ‚the number of surviving children a couple 
would have if they made no deliberate attempt to limit family size‛ and costs of 
fertility regulation is seen as the cumulative effect of couples attitudes, the 
disadvantages of many techniques (e.g. abortion) and the economic cost34 (Easterlin 
and Crimmins 1985 p.14).  
 
There are limitations to Easterlin’s approach. Kirk states ‚He, like early 
writers on transition, fails to specify the socio-economic factors that explain 
demand‛ (1996 p.371), a limitation also noted by Hirschman (1994 p.215). Into the 
‘demand’ slot of the Easterlin-Crimmins framework, we can simply insert the 
microeconomic theory of fertility. Into supply we can group together the basic 
biological influences (which may depend partly on culture, for example a taboo on 
intercourse while a mother is nursing). Together, demand and supply determine the 
motivation for fertility regulation. For instance, if demand is less than supply, 
couples will seek to limit their fertility. However, the constraint, the costs of fertility 
regulation (both psychic and economic) is influenced by culture and access to the 
knowledge and means of control may be limited (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985 p.16-
18). Here, we may slot in the ‘innovation diffusion’ arguments for fertility decline. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the intellectual organisation schema of Easterlin and Crimmins. 
 
In this model, we can see how both an ‘adaptation’ and ‘innovation 
diffusion’ process for fertility decline would occur. A sizeable reduction in demand 
holding supply and costs constant, will lead to a reduction in fertility. If you assume 
that a pre-transitional society in this model has an excess of supply, that is demand 
< supply, and holding these constant, a reduction in the costs of fertility regulation 
would directly cause a reduction in fertility. However, the most appealing aspect of 
this model is that the two possible explanations are integrated into a complimentary 
                                                
34 Age at marriage is treated as exogenous in Easterlin and Crimmin’s model. They cite evidence from 
Thailand which suggests that couples do not consider their age at marriage as being linked to their 
ultimate family size (1985 p.19). 
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approach. The relative importance of these variables is a matter for ‚empirical 
determination‛ (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985 p.30)35.  
 
Figure 2.1: The Easterlin-Crimmins Organisational Schema 
 
Source: Easterlin and Crimmins 1985 p.13. 
 
The rest of this chapter is comprised of five sections. Section 2.2 describes in 
detail the microeconomic theory of fertility, and Section 2.3 discusses the supply 
                                                
35 Easterlin and Crimmins find strong support for their model in the empirical data, a micro level 
analysis of Sri Lanka and Colombia (using WFS data) and a macro level analysis of Karnataka and 
Taiwan. 
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side of human fertility. Section 2.4 analyses the costs of fertility regulation and the 
‘innovation diffusion’ hypothesis, while section 2.5 introduces some insights from 
the evolutionary biology literature. Section 2.6 Concludes. 
 
Section 2.2: Demand Theories of Fertility 
 
Gary Becker first formulated the microeconomic theory of fertility in 1960, and he 
along with other scholars, such as Schultz (1981, 1985) have applied the economic 
theory of consumer behaviour to fertility decisions. The individual is viewed as a 
utility maximising agent subject to a budget constraint, and children are viewed as a 
special kind of ‘good’, just like cars, TVs and other consumer goods. Individual 
fertility is as a response to the consumer’s demand for children, relative to other 
goods, and therefore responds to income and the relative price of these goods 
(Easterlin 1975 p.54). 
 
According to Easterlin, this approach has resulted in some valuable 
contributions to our understanding of fertility. Firstly, it is ‚full‛ or ‚potential‛ 
income, which includes both money and time, as opposed to money income alone, 
that has the most relevance in fertility decisions. The implication is that desired 
fertility is not only affected by the income constraint and the cost of children, but 
also by the opportunity cost of parents time (particularly the mother). Further, this 
model has been developed to include formal modelling of the relationship between 
family size and the level of child investment in the form of a ‘trade-off’ between the 
quantity of children demanded and their ‘quality’ (Becker 1960, Mincer 1963, 
Schultz 1981). It is this trade off, the substitution of quality for quantity, which is 
central to the microeconomic explanation for Europe’s fertility decline. 
 
Historically, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests a positive income-
fertility relationship before the 20th century, and Becker cites such examples as Italy 
15th – 16th centuries, and Canada, the United States and Germany in the 18th century 
(1991 p.144). For the town of Nuits in France, Hadeishi not only found a positive 
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correlation between fertility and income (18th century), but also between changes in 
income and changes in fertility (2003 p.489).  Examining wills, Clark finds a positive 
relationship between income and net fertility for 17th century England (2005 p.9). 
Sometime about 1900 the income-fertility relationship appears to have become 
wholly negative, and in modern times the relationship is difficult to clarify. The 
microeconomic theory of fertility suggests that the relative price of children is the 
key to parent’s decisions on family size. Economic growth will exert non-monotonic 
effects on the birth rate, as the relative prices of children and other goods changes 
over time. Figure 2.2 sketches the theorised income fertility relationship over time. 
Early on, we see a strong positive association due to a positive income effect36 on the 
number of children demanded, which turns negative beyond a certain income level 
before flattening out.  
 
Figure 2.2: The Income-Fertility Relationship 
 
Source: Clark 2005a p.9 
                                                
36 Clark gives three reasons for a positive association between fertility and income in the pre-industrial 
world, 1. a minimum consumption level had to be reached before having children, 2. Children needed 
a minimum consumption transfer, 3. Human capital was not productive. (p.7 2005a).  
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At the turning point, income growth starts to have a negative impact on 
fertility. It is theorised that at this point the Substitution effect (Parents substituting 
child quality for quantity) is greater than the income effect. Mechanisms through 
which this happens include increased costs of children, increased returns to human 
capital, and changes in the structure of the economy from agricultural to industrial.  
 
Another important idea in the economic study of fertility is the Easterlin’ 
hypothesis, which assumes that an individual’s taste for goods, services and 
children is formed at an early age, during socialisation in the parental home. (Van 
de Kaa 1996 p.413). If they find it difficult to achieve this standard of living as 
adults, marriage may be delayed and family size reduced 37(Van de Kaa 1996 p.413). 
His empirical analysis found a rise in US relative incomes between 1930 and 1950, 
associated with rising fertility. In this analysis, the relevant variable for fertility is 
relative economic status, not necessarily income (Freedman 1976 p.412). 
 
The Microeconomic Theory of Fertility in Detail 
 
I will now examine the microeconomic theory of fertility in detail. To reconcile the 
apparent contradiction of human behaviour since the fertility transition with respect 
to Darwinian theory, Becker distinguishes between the number of children 
demanded and the expenditure per child. The logic is ‚a reduction in the number of 
children born to a couple can increase the representation of their children in the next 
generation if this enables the couple to invest sufficiently more in the education, 
training and ‚attractiveness‛ of each child to increase markedly their probability of 
survival to reproductive ages and the reproduction of each survivor (Becker 1991 
p.137)38. Increased expenditure per child or increased investment in child ‘quality’ 
can also improve the child’s competitive position in the marriage market. The 
interaction between the quantity of children demanded and their quality (the 
                                                
37 Similarly, if conditions were better than what they expected, they may marry earlier and increase 
family size. 
38 Becker’s italics. 
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amount of expenditure per child) is ‚probably the major contribution of the 
economic analysis of fertility‛ (Becker 1991 p.135). 
 
This section fully describes Becker’s model as I believe that it captures some
fundamental principles of people’s fertility decision making processes. Further, it is 
important to lay down a firm theoretical foundation for the project. As well as 
directly testing for Beckerian patterns in chapter 3, chapter 6 will develop and adjust 
some of the variables in Becker’s model. The approach is to model human fertility 
behaviour just as you would model a firm. Instead of profit maximising, the 
individual agent is utility maximising subject to constraints39. Becker assumes that 
parents will maximise a utility function consisting of the number of children, n, their 
quality, q and a basket of other goods, .,...,1 nZZ  
),...,,,( 1 nZZqnUU   
Combining all other goods into one (because there are no good substitutes for 
children), and ignoring quality (for the time being), the utility function becomes 
),( ZnUU  40 
The budget constraint of each family is  
IZnp zn   
Where I is full income (monetary income and opportunity cost of parent’s time), np  
and z are the costs of production of children and purchasing goods respectively. 
Given I, np  and z  the optimal quantities of n and Z, are where 
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Therefore, the demand for children is conditional upon full income and the relative 
price of children.  
(All of the above derived from Becker 1991 p.137-138). 
 
                                                
39 What follows is entirely derived from Becker 1991 p.137-138. 
40 These utility functions assume no changes in the ages of children and the spacing of births (Becker 
1991 p.138). 
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Factors exogenous to the model drive the decline in fertility at this point. 
Becker argues that rural communities will have higher fertility than urban areas 
because there is a greater potential for children to contribute productively to the 
household, than there is in cities, thereby reducing their net cost and stimulating 
demand. Endogenously, factors that affect the relative cost of children will affect 
fertility levels. For instance, the growth in female earnings potential has been 
accompanied by a large increase in female labour force participation and the decline 
of fertility in the western world over the past 2 centuries. The value of women’s 
time and market place potential has risen thus increasing the opportunity cost of 
having children41 (Becker 1991 p.140).  
 
The principal insight from the economic analysis of fertility however is the 
interaction of child quantity and quality. From the same utility function described 
previously: 
),...,,,( 1 nZZqnUU   
Assuming that all children in a family have the same quality and this quality is fully 
produced within the family from its own time and market goods. The budget 
constraint is    
IZnqp zc   
Where cp = the constant cost of a unit of quality. This is not a linear budget 
constraint, but depends multiplicatively on n and q. Maximising utility subject to 
this constraint gives three equilibrium conditions 
ncn qpMU
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41 At the time of Europe’s fertility transition (late 19th century), female labour force participation was in 
general relatively constant and in some countries was actually decreasing (see Bairoch and Goertz 
1986). 
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n and q  are the shadow prices of quantity and quality. From the above 
conditions, we can see that both shadow prices depend on the cost of a unit of 
quality, cp  and also that the shadow price for quality ( q ) depends on the quantity 
of children (n), as conversely does the shadow price for quantity ( n ) depend on the 
quality of children (q). Maximising utility subject to the budget constraint for the 
equilibrium values, results in the following relationships:  
),,,( Rdn zqnn   
),,,( Rdq zqnq   
),,,( RdZ zqnz   
Where R is full shadow income. Quantity, quality and demand for other goods are 
functions of the shadow prices and income. For example, an increase in the shadow 
price for child quality, would lead to a reduction in the quantity of children 
demanded 
),,,( Rdn zqnn    
Now suppose an exogenous increase in n. 
n  
q   ( qnpc  ) 
q  n  n  q  q < 
This interaction continues until a new equilibrium is found, and is dependant upon 
the elasticity of substitution of n for q in the utility function. If they are close 
substitutes, the interaction outlined above will continue until either n or q were 
negligible. The relationship described by this interaction means that it cannot be 
presumed that quantity and quality are close substitutes (internal equilibrium 
would be impossible otherwise). 
 
Adding a fixed cost per child for all expenditure independent of quality (for 
example time, family planning, risk and discomfort in pregnancy), called nP and 
qP to symbolise expenditures on quality that are independent of quantity (learning 
from parents for example) to the budget constraint: 
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IZnqpqpnp zcqn    
Maximising utility subject to the constraint: 
nnccnn rqpqppMU   )1()(  
qpqqc
c
cqq rnpnq
q
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Where qppr cnn  (the ratio of fixed to variable costs for quantity), 
nppr cqq  (the ratio of fixed to variable costs for quality) and pq1  is the ratio of 
marginal variable costs to average variable costs. Therefore 
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The ratio of the shadow prices of q and n is related to the ratio of q and n themselves, 
the ratio of the fixed to variable costs, and the ratio of marginal to average variable 
costs of quantity and quality. Now, let us illustrate what would happen following a 
rise in the fixed cost of children, nP . 
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The interaction between quantity and quality established in the model indicates that 
even a small rise in the fixed cost of children can induce a strong substitution effect 
from quantity to quality, even if the elasticity of substitution between n and q is not 
large. In Becker’s model, an exogenous decline in infant mortality will raise the 
fixed cost of quantity, lowering the demand for surviving children, and so the 
expected relationship of fertility and infant mortality should be positive. (All of the 
above summarised from Becker 1991 p.135-154). 
 
What are the practical implications of Becker’s theory? At low levels of 
income, income growth will increase both quantity demanded and the quality of 
children. At a certain income threshold, the quality-quantity trade-off effect will 
kick in, and the increased investment in child quality will serve to depress the 
number of children demanded (Winegarden and Wheeler 1992 p.423). This 
generates an ‘inverted U’ shaped relationship between income growth and fertility, 
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consistent (at least in a general way) with the pre-modern positive relationship, and 
today’s negative relationship. A simple econometric model reflecting this structure 
is tested for transition era Europe in chapter 3. 
 
Further tests of Becker’s theory can be pursued by adding other
socioeconomic variables. Table 2.1 summarises the expected correlations already 
mentioned in this section. All of these implied relationships are driven by the 
changing costs of children. 
 
Table 2.1: Expected Relationships from the Economic Theory of Fertility 
Variable 
Expected 
relationship 
Cost of 
Children 
Urbanisation - ↑ 
Population in agriculture + ↓ 
Female labour force participation - ↑ 
Education42 - ↑ 
Infant mortality + ↓ 
(Becker 1991 p.139-144). 
 
The microeconomic theory is perhaps a better specified version of classical 
demographic transition theory. The model is simple and eloquent and has rightfully 
been placed at the centre of fertility analyses by economists. However, as with 
demographic transition theory, there are problems reconciling the theoretical 
expected relationships with the empirical record. As Becker’s theory relies upon 
modernisation to initiate the quality-quantity trade off, how does this model explain 
the earlier decline of fertility in France compared to her more industrialised 
neighbour, England? How does it explain the wild fluctuations in the levels of 
marital fertility and infant mortality reported in figure 1.2? How does it explain the 
close timing of the decline in all the provinces of Europe, which differed 
dramatically in their respective labour forces, income and education? Further, 
fertility decline in many countries in 19th century Europe was accompanied by 
                                                
42 Increases in ‘education’ reflect increases in the costs of children. 
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stagnant and in some cases, declining not rising, female labour force participation43. 
The microeconomic model of fertility cannot answer these questions. The most 
complete empirical test of the quality-quantity trade-off in humans is that of Kaplan 
et al. (1995). Using a sample of over 7,000 men from New Mexico, they find that 
smaller family sizes are indeed correlated with higher offspring education and 
income (1995 p.325). However, this quality-quantity trade-off does not result in a 
higher number of grandchildren for those who have smaller families (1995 p.325). 
 
In the 1970s, Caldwell offered an alternative hypothesis concerning the 
economic causes of the fertility decline. He theorised a reversal in the 
intergenerational flow of wealth. In traditional societies, children can work and 
contribute to family income (for instance by helping out from an early age on the 
family farm). As societies modernise, this net wealth flow reverses and children are 
now a net cost rather than a net benefit (Caldwell 1976 p.344). Large families make 
sense in the traditional era, small families in the modern era. In reality however, 
Caldwell’s model is ‚fundamentally a cultural model, not an economic one‛ (Alter 
1992 p.24). His definition of wealth includes the satisfaction men receive from the 
deference of their children and his empirical work stresses the importance of 
changing attitudes to education (Alter 1992 p.25). As pointed out by Kirk, the most 
economically rational behaviour in the modern era in Caldwell’s model is to be 
childless (1996 p.372). The model itself remains empirically unproven (Kirk 1996 
p.372, Hirschman 1994 p.214). Kaplan, following his empirical test of Caldwell’s 
theory stated ‚under most conditions, humans, like all other known organisms, 
invest in, rather than exploit, their offspring‛ (1994 p.785) 
 
 In chapter 6, I use the foundation of the microeconomic theory of fertility to 
model a neglected aspect of our theorising of Europe’s fertility transition, that of 
relative status, social mobility and economic inequality. I will describe my 
motivation for these ideas after first describing the supply of fertility. 
                                                
43 For instance France, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark (Bairoch and Goertz 1986). Further, Alter argues 
that it is not the cost of children which is rising but parents’ ‚definition of appropriate childrearing‛, in 
other words a change in their subjective preferences and not the economic environment (1992 p.16).  
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Section 2.3: Supply Theories of Fertility 
 
The supply of fertility can be thought of as all the biological and institutional
constraints on the number of potential children. To illustrate why this is important 
in understanding why fertility declined, let us discuss ‘natural fertility’. The number 
of live births in a population which practices no form of birth limitation is known as 
‚natural fertility‛44. However, its variation is not purely biological as many cultures 
differ in their customs of intercourse, abstinence and breastfeeding. The birth 
interval and the length of the reproductive span are the main determinants of 
natural fertility, which can be broken down to underlying factors such as 
postpartum infecundability, the waiting time to conception, intrauterine mortality, 
permanent sterility and age of entry into the reproductive span45 (Bulato and Lee 
1983 p.4). Figure 2.3 shows how modernisation can increase the supply of children. 
 
Figure 2.3: Modernisation, Potential Fertility and Actual Fertility46 
 
Where: P = biological reproductive potential, N = ‘natural fertility’, B = actual 
fertility and R = N-B (averted/unwanted births). 
Source: Easterlin and Crimmins 1985 p.7. 
                                                
44 Henry defined natural fertility (1953) as ‚the fertility of a human population that makes no deliberate 
effort to limit births‛ (Bulato and Lee 1983 P.3) 
45 The first three relate to the birth interval, the last two refer to the length of the reproductive span 
46 Source: ‚Schematic representation of the Fertility Revolution‛ (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985 p.7) 
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As time or modernisation increases, the supply of fertility increases as see by 
the jump in ‘N’ in figure 2.3. Better nutrition and medical knowledge are examples 
of how modernisation can increase natural fertility. Figure 2.3 illustrates how actual 
fertility can initially rise in direct response to modernisation’s positive influence
on natural fertility. Dyson and Murphy find strong evidence for this pattern in 
almost all fertility transitions, a significant rise before a sustained fertility decline. 
Examining fI , the Princeton projects measure of overall fertility, Dyson and 
Murphy state ‚ fI  was generally rising before about 1880 or 1890; the years around 
which declines set in‛ (Dyson and Murphy 1985 p.401). Examining a wide global 
database, they observe that ‚virtually all series indicate that fertility rises, frequently 
to unprecedented levels, before it begins its long term decline‛. Further, ‚available 
series strongly suggest that the origins of fertility transition are located prior to the 
pronounced peak that typically precedes a sustained period of fertility decline‛ 
(Dyson and Murphy 1985 p.420). Such analysis provides justification for modelling 
fertility over a long period, both pre and post decline, as opposed to only 
identifying the onset of decline.  
 
Section 2.4: Diffusion Effects  
 
The costs of fertility regulation 
The apparent dismissal of an association between fertility decline and 
socioeconomic measures by the EFP, discussed in chapter one, has led many 
researchers to argue that fertility decline is the result of the diffusion of new birth 
control techniques and/or ideational change. Cleland and Wilson, for instance, 
argue against the assumption that reduced parental demand for children is the main 
cause of fertility decline.  They attribute fertility transition to ideational forces, and 
argue strongly against an economic interpretation. They argue that the absence of 
birth control in pre decline populations does not necessarily mean that children 
generated a high economic value for their parents. Many of these children were 
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unwanted47 . Further, they point out that fertility decline had a higher correlation 
with social variables such as literacy and culture, than with any economic variable, 
and the speed of transition from high to low fertility reflects the diffusion of new 
ideas. In their view, Pre-transitional European populations did not exercise 
conscious control over their fertility. They see the demographic transition as 
occurring in 2 phases, the first induced by the introduction and diffusion of birth 
control which enables the elimination of excess fertility, and following this ‚a 
second phase in which a complex and poorly understood set of factors determine 
the level of controlled fertility‛ (Cleland and Wilson 1987 p. 21-30). Potts argues that 
unconstrained access to fertility-regulation technologies is the primary factor 
responsible for fertility decline (1997 p.10). He states: 
‚For as long as people did not have access to the means to control their fertility, they 
behaved as other animals, with the biologically most successful leaving most 
descendants‛ (Potts 1997 p.6).  
 
The argument is that people have always wanted to control their family size 
but have not always been aware of how to achieve this goal. The fertility transition 
begins when some population sub-groups ‘discover’ an effective method of fertility 
regulation. Potts proposes: ‚because the wealthy are more likely to be successful 
than the poor in obtaining contraception, there is a negative relationship between 
income and fertility‛ (Potts 1997 p.18). The relationship of aggregate and individual 
level fertility to economic change is therefore ambiguous. Potts paper argues 
strongly that unrestricted access to fertility regulation technologies is the key factor 
in fertility decline. Subsidising contraception for the poor is his primary policy 
recommendation (1997). 
 
The EFP placed much of its focus in explaining the onset of fertility decline, 
as signified by a sustained reduction of 10% in marital fertility. Knodel and van de 
Walle (1979) and Cleland and Wilson (1987) argue that the association of this timing 
                                                
47 However, parents in Africa frequently desire large number of surviving children, a difficulty for a 
pure birth control diffusion argument (and recognised as such by Cleland and Wilson) (Mason 1997 
p.445, Bledsoe 1994 p.107). Bledsoe argues that women in the Gambia are eagerly adopting Western 
contraceptives, not to reduce fertility, but to control the timing and circumstances of births (Bledsoe 
1994 p.129). 
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and socioeconomic changes is less than its association with cultural and 
geographical variables. However, this does not mean that economic and structural 
changes played no part as the underlying cause of the fertility decline in the first 
place, only that some results indicate that the timing of the decline is more correlated 
with cultural measures. Burch states ‚modernisation, industrialisation, 
urbanisation—the central variables of classic transition theory—eventually and 
unfailingly have been followed by low fertility (1995 p.15). If we take a 1000 year 
perspective, relatively minor deviations in the onset of the transition would not alter 
the justifiable argument that the fertility transition must have some relation to the 
economic upheaval in our world over the past two centuries. 
 
Becker argues strongly against the  ‘innovation diffusion’ argument for 
fertility decline, pointing out that small changes in marriage patterns, reducing the 
frequency of sex, extending breastfeeding and implementing simple birth control 
techniques48 can result in significant decreases in fertility49 (1991 p.142). In other 
words, he is suggesting that the technology to limit births has always been there. 
Notestein would agree; ‚It does not follow that contraception can be viewed as the 
cause of the declining birth rate in any profound sense. Relatively effective methods 
of contraception were widely known for centuries before they were generally used‛ 
(1945 p.40). The fertility decline is a function of demand, not technology. The 
development of contraceptive technology such as the diaphragm and the pill are an 
‚induced response to other decreases in the demand for children rather than an 
important cause of the decreased demand‛ (Becker 1991 p.143).  
 
Proponents of the ‘innovation diffusion’ argument often seek to downplay 
the role of economic variables in the determination of fertility decline. On the other 
side, many economist do the opposite, insisting that the demand for children is 
primary. Some argue that the ‘innovation diffusion’ hypothesis and the adaptation 
                                                
48 Such as Coitius interruptis. 
49 Becker estimates that delaying marriage by three years, reducing the frequency of coition by 10%, 
extending breast feeding by three months would reduce fertility by nearly 25% (1991 p.142). 
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hypothesis are two elements of a complimentary explanation of the demographic 
transition, as opposed to being competing theories (Guinnane et al. 1994 p.1). 
 
The third component of Eastern and Crimmins framework is the ‘costs of 
fertility regulation’. Fertility regulation includes contraception, induced abortion 
and infanticide. Its costs include not only monetary cost but also costs relating to
time, information, ‘psychic costs’ such as embarrassment and guilt and also the fear 
of breaking social norms and morals (Bulato and Lee 1983 p.7). Here, there is a 
perfect space to include the ‘innovation diffusion’ hypothesis via the spread of 
knowledge concerning birth control technology. If we assume that parents in pre-
Transitional societies are unaware of any technology to limit births, the discovery of 
this technology will bring fertility decisions within ‚the calculus of conscious 
choice‛, as Ansley Coale would put it (Alter 1992 p.19).  
 
However, in order for fertility to decline there must be a motivation for 
doing so. Birth control technology is a method, not a reason. Further, the technology 
employed in Europe’s fertility revolution was not new. Coitus interuptus, or 
‘withdrawal’ was the principal way that European’s controlled their family size (Lee 
2003 p.174). This technology has always been available to parents50. So how much of 
an ‘innovation’ was this? What exactly was diffusing? 
 
A central empirical pillar of the ‘innovation diffusion’ hypothesis is the close 
association of fertility decline along linguistic and cultural lines, one of the results of 
the EFP (discussed in chapter one). As Alter summarises: 
 
‚Fertility patterns in nineteenth century Europe followed the language and dialect 
boundaries established centuries earlier‛ (1992 p.21). 
 
Thus it is fair to say that fertility decline seems to have a higher association with 
these cultural delineations than it those with any socioeconomic variable. The speed 
of the fertility decline within these linguistic or cultural groups suggest that 
                                                
50 It is mentioned in the old testament as the ‚sin of Onan‛, Genesis 38:9. 
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individual fertility decisions are interdependent. It appears that individuals choose 
their fertility not in isolation but relative to their reference group. Once a certain 
number of this group adopt a smaller family size ‘norm’, all other members are 
bound to imitate.  
Figure 2.4: Individual and Group Fertility 
 
 
Figure 2.4 is a simple visual representation of the fertility choices of 
individuals as a function of ‘group’ fertility51. Allowing for individual preferences 
(represented by ), members will choose a level of fertility such that  
Individual/couple fertility=  (Group fertility) 
This simple and reasonable hypothesis can explain why fertility decline is more 
associated with cultural and linguistic delineations than socioeconomic variables. 
However, it does not explain why fertility declined in the first place.  
 
Richards has raised the question of whether we can assume ‚structural 
stability‛ in statistical models of fertility, that is if we can assume that the same 
process which accounts for cross sectional variation can account for changes over 
                                                
51 Kohler (2001) models individual fertility choice as a function of aggregate fertility. Bongaarts and 
Watkins (1996) and Newsom et al. (2005) also analyse the role of social interactions in fertility 
transitions. 
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time as well (1983 p. 696). If the view is taken that the fertility levels for individual 
countries are the result of a long historical process, resulting from levels of natural 
fertility and supply of children amongst other factors, the path of variation of  
fertility and socioeconomic measures within a country over time should not be 
expected to be the same between countries. Unfortunately, Richards claims ‚there is 
no theory for aggregate fertility time series that is distinguishable from propositions 
concerning cross-sectional differentials‛ (1983 p.720). 
 The idea that cross sectional variation in the onset of fertility decline can lead 
to confusion over the time trend causal forces is explained concisely by Burch: 
 
‛For example, in early post-war U.S fertility surveys, it was discovered that one of 
the largest individual fertility differentials was by religion. In terms of averages and 
net of multiple controls, Catholics tended to have roughly four children, Non-
Catholics roughly three. In regression analyses, religious denomination explained 
the most variance in completed or predicted fertility. Can we say therefore that 
religion was the most important determinant of fertility or of catholic fertility? 
Certainly not. The most important determinants of fertility were those factors that 
caused both Catholics and Non-Catholics to have only moderate fertility—three or 
four children versus eight or nine or even more of which they were capable. These 
common causal factors, shared by Catholics and non-Catholics alike, included such 
facts as common residence in a modern, urban, industrial, democratic, open society, 
with a somewhat secularized culture and with ready access to information and 
means of birth control. These factors explain why Catholics had only four children; 
Catholicism presumably explained why they had slightly more than other 
Americans. Factors that account for a difference of five or more children on average 
surely can be said to be more important than those which explain a difference of one 
child on average‛52 (Birch 1995 p.16). 
 
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the argument behind Burch’s example. At every point 
in time, Catholics have higher fertility than Protestants. Yet over time, fertility is 
declining for both.  Cross sectional regressions will always find a highly significant 
religious differential, represented by CS , but the source of the decline may not be 
religion but a joint environmental factor for both groups, which causes the common 
                                                
52 The same is true for Germany, Knodel writes: 
‚Essentially at any time between unification and the 1930s differences in the level of fertility of the 
three major religious groups were evident wherever data were available. Jews had the lowest fertility, 
Catholics the highest, and the Protestants occupied an intermediate position<Eventually, however, 
the fertility of all three religious groups declined substantially‛ (1974 p.253). 
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time trend, T .In Europe’s provinces, fertility decline was clearly stratified by 
linguistic groups (as discussed in chapter 1). The EFP emphasised these cultural 
correlations in with fertility. Yet, as Alter notes, ‚all of Europe’s linguistic regions 
ultimately underwent a demographic transition,‛ (1992 p.21). In Europe, linguistic 
heritage was a source of differences in the timing of the decline; it does not tell us 
why fertility declined for every linguistic group eventually. 
 
Figure 2.5: Burch’s Critique of the Innovation/Diffusion Hypothesis 
 
 
The micro economic model of fertility assumes that preferences are 
completely independent. However, the empirical character of Europe’s fertility 
decline seems to indicate non-economic forces at work. The next section introduces 
some insights from evolutionary biology, in order to make sense of this apparent 
paradox. 
  
Section 2.5: Evolutionary insights 
 
Within the field of Evolutionary Biology, there is also active debate on the European 
fertility transition (see for instance Mace 2000, Kaplan et al. 1995, Kaplan and 
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Lancaster 2003, Newsom et al. 2005). Economic interpretations are taken into 
account, but there is more emphasis on the supply side of fertility decisions. The 
puzzle here is, given that ‚humans<have been designed by natural selection to 
strive to maximise their genetic representation in future generations‛, why have the 
richest and most advanced populations of the World reduced their fertility? (Turke 
1989 p.62) Evolutionary explanations of human fertility have generally faced a 
similar lack of success in explaining the empirical record as economic explanations 
(Kaplan et al. 1995 p.326).  
 
Evolutionary explanations for Europe’s fertility decline have traditionally 
focused on the quantity-quality trade-off (first proposed for clutch size by Lack), 
and this has ‚structured most subsequent thinking in life history analysis, including 
work on humans‛53 (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998 p.266). Turke’s theory of fertility 
decline is remarkably similar to the traditional economic explanation, focusing on 
the changing costs of children. However, Turke includes the idea of relative fertility 
as being a causal factor for fertility decline and his ideas will be discussed later in 
this section (1989 p.64). The fertility transition and ‚the fact that people in an 
increasing number of societies worldwide voluntarily reproduce at lower levels 
than would apparently maximise their lifetime reproduction poses a major 
challenge to evolutionary anthropologists‛ (Borgerhoff Mulder 1998 p.266).  
 
 Other scholars in this field take a different view (just as in economics and 
sociology), that the decline of fertility had more to do with culture and the 
availability of effective contraception than socioeconomic factors. Potts (1997) 
questions the assumption that people make rational choice in relation to family size, 
citing three biological assumptions; (1) humans are genetically predisposed to seek 
sexual relations, (2) to cherish and support their children when they arrive and (3) to 
be socially and sexually competitive. Therefore, ‚For as long as people did not have 
access to the means to control their fertility54, they behaved as other animals, with 
                                                
53 There is also the argument that low fertility is a ‚maladaptive‛ outcome (Mace 200 p.386). 
54 This analysis ignores the presence of birth control techniques in pre-modern populations, such as 
abstinence and even more importantly the European Marriage Pattern. 
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the biologically most successful leaving most descendants‛. Potts argues that 
unconstrained access to fertility-regulation technologies is the primary factor 
responsible for fertility decline (1997 p.5-10). 
 
Kaplan and Lancaster state that there are two tradeoffs affecting natural 
selection on fertility. Firstly, there is a trade off between present and future 
reproduction. Most organisms have a juvenile stage in which fertility is zero, and 
energy is focused towards growth. The second trade-off is between quantity and 
quality of offspring. These trade-offs are expected to result in the maximisation of 
fitness and of long term descendants55 (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.172). In this 
analysis, there are four factors which affect fertility, the timing of reproduction and 
parental investment: (1) The resources used in the reproduction process (and their 
production processes), (2) Mortality (risks and technology of reduction), (3) The 
complimentarily between the sexes in reproduction and (4) Variation in resource 
production (among and within individuals). Because of ecological variability 
throughout history, humans have evolved to deal systematically with variations in 
these four factors, resulting in ‚radical shifts in parenting and mating practices‛ 
(Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.175-9). 
 
Kaplan and Lancaster discuss the variation and development of these four 
factors through the long run of human history. For hunter gatherers, monogamy 
was optimal because the sexes could specialise in either hunting or gathering. In 
horticultural societies, there is a high frequency of polygynous marriages, due to 
high male mortality56 and made possible by the ability of women to support 
themselves and their children through their own labour. Fertility is higher here, 
mainly due to the reduction in infant mortality. The domestication of animals had a 
‚profound‛ effect upon human social relations, nuptiality and child investment. 
Kaplan and Lancaster state, ‚For the first time in history, men could control a form 
of extra-somatic wealth that could be held by individuals, thus increasing the 
                                                
55 Becker uses the same reasoning to reconcile low fertility with Darwinian selection (1991 p.137). 
56 Through ‚chronic intergroup warfare and raiding increases‛ as society develops from hunter 
gatherer to horticultural (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.188). 
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variance in male quality based on the resources each could control‛ (Kaplan and 
Lancaster 2003 p.190). With herds forming the basis of the new economy, economic 
conflict increases, and this places ‚a high premium on males as defenders and 
raiders‛ (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.190). Polygamy is dominant, with wars, 
feuds, social stratification, male alliances, and ‚a geographic flow of women from 
the subordinate to the dominant groups via bride capture‛ (Kaplan and Lancaster 
2003 p.190). A male’s ability to attract wives and his reproductive success depend 
now upon his extra-somatic wealth, his ability (and that of his family) to make 
‚bride wealth‛ payment. Families will both make and receive these payments on 
behalf of their daughters. It is at this point in human history, where a crucial key to 
understanding fertility behaviour, first becomes apparent. Kaplan and Lancaster 
write: 
 
‚Most significantly, there is suggestive evidence that for the first time humans 
began to reproduce at levels that may not maximise the number of descendents with 
the appearance of extra-somatic wealth and its inheritance. Men appear to marry 
fewer wives than they could afford in the interests of providing each child with a 
greater endowment. In other words, male pastoralists may pit quality against 
quantity of children to preserve a lineage status and resource base rather than 
simply maximising the number of descendents‛57  
(Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.192). 
 
The onset of civilisation enabled fertility to increase through the increased 
reliability of food resources, where mortality continued to decreases the stock of 
young males. Kaplan and Lancaster point to historical evidence for the size of 
despotic male’s harems, which varied with socioeconomic status in the Indian, 
Chinese, Inca and Aztec civilisations (2003 p.194). As well as near universal 
marriage for women, the wide variance in resource endowment meant that a 
significant number of men had no access to the marriage market. This leads to 
competition between females for the limited number of quality husbands, and the 
development of customs such as the payment of dowries and assurances of virginity 
and chastity (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.195). Parents will adjust their investment 
in children in order to maximise their access to the marriage market, but also, in 
                                                
57 Kaplan and Lancaster cite Borgerhoff Mulder (2000) and Mace (2000) for this view. 
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some circumstance, balance this with the possible child labour contributions to the 
household (particularly in rural areas).  
 
Population growth and the increases saturation of productive lands lead 
parents to adopt reproductive strategies which help to sustain the concentration of 
wealth. Potential heirs are reduced through monogamy, abandonment, preference 
for boys over girls and preference based on birth order58 (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 
p.197). With these provisions, the wealthy raise as much children as they can, but 
only a predetermined few inherit the majority of the wealth. Kaplan and Lancaster 
state ‚during this period, there is a strong correlation between wealth, probability of 
marriage< and completed fertility‛59 (2003 p.197). The transition to low fertility 
begins when the income-fertility relationship goes from positive to negative, and 
finally to no relationship at all. According to Kaplan and Lancaster (2003 p.202) the 
reason for lower fertility amongst the wealthy first, is due to infant mortality being 
lower and returns to investment in education  larger, earlier than they are for the 
poor. Eventually, all of society experiences significant decline in infant mortality 
and there is an increased demand for skilled workers, thereby resulting in equal 
fertility between economic strata. The gradual decrease in fertility as evident from 
national aggregates of fertility rates may then represent an increasing proportion of 
the population who have low fertility preferences. To sum up their argument, it is 
the presence of extra-somatic wealth which causes the deviation in human fertility 
behaviour away from the 2 influences of natural selection stated at the outset. 
Modern fertility rates, some below replacement (many parts of Western and Eastern 
Europe) may be a reflection of ‚the extreme importance of extra-somatic wealth‛ 
(Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.207).  
 
Turke also contributes the angle of evolution to our understanding of the 
changing demand for children, and argues that ‚humans, like other organisms, have 
been designed by natural selection to strive to maximize their genetic representation 
                                                
58 Marriage and childbirth are no longer near universal for women also (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 
p.197). 
59 Kaplan and Lancaster cite Voland (2000) for this. 
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in future generations‛ (1989 p.62). Humans ‚rely extensively on learning‛ and it has 
been social competition which has driven its development, with human behaviour 
continuing ‚to centre around social competition‛ (Turke 1989 p.63).  
Turke builds an evolutionary theory of fertility from the staring point that 
the human mind has evolved to ‚facilitate individual reproduction‛, which leads to 
hypotheses concerning resource flows, kinship and individual goals (1989 p.64). 
Assuming demand for children is mainly determined by the extent of kin support60, 
Turke’s model can be summarised as follows: 
 
1.Humans have evolved to strive for economic and social success.  
Simple maximisation does not occur in the human species because of the problem of 
providing for children and the impact on parents social and economic potential. 
Turke argues that the desire for children is ‚weak‛ in humans, and conception is 
primarily the result of strong desires for copulation. Humans have adapted to use 
planning and foresight in the pursuit of economic and social success, and will 
‚nearly always take steps that increase their and their children’s‛ relative position 
(1989 p.66). 
2. In traditional societies, the costs of children are spread amongst an extended kin. 
Kinship networks are important for fertility analysis in traditional societies because 
the burden and cost of child rearing can be spread out amongst the extended family. 
It is optimal for many members, from an evolutionary angle, to be involved in the 
upbringing of children, even if they are not their own. For instance, a parent who 
successfully rears a child perpetuates ½ of his/her genes while an aunt who raises a 
niece perpetuates ¼. For post menopausal women, the successful rearing of grand 
children is the genetic survival of 1/8 of her genes. This reasoning leads to the 
hypothesis that ‚the net flow of resources and services should be from individuals 
of low direct reproductive value to close relative of high direct reproductive value‛ 
(Turke 1989 p.67). 
                                                
60 A direct contradiction of Caldwell’s intergenerational wealth flow theory (1976), which states that the 
flow is from children to parents in traditional systems.   
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3. Modernisation results in more opportunity for economic and social  success, 
breaking down the traditional kinship networks 
Modernisation via economic growth alters the traditional system and kinship 
networks breakdown, due to factors such as increased economic opportunities and 
growth of the state amongst others (Turke 1989 p.67). Modern couples not only lack 
the support of an extended kin, they also lack kin encouragement for higher fertility – 
the high levels of exposure to non-relatives in modern societies is a very recent 
environmental change (on an evolutionary timescale)61 (Mace 2000 p.386).  
4. This breakdown means that the cost of a child is concentrated on the parents62 
The opportunity cost in raising children is now greater that it was under the 
traditional system. Shortages of babysitters and teachers are likely to arise, but 
parents are also freed from kinship obligations (Turke 1989 p.71). 
5. Once some parents concentrate resources on small numbers of children, other 
parents must do the same if there offspring are to be socially competitive 
Individuals who have fewer children are able to concentrate more resources on each 
child (and themselves). This extra investment increases both the parent’s and the 
child’s social and economic success. Other parents are compelled to restrain their 
fertility in order so they and their children can be socially and economically 
competitive (Turke p.71). 
Turke finds support for parts of his theory from his research on the Ifaluk 
people of Micronesia (1989 p.73). Element 1 to 4 of Turke’s theory is almost identical 
                                                
61
 Newsom et al. discuss this change in the frequency of communication with kin and its relationship 
with fertility decline explicitly (2005). 
62 Turke's theory puts a different interpretation on ‘wealth’. Pointing to the observed negative income-
fertility relationship evident from cross national analysis today, he states that a contradiction with 
evolutionary theory is only correct if you assume ‚that women in modern societies have more 
resources for reproduction‛ (1989 p.83). They do not, according to Turke, because of the absence of the 
extended kin system, educational demands and the desire to consume many luxury goods, the latter 
two essential to their children’s and their own economic and social success. (Turke 1989 p.83). 
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to the microeconomic theory of fertility. The development comes with element 5, the 
relative fertility status of a couple63.  
 
The term ‘diffusion’ as used in the fertility transition literature, generally 
refers to the diffusion of birth control technology, and can affect overall fertility by 
reducing the costs of fertility regulation, by increasing information and social 
acceptance of new or little known techniques. However, a process of diffusion can 
act in another way, in the form of a ‘trend’. This distinction is not made explicit in 
the literature, but I believe it adds another dimension to our understanding of the 
determinants of aggregate fertility. Traditional economic theory on fertility, as 
outlined previously, assumes socially isolated couples. Insight and theory from 
evolutionary biology and anthropology can provide structure to the view that a 
couple’s fertility is not only determined by supply and demand, but also by the 
fertility behaviour of the community, social group and ‘trendsetters’ (i.e. the 
wealthy). Where the wealthy class reduce their fertility (for their own socioeconomic 
reasons64), a ‘low fertility wave’ can be generated, spreading down the social strata, 
inducing parents to reduce their fertility so that they can increase child quality, and 
thereby ensuring that their children will be socially and economically competitive65. 
The wave can be self contained if the size of the wealthy class is very small (such as 
in ancient Rome, where Caldwell documented a fertility decline amongst the elites 
(2004)), and there exists a large degree of economic inequality between the various 
subsections of the society. Similarly, such a theory would propose that fertility 
decline would be more rapid where income inequality is more even, and aspirations 
are growing. Crucially, such a viewpoint can explain how aggregate fertility can 
decline, for socioeconomic reasons (via a child quantity-quantity trade-off) in the 
absence of any significant changes in the level of real wages or modernisation, but 
perhaps alongside a changing environment for social mobility between subsections 
of the population.  
                                                
63 The traditional economic model for the demand for children assumes isolated couples. 
64 By substituting quality for quantity, to ‚sustain the concentration of wealth‛ (Kaplan and Lancaster 
2003 p.147). 
65 As set out in element 5 of Turke’s theory. 
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To illustrate this idea lets take a hypothetical three couple ‘community’: 
Couple 1: wealthy, with income *Y , and fertility 1F  
Couple 2: poor, with incomeY , and fertility 2F  
Couple 3: poor, with incomeY , and fertility 3F  
Where YY *  
As their income rises and reaches a certain threshold point, couple 1 substitute child 
quality for quantity, consistent with economic and evolutionary theory. 
 1* FY  
Supposing Y  is held constant, what happens to the fertility rates of couples 2 and 3? 
Economic theory: The level of fertility depends on full income and the relative costs 
of children. With no change in either of these, there is no change in fertility. 
Evolutionary theory: Parents will adjust their fertility to enhance their children’s 
social and economic competitiveness: 
 321 FFF  
The process by which this happens will resemble ‘innovation diffusion’, and 
would happen rapidly in this small setting. For larger communities, the speed of 
diffusion would depend on informational constraints, where increasing 
urbanisation, for example, would serve to depress fertility. We would expect this 
diffusion trend to operate along social strata, as parents will focus on ensuring their 
children are socially competitive within their immediate social group, and also, 
perhaps, the social group which they aspire to join (or have their children join). 
Further, this effect would be expected to operate along linguistic and cultural lines, 
as the historical experience of Europe suggests66. The environment for social 
mobility will affect the fertility rate through this social competition dynamic. As the 
possibilities for upward (an of course downward) social mobility are a function of 
the underlying level of economic inequality in a society, changes in inequality 
themselves can influence the birth rate.  
 
                                                
66 Leasure (1963) discovered a remarkable similarity between the linguistic and fertility map of Spain, 
as did Knodel with Germany (1978). 
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Section 2.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has used the Easterlin-Crimmins framework to organise the many 
different and competing theories of Europe’s fertility decline into appropriate 
intellectual categories. Following this, brief but detailed analyses of the theoretical 
foundations behind the demand and supply of children, and the costs of fertility 
regulation were conducted. Throughout, the underlying theory was cross 
referenced with the empirical findings so that the reader could be aware of each 
theories weak spots. The principal weak point of the microeconomic theory of 
fertility, as with demographic transition theory, is the unfortunate fact that the 
historical record does not support it. The historical record points to a non-economic, 
or ‘innovation diffusion’ hypothesis for Europe’s fertility decline. However, these 
ideas do not offer us a reasonable reason for why fertility declined in the first place.  
 
However, linking the microeconomic model of fertility to evolutionary 
arguments concerning human’s preoccupation with social competition provides 
hope for understanding. Following a brief discussion and example, I argued that 
fertility could decline in the absence of great change in the level of ‘modernisation’, 
with ‘innovation diffusion’ like characteristics. The reason for this is human’s 
preoccupation with relative socioeconomic position. The simple hypothetical 
example served to illustrate the intuition behind the idea, but in the real world, 
society is stratified along linguistic, cultural and economic strata. A change in the 
environment for social mobility, as indicated by measures of the level of economic 
inequality may induce fertility responses in population subgroups. I pursue these 
theoretical ideas further in chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3 – Is Economic Growth Correlated with the Onset of the Fertility 
Transition in Europe? 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter uses newly constructed estimates of the index of marital fertility to re-
date the year fertility declined in ten European countries. Econometric structural 
break tests are applied to time series data, providing a novel and endogenous 
method to detect the onset of a new demographic regime. The new estimates are in 
every case earlier than the original European Fertility Project estimates. However, 
these results do not point to any socioeconomic threshold for fertility transition. The 
levels of socioeconomic development, along with levels of infant mortality vary 
widely at the onset of the fertility transition in Europe. Following this, the data is 
tested for the presence of an ‘inverted U’ income fertility pattern, as predicted by the 
microeconomic theory of fertility. The ‘turning-point’ level of income per capita was 
rarely statistically significant. Where it was, the negative effect of income on fertility 
kicks in after the onset of fertility decline. 
 
Section 3.1: Introduction 
 
The decline in European fertility rates during the last half of the 19th century was an 
unprecedented and revolutionary break from the past. This new pattern of 
behaviour allowed economic growth to be transformed into sustainable growth in 
income per person and allowed European populations to escape the ‘Malthusian 
Trap’, where income growth was always brought back to subsistence levels via the 
expansion of population. This monumental transition followed the Industrialisation 
Revolution in most countries and preceded it in others. Our current knowledge on 
the exact processes involved in the initiation of fertility decline allows us to make 
the following generalisations: Fertility was driven downwards via control of fertility 
within marriage, and once this process began, it was irreversible (Watkins 1986 
p.431). As chapter one described, the decline was concentrated in time but not in 
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space – 59% of Europe’s provinces experienced the beginnings of their fertility 
transition almost simultaneously (Knodel and van de Walle 1979 p.394).  
 
As a precursor to the disaggregated individual level analyses in later 
chapters, this chapter will provide a thorough description of the demographic, 
economic and structural characteristics of Europe’s fertility decline at the macro 
level. The analysis will proceed in two major analytical sections. Section 3.3 will 
examine the onset of decline via new annual estimates of marital fertility. 
Econometric Structural break tests will be employed to date the decline and the 
socioeconomic characteristics at this year will be summarised. This information will 
form the basis for an empirical critique of demographic transition theory. Section 3.5 
will test the marital fertility, infant mortality and income series for the presence of a 
Beckerian ‘inverted U’ relationship between Income growth and fertility change.  
 
The trend in historical demography over the past 50 years has been one of 
disaggregation, with researchers testing economic and demographic relations via 
individual level data. However, the conclusions to the European Fertility Project 
(EFP) emphasised the simultaneity of the decline, which prompts research to begin 
at the macro level. Further, a researcher who began at the micro level could 
conclude that fertility declined in his painfully reconstituted village sample because 
of specific factors such as, say, the local factory closing. Another researcher could 
find that in his village fertility declined because the local market for female labour 
increased its demand, while another could find that the most important factor was 
the changing influence of religious adherence. The point is that multiple researchers 
examining multiple localities might find multiple location specific explanations for 
fertility decline. What we already know is however, at the aggregate level, these 
declines took place at pretty much the same point in time67. This suggests that we 
must first examine the macro level climate before disaggregating to the individual 
level. The policy implications of historical demographic studies are mainly 
discussed at the macro level. This fact is increasingly being recognised by 
                                                
67 This is a summary of an observation conveyed by George Alter at a seminar at the University of 
Michigan, August 2006. 
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researchers, and recently there have been a number of aggregate level investigations 
into the determinants of the fertility rate. McNown and Ridao-Cano state: ‚Since 
this debate [economic v. attitudinal explanations for fertility decline] concerns 
trends and patterns in fertility behaviour at the societal level, aggregate time series 
analysis is appropriate‛ (2005 p.521). 
 
The EFP has been heavily criticized by many authors (in particular Brown 
and Guinnane (2003). Chapter one summarised the EFP studies and detailed the 
EFP authors’ stated concerns. Galloway et al. provide a neat summary of the reasons 
why the conclusions of the EFP are questioned; 
 
The EFP’s ‚inability to test existing theory adequately for a variety of reasons, 
including excessively large units of analyses, lack of useful socio-economic 
measures (for example, direct measures of income have rarely been used), coarsely 
defined independent variables, insufficient sample size, inadequate method and 
improperly specified models. Indeed, because of these problems important elements 
of fertility transition theory have not yet been adequately tested for Europe.‛ 
(1994 p.135). 
 
The European Fertility Project (EFP), discussed in detail in chapter one, was 
the largest empirical project on Europe’s demographic transition. The results of the 
EFP led to the abandonment of demographic transition theory as the consensus 
explanatory hypothesis of Europe’s fertility decline. Simultaneous with this 
rejection by demographers, economists have modelled the micro level determinants 
of family size. Gary Becker’s work in this regard (1960, 1991) has been hugely 
influential (and is detailed in chapter two). Despite the wholesale acceptance of 
Becker’s model within mainstream economics, the central empirical predictions of 
his model have rarely been tested.  In a paper reporting the early stages of the 
fertility transition in Kenya, Robinson firmly queries Becker’s model. He states ‚this 
proposition has not been proven, only asserted often enough to gain a certain 
credibility and force through repetition‛ (Robinson 1992 p.453). As chapter one 
discussed, explanations for Europe’s fertility decline can be categorised as either 
innovation-diffusion or adaptation. The simultaneity of Europe’s transition has led 
many researchers to the conclusion that economic growth could not be a causal 
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force in the fertility transition (the innovation-diffusion hypothesis). However, as 
mentioned previously, other researcher question the EFP’s conclusions and reason 
for an adaptation explanation for the fertility decline. With regard to the 
simultaneity of the decline, Guinnane et al. make the following observation; 
 
‚Cleland and Wilson observe that fertility fell in 71% of Europe’s provinces between 
1880 and 1930, and refer to this period as a ‚short time‛. Is 50 years really so brief a 
period? Europe’s declines in fertility<were no more closely timed than its 
industrialisation. If economic forces could not be an important factor in the decline 
of fertility, as Cleland and Wilson argue, are we to think that economic forces did 
not bring about industrialisation of England or Germany‛ (1994 p.17). 
 
This thesis is a re-examination of the economic correlates of the fertility 
transition. This chapter68 will provide the macro level backdrop to the individual 
level analyses in the rest of the thesis by testing newly constructed estimates of 
fertility for patterns predicted by the economic theory of fertility.  
 
The rest of this chapter is comprised of five sections. Section 3.2 details the 
data and its summary characteristics. Section 3.3 details the methodology and 
results of a new test for estimating the onset of fertility decline. Section 3.4discusses 
the implications of the results of section 3.3 for demographic transition theory, while 
section 3.5 tests for a Beckerian ‘inverted U’ income-fertility pattern. Section 3.6 
Concludes. 
 
Section 3.2: The Data 
 
This chapter re-dates the aggregate decline in fertility for ten European countries 
using a new time series and methodology. This section details the methodology 
employed to generate annual estimates of marital fertility. The EFP analysed 
Europe’s fertility decline through a set of standardised fertility and nuptulaity 
indices which were developed by Ansley Coale. These indices, fI  (the index of 
                                                
68 Methodologically, much of the inspiration for this chapter comes from the work of Winegarden and 
Wheeler (199268), particularly in examining the income-fertility relationship for evidence of an 
‘inverted-U’ income-fertility pattern. 
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overall fertility), gI  (the index of marital fertility), hI  (the index of illegitimate 
fertility) and mI  (the index of nuptiality) were presented as a fraction of a 
‘maximum’ level of fertility – (that of the Hutterites69). The standardisations control 
for varying age structures and proportions married amongst the female 
populations. For this analysis, annual estimates of Coale’s measures were 
constructed by linearly interpolating the age structure of the female population 
between censuses, and doing the same for the proportion of females married at 
different ages. Then by factoring in the available annual series of births in each 
country, and also the total number of legitimate births, annual estimates of 
hgf III ,, and mI  were calculated. In other words, the fertility potential of a country 
was estimated annually by applying the Hutterite schedule to the specific female 
age structure, which was then used as the denominator. The numerator is the actual 
level of births/legitimate births. The results of this exercise were perfectly consistent 
with the Princeton data (at the census dates), and revealed a lot of inter censual 
variation (See the appendix for a comparison between these annual estimates and 
the Princeton estimates). 
 
Annual estimates for gI
70, the index of marital fertility and the ‘key variable’ 
in this analysis, were constructed for all European countries where the data was 
available. The formula used was: 
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Where tLB  = Legitimate births in year t, tam ,  = the marriage rate of female age 
group a, at year t, taN , = Number of women in age group a, at year t and ah  = 
marital fertility rate of Hutterites in age group a. Annual estimates of Coale’s indices 
were estimated for 22 European countries. The index of marital fertility ( gI ) for
                                                
69 An Anabaptist religious group who make no attempts to control their fertility and marry at young 
ages. 
70 Annual Estimates for Coale’s Indices Sources: 
Hutterite Schedule: Sardon 1996 p.253. 
Age Structure, female population, married female population and births (legitimate and illegitimate): 
Rothenbacher 2002 CD:Rom. 
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three representative cases are illustrated below in figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: The Index of Marital Fertility, 1850-1913 
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Source: Own calculations based on Rothenbacher 2002. 
 
The index of marital fertility for England and Wales, France and Ireland 
roughly represent the variety of fertility decline patterns in Europe during the late 
19th century. The early decliner (and alone in this group) is France, where fertility 
decline began before the start of the sample period. More representative of the 
general European experience is England and Wales, where decline appears to set in 
about the 1870s and is certainly experiencing irreversible decline by the mid 1880s. 
Ireland represents the late decliner group, with marital fertility high (and even 
rising) during the period 1850-1913. Sustained fertility decline is not established 
until after World War I. In general most European countries fall within the range 
established by England and Wales and the late decliner Ireland. So as to pinpoint 
the decline of fertility in Europe, these annual estimates for the overall fertility and 
marital fertility indices were analysed for the presence of a structural break. This 
exercise is reported in the next section. 
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Section 3.3: The year of Fertility Decline 
 
The EFP collected and analysed fertility data for over 600 provinces of Europe. The 
project conclusions (summarised in Watkins (1986) stressed the simultaneity of the 
fertility decline across varying environments of socioeconomic development as a 
key reason to believe that the two were unrelated. The EFP defined the onset of 
fertility transition as a 10% drop in the value of gI , where gI  never again reaches its 
pre-transition level. However, the EFP was restricted to using census year data and 
the estimated years were based on interpolations between these dates71 (Watkins 
1986 p.395). The availability of annual estimates permits a more specific pinpointing 
of the year of decline.  
 
Identifying structural change in a time series has received some attention in 
the Econometric literature over the past decade. The attraction of using these 
techniques on the historical trend of fertility in Europe is the fact that it does away 
with the clumsy 10% definition of fertility decline, and offers an endogenous and 
objective new dating procedure. A popular methodology used to detect structural 
breaks in a time series is that of Zivot and Andrews. The Zivot-Andrews procedure 
tests the null that the variable in question contains a unit root with drift (no 
structural break) versus the alternative that the data is a trend stationary process 
(TSP) with one structural break  
 
Formally the Zivot Andrews test is as follows 
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Where t
DT
 - Dummy representing a break in the trend term at time b
T
 and t
DU
 - 
Dummy representing a change in the constant term. 
1tDU  if b
Tt 
, 0 otherwise.  
                                                
71 See also Casterline (2001 p.46) for criticism of the EFP’s timing of the fertility transitions. 
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Nelson and Plosser (1982) famously demonstrated that the majority of US 
macroeconomic time series could be classified as ‘random walks’ – that is the trend 
was not fixed, but could be shifted by random shocks which would persist until 
moved again by another random shock (Hansen 2001 p.124). This prompted a 
backlash, one of which was Perron (1989) who argued that the movement of the 
trend in macroeconomic time series could be explained by ‚a parsimonious single 
structural break‛ (argument as summarised by Hansen 2001 p.124). Perron’s 
original test involved an exogenous knowledge of the trend break, which was 
disputed by Zivot and Andrews (1992), who developed a test which could 
endogenously determine the date of the structural change. The structural change is 
accounted for by a change in either the constant or the trend term, or both. Repeated 
regressions are run for different values of the break term (a dummy variable as 
employed in the test structure above). The breakpoint is chosen where the (one 
sided) t-stat for the coefficient on the autoregressive term (ˆ ) is minimised – 
therefore the break is chosen where the support for the null hypothesis (of a unit 
root) is the weakest (Hansen 2001 p.124). 
 
The Zivot-Andrews test72 for structural change was applied to 10 European 
countries for which the historical fertility data was of sufficient length (in order to 
identify a genuine structural shift and avoid identifying a short-run fluctuation). 
The sample period for all countries apart from France and Switzerland is 1850-1913 
(1852-1913 for Switzerland, 1740-1911 for France73), and the test is constructed to 
allow for a structural break in the trend, the intercept or both. The results are listed 
in table 3.1.  
 
Allowing for one structural break produced the latest (and therefore most 
conservative) estimates for the year of structural change in the time series of marital 
fertility74. The exercise has resulted in some important clarifications on the macro
                                                
72 I used Christopher Baum’s ZANDREWS module for Stata. 
73 The data from France is taken from Weir (1994) Table B3. p.330-1. 
74 In 10/12 countries tested. 
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Table 3.1: Structural Breaks in European Marital Fertility 
 Country 
Year  
of Break 
Break 
Type Country 
Year  
of Break 
Break 
Type 
Austria 
  
  
1901** 
1901 
1908 
T+I 
I 
T 
England 
 and Wales 
  
1862 
1872 
1877* 
I 
T+I 
T 
Belgium 
  
  
1863 
1872 
1874 
I 
T+I 
T 
France 
  
  
1772 
1776* 
1789** 
I 
T 
T+I 
Switzerland 
  
  
1870 
1865 
1884 
I 
T+I 
T 
Hungary 
  
  
1865 
1881 
1881 
I 
T 
T+I 
Germany 
  
  
1872** 
1872 
1877** 
T+I 
I 
T 
Norway 
  
  
1874** 
1874 
1899 
I 
T+I 
T 
Denmark 
  
  
1874 
1875 
1887 
I 
T+I 
T 
Sweden  
  
  
1871 
1873 
1887 
I 
T+I 
T 
Spain 
  
  
1893*** 
1893** 
1897** 
T+I 
I 
T 
Finland 
  
  
1870*** 
1870*** 
1887*** 
I 
T+I 
T 
Where T=Trend and I=Intercept. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Structural Break in Marital Fertility Trend 
Zivot-Andrews Test Unit Root Test allowing for 1 structural break in the TREND 
Country 
Break 
Year 
talpha75 
Princeton 
Date 
Difference  to 
Princeton dating 
France 1776 -4.33* 1800 -14 
Belgium 1874 -3.90 1882 -8 
England and Wales 1877 -4.22* 1892 -15 
Germany 1877 -4.53** 1890 -13 
Switzerland 1884 -3.55 1885 -1 
Denmark 1887 -2.39 1900 -13 
Sweden 1887 -3.60 1892 -5 
Finland 1887 -5.20*** 1910 -23 
Norway 1899 -2.49 1904 -5 
Austria 1903 -4.87** 1908 -5 
* P<0.05, ** P<0.01, *** P<0.001 
 
                                                
75 The asymptotic critical values for this test ‚should only be used as a crude guide‛ – they make it 
hard to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (Hansen 2001 p.124). Therefore the 10% level is used as 
a cut-off. 
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level picture. Firstly, we now have an exact year for the start of the macro level 
fertility transition in France. Previously estimated as ca.1800 (Watkins 1986 p.394), 
the Zivot-Andrews test indicates 1776 as the ‚year of decline‛. This is important as 
it places the origin of the French fertility decline over a decade before the Revolution 
of 1789-1799, and casts fresh doubt on the causal link of events surrounding the 
Revolution and the onset of the fertility transition. Strikingly, France experiences 
fertility decline 98 years before anywhere else in Europe. The next country to start a 
transition is Belgium, in 1874. The structural change in Belgium’s fertility series is 
dated eight years before its date of 10% decline. For England and Wales and 
Germany, both of whom experience structural change in 1877, the EFP 
underestimation is 15 and 13 years respectively. The details of the structural break 
in trend are listed in table 3.2, along with the EFP dates (calculated as the year 
fertility declined by 10%). 
 
The results of this exercise follow recent criticisms of the EFP’s methodology 
and conclusions. Brown and Guinnane (2003 p.26) have taken issue with the 
definition of fertility decline and argued that it fails to capture the origins of the 
transition in a meaningful way. While this exercise can say nothing on the problem 
of identifying fertility decline with aggregate level data (as opposed to individual 
level datasets), a new method for dating fertility decline is forwarded and the 
results indicate significant underestimation of the fertility transition in Europe by 
the EFP. The differences are not large but are calculated based on the most 
conservative estimates of the Zivot-Andrews tests. Further work, particularly with 
tests which can locate more than one structural break is desirable. These dates are 
now taken to summarise the relative socioeconomic status of Europe at the time of 
fertility decline in each of the countries tested. 
 
Section 3.4: Demographic Transition Theory Debunked 
 
The results of the re-dating exercise, where the most conservative (latest) 
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Table 3.3: Summary Table of Socioeconomic Characteristics at Year of Decline 
 
Labour Force: Sectoral shares 
(%)   
Country 
Year of 
Decline 
Index 
of 
Marital 
Fertility 
GDPpc 
Primary 
Schooling 
(per 1000) 
Crude 
Death 
Rate 
(Per 
100) 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
(per 
1000) 
Agriculture Industry Services 
Female 
Labour 
Force 
Participation 
(%) 
Urbanisation 
(%) 
France  1776 0.811 <$1,135 <38876 - 185.0 70+ - - - <12.2 
Belgium  1874 0.813 $2,890 604.1 20.7 136.9 41.6 36.9 20.7 34.3 41.2 
England77 1877 0.703 $3,425 423.1 20.3 136.0 14.1 47.9 28.9 - 54.5 
Germany  1877 0.800 $2,033 711* 26.4 218.0 46.7 35.4 16.6 18.1 30.4 
Switzerland  1884 0.651 $2,657 765.7 20.2 160.8 40.8 42.8 16.3 - 22.4 
Denmark  1887 0.680 $2,395 670* 18.2 131.2 46.5 25.5 17.6 Apx. 30. 26.7 
Sweden  1887 0.707 $1,926 666.8 16.1 103.1 59.0 12.7 11.8 25.7 15.1 
Finland  1887 0.730 $1,276 94.7 19.0 131.8 64.3 11.7 12.8 14.8 7.6 
Norway  1899 0.717 $1,927 628.7 16.8 106.7 41.8 26.9 29.0 12.4 23.9 
Austria  1903 0.643 $2,941 671.2 21.6 210.9 58.9 23.2 15.0 45.2 26.5 
Source: See appendix. 
                                                 
76 Lindert Source used (nearest available year, 1830 for France, 1890 for Denmark and 1880 for Germany) 
77 And Wales. 
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break year I selected, is listed in ascending order of break point year in table 3.378. 
For each country, table 3.3 lists GDP per capita, primary schooling enrolment rates, 
crude death rates, infant mortality rates, sectoral composition of the labour force, 
female labour force participation and urbanisation rates. The reported values refer 
to the ‘year of decline’.  
 
Again, the striking peculiarity of the French experience is highlighted by this 
table. With a proportion of over 70% of the working population in agriculture, 
urbanisation rates of less than 12.2% and a GDPpc of less than $1,135 (1990 Gary-
Kheamis dollars) irreversible fertility decline took hold. The variety of the European 
experience can be illustrated by looking at the variation in these socioeconomic 
measures at the time of decline. Excluding France, GDPpc ranged from $1,276 to 
$3,425 – an almost 300% differential. Combining this with the proportion in 
agriculture (varying from 14.1% to 64.3% - a 450% differential!), the observations of 
classic demographic transition theory fail to apply to the European case. There is no 
relationship in the National data which demographic transition theory can predict 
or explain. If one takes a thousand year perspective, the general idea holds: 
‘modernisation equals fertility decline’ with varying regions experiencing varying 
leads and lags in the transition date. However, the processes involved behind the 
impulse for fertility decline to take hold are not adequately explained by this vague 
concept of modernisation. Urbanisation rates vary from 7.6% to 54.5% and crude 
death rates vary from 16.1 per thousand to 26.4 per thousand. The variation in level 
of child mortality at the time of the decline (for the selected countries tested for 
structural change in marital fertility) is from 103.1 per thousand (Sweden) to 218 per 
thousand (Germany). In short, I (and many researchers before me) can find no 
‘silver bullet’ with the standard socioeconomic variables available for explaining 
Europe’s fertility decline in the aggregate data.  
 
                                                
78 The table is inspired by table 1 in Knodel and van de Walle, 1979 (p.221-2). 
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Section 3.5: Empirical Evidence for a Beckerian Inverted U Income –Fertility 
Relationship? 
 
The results of re-dating Europe’s fertility decline indicated that there was no simple 
socioeconomic threshold that would initiate a fertility transition. However, there is 
reason to expect a non-linear modernisation-fertility relationship. The economic 
model of fertility demonstrates how parents will substitute child quantity for child 
quality, once the returns to child investment reach a certain point. Initial sustained 
increases in income will prompt parents to increase the number of children 
demanded. Once child quality is demanded however, parents will sacrifice family 
size for a higher level of quality per child. ‘Quality’ may be understood as 
expenditure on children above a fixed cost of subsistence. Becker’s theory is 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. The point at which parents substitute quality 
for quantity is related to the aggregate economy. The more developed an economy, 
the greater the need for educated workers, and the greater the incentive for parents 
to invest in child quality. The best proxy for the level of economic development in a 
country is it’s GDP per capita. The theoretical framework established by Becker 
produces a testable hypothesis for the aggregate level. If the decline in fertility is 
wholly due to parental substitution of child quantity for quality, then we should 
expect to find an inverted U relationship between a country’s fertility rate and its 
level of economic development. Due to econometric problems in estimating these 
type of relationships, the testable hypothesis can be re-expressed in terms of changes: 
changes in the fertility rate should respond positively to income changes before the 
decline of fertility, and negatively thereafter.  
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the income-fertility relationship. At low levels of 
income, increases to income have a positive effect on fertility. Populations where a 
significant proportion of the population are living near subsistence will experience 
increased fertility levels due to the greater nutrition of mothers. Further, more and 
better nutrition will allow for a decrease in child mortality. This effect is expected to 
dominate in a pre-industrial society. As incomes grow, however, the microeconomic 
 82 
theory of fertility predicts a threshold where parent’s switch from choosing quantity 
to quality of children. After this threshold level, all increments to income are 
expected to reduce fertility, as a greater proportion of the population switch to 
demanding high quality children. This chapter will conduct two tests for this 
pattern. The first is a ‘strong’ test of the microeconomic theory of fertility. The 
calculation of the year fertility decline begins via the econometric structural break 
tests will allow the comparison of GDP per capita across the countries of Europe at 
this date. The second, ‘weak’ test is to allow the thresholds to vary across the 
countries in the sample, and econometrically test for the significance of the 
relationship between GDP per capita and the index of marital fertility. Following 
this, the ‘turning point’ year is calculated from the regression coefficients and 
compared with the year of structural change in the index of marital fertility. If this 
‘turning point’ year occurs before the year of structural change in the fertility series, 
this is strong evidence for the validity of the economic model of fertility as a 
powerful explanation for the decline of fertility in Europe. If it occurs after, this will 
represent a refutation of the economic model of fertility, as applied to Europe’s 19th 
century decline.  
 
Figure 3.2: The Income-Fertility Relationship 
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relationship takes the form of an inverted U was first raised by Nancy Birdsall 
(1980). Theoretical justifications come not only from Becker (1991), but Ehrlich and 
Liu (1991), Tamura (1996) and Galor and Weil (2000), in the form of a trade off 
between child quantity and quality. Becker, states ‚I am convinced that the most 
promising explanation is found in the interaction between the quantity and quality 
of children, for it implies that the demand for children is highly responsive to price 
and perhaps to income, even when children have no close substitutes‛ (Becker 1991 
p.149).  
 
Figure 3.3: Levels of GDPpc at the Year of Fertility Decline 
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Figure 3.3 reports the GDPpc levels at the year fertility declined in the ten 
countries tested for a structural break in the index of marital fertility. As reported in 
the last section, the levels of GDP varied immensely. For instance, England’s GDP at 
the time of fertility decline (1877) was over 3.5 times that of France (1776) and over 
three times that of Finland (1887). Across countries, there is no evidence for a 
threshold level of economic development which initiates fertility decline. Thus we 
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can conclude that the ‘strong’ test of the microeconomic theory of fertility is a 
negative result. 
 
 The ‘weak’ test of the economic theory of fertility is to allow the income 
thresholds to vary within the countries of Europe. Through testing each data series 
individually, separate estimates of the income threshold can be calculated. The idea 
is to impose a quadratic functional form on the relationship between the index of 
marital fertility and income. The following equation represents the econometric 
model applied to the data series; 
1
2
11   tttg IMYYCI  
Where Ig = Index of marital fertility, C = constant term, Y = per capita GDP, 2Y = per 
capita GDP squared and 1tIM = Infant mortality. 
 
The model is intentionally parsimonious to reflect the unambiguity of the 
underlying theory. The lag format assumes that fertility decisions are made (on 
average) in the 12 months before the year of birth. The model assumes that changes 
in economic growth will exert non-monotonic effects on the birth rate, with the 
quadratic formation intended to capture the theorised parental substitution of child 
quantity for quality. Low levels of income should see a positive correlation between 
economic growth and the birth rate. At a certain level, the income effect (which 
increases parents demand for children), will be offset by the price effect of another 
child. This relationship is based upon the economic model of fertility developed by 
Becker (1960, 1991), as Docquier argues that the macroeconomic characteristics of 
the income fertility relationship ‚are linked to the theoretical micro foundations of 
fertility decisions‛ (2004 p.263). 
 
Very few empirical attempts have been made to detect the presence of this 
inverted U relationship, or the implied income threshold, where the effect of 
growing income on fertility changes from positive to negative. However, Nagarajan 
(1980) tested a similar model of fertility using a quadratic income formation, for 20th 
century American data. His model was of the form: B = aY +bYSquared +cT. He 
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tested this against other linear models (and also models excluding the time trend, 
T), and found that this was by far the most statistically accurate model, producing a 
non-linear income-fertility relationship, with a turning point around $1479 
(Nagarajan 1980 p.167). Winegarden and Wheeler applied a similar model to 
Norway, Sweden, the UK and Germany, finding that economic growth played a role 
in fertility decline but could not be linked to the initiation of the decline (1992 p.432). 
In a comparative study, Barro and Sala-I-Martin show that for countries with 
income per capita below $767, fertility and income have a positive correlation, those 
above tend to have a negative relationship (Docquier 2004 p.261). As well as finding 
some support for the inverted U relationship, Strulik and Sikander’s results show 
‚that in every year under investigation, there exists a certain income threshold 
above which the correlation between income and fertility is significantly negative‛ 
(2002 p.4). Also, they find that while the fertility coordinate of the threshold does 
not change much (apx. 6.5 from 1960 to 1985), the income coordinate changes 
considerably over the period. ‚The more recent the observed period the lower the 
level of income from which an income improvement goes hand in hand with a 
marked and persistent reduction in fertility‚ (Strulik and Sikander 2002 p.4). 
 
To begin with, separate time series regressions were run for each European 
country. Once the results are obtained a simple formula is applied to the coefficients 
of the two income terms to obtain the formula for the slope of the regression line. 
Solving where this equals zero results in a ‘turning point’ level of per capita income, 
which also gives a turning point year (cross referenced from the original data 
series). This year is then compared to the year of structural change in the marital 
fertility series (obtained via the Zivot-Andrews technique). A value of 0 or a 
negative value in the net difference of these years would suggest that income 
growth may have acted to initiate fertility decline, consistent with microeconomic 
theory.  
 
The fertility series is the annual estimates of marital fertility used in the 
structural break tests, and infant mortality is taken from Rothenbacher (2002). The 
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variable used to represent income is GDP per capita expressed in constant prices, 
and these values are taken from Maddison, A The World Economy: Historical Statistics 
(2003)79. There are well known problems associated with the development of 
internationally comparable real income estimates, as exchange rates do not reflect 
relative purchasing power. Maddison uses the long span projection procedure to 
correct for this problem, projecting a 1990 GDP per capita benchmark (in purchasing 
power parity adjusted international dollars) to all other years, using domestic 
growth rates (Pamuk 2005 p.5). Maddison’s data are the ‚best estimates‛ of this 
kind available (Prados de la Escosura 2000 p.2).  
 
Non-Stationarity represents the principal econometric issue to be overcome 
in this analysis, as its presence can lead to incorrect inferences about the estimated 
parameters of the model (McNown and Ridao-Cano 2005 p.521). The purpose of this 
test is to generate country specific ‘turning point years’ via individual time series 
regressions, and also to pool the data to test for a European wide pattern. Visual 
inspection revealed a strong tendency for these variables to trend over the sample 
period. Classical regression analysis assumes that the underlying process generating 
the data is stationary – that is it has a constant mean and variance. In other words, 
the mean, variance (and also auto-covariance) must be the same no matter what 
time they are tested. Intuitively, the assumption of stationarity seems implausible 
for GDP pc and fertility during this period.  Formally, a popular method to test for 
stationarity is to test for a unit root. A unit root exists if the coefficient  is equal to 
1 in the following regression of a variable, Y  
ttt uYY  1  
Such a series is known as a random walk. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests (ADF)80 test 
for this pattern and were applied to all the variables in the data series.  For marital
                                                
79 See pp.25-31, and 91-94 for the sources Maddison uses to derive his estimates. 
80 The ADF tests the following regression: 

 
m
i
tititt YYtY
1
121   
Where 1  , t =the trend. The null, hypothesis is that 0 , i.e. there is a unit root. The lagged 
difference term on the RHS is included to account for autocorrelation, and the lag length is chosen so 
that the error term,   is independent (Gujarati p.721 1995). For robustness, the tests were conducted 
with and without the trend term, and also for 1, 2 and 3 lags of the test variable.  
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for Regression81 
 
gI  
GDP 
pc 
IM 
 
gI  GDP pc IM 
Austria (1870) Netherlands (1850)82 
Mean .69 2537 153 .77 3055 171 
Max .85 3505 189 .87 4048 252 
Min .53 1650 107 .6 2363 87 
Standard Dev. .06 516 16 .07 483 35 
 Belgium (1850) Norway (1850) 
Mean .69 3052 130 .72 15632 96 
Max .84 4219 167 .8 2447 126 
Min .42 1847 92 .6 955 64 
Standard Dev. .12 666 15 .05 360 14 
 Denmark (1850) Sweden (1850) 
Mean .64 2424 158 .67 1989 116 
Max .71 3912 392 .74 3096 170 
Min .49 1662 108 .52 1216 70 
Standard Dev. .05 660 41 .51 537 26 
 Finland (1860) Switzerland (1852) 
Mean .68 1359 162 .65 2766 165 
Max .76 2111 238 .75 4377 221 
Min .47 885 104 .51 1365 94 
Standard Dev. .04 327 23 .06 907 30 
 France (1850) England (1850) 
Mean .43 2301 215 .62 3613 145 
Max .52 3514 262 .71 4920 163 
Min .3 1568 147 .46 2330 95 
Standard Dev. .06 500 23 .07 717 15 
 Germany (1852) 
Mean .69 2270 215 
Max .8 3648 262 
Min .52 1407 147 
Standard Dev. .06 625 23 
 
Total gI  GDP pc IM 
Mean .66 2335 164 
Max .87 4920 396 
Min .31 885 64 
Standard Deviation .1 865 47 
Where gI  is the index of marital fertility, GDP pc is gross domestic product per capita and 
IM is infant mortality (rate per 1000). 
                                                
81 Start year of sample in parenthesis, end date is 1913 for all countries. 
82 Gaps in sample (1864-69). 
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fertility and income, the null hypothesis of a unit root failed to be rejected in all 
cases. The same was true for infant mortality, with one exception, Belgium83.  
 
Therefore, there is a high risk of spurious regression (i.e. establishing 
astatistically significant relationship even when none exists in reality) when analysis 
is performed on levels. Traditionally, one solution has been to include a linear or 
polynomial time trend on the explanatory side, thereby ‘detrending’ the data. This 
approach does not help to solve the problem of a non-constant variance however. A 
better solution is to first difference the data, and use these in place of the original 
levels (providing they themselves are stationary). This approach has the penalty of 
washing out any level effects – any inference must therefore concern the effects of 
changes. This changes the nature of the underlying test, as mentioned before. The 
testable hypothesis must re-expressed in terms of changes: changes in the fertility 
rate should respond positively to income changes before the decline of fertility, and 
negatively thereafter. 
 
Serial correlation was present in almost all series, as indicated by the Durban 
Watson statistic from exploratory OLS regressions. This may represent a certain 
inertia/trend in fertility rates, where on a year to year basis they may be quite 
‘sticky’. This means that while the estimated coefficient estimates are consistent, 
their standard errors are biased downwards and the 
2R  is overestimated. Various 
techniques have been developed to deal with the problem of autocorrelated 
residuals, one of which is Cochrane-Orcutt regression. This method assumes that 
the errors are correlated with a one year lag, and includes rho (ρ) times the lag of the 
dependent variable on the right hand side of the model. The idea is to dynamically 
model the error component, as illustrated in the following: 
 
Take the model 
    ttt
uXY  10   
Where the error term is autocorrelated: 
                                                
83 However, the null of unit root was only rejected at the 10% level when 3 lags of infant mortality were 
included. 
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ttt euu  1  
Where: t
Y
= the dependant variable at time t, t
X
= the independent variable at time t, 
tu = the serially correlated residual, n

= the parameters of the model, ρ= The 
coefficient of autocorrelation, t
e
= ‘white noise’  
Using the previous year’s model: 
11101   ttt uXY   
And multiplying by ρ gives 
11101   ttt uXY   
Subtracting this from the first equation: 
11101 )1()1(   tttttt uuXXYY   
ttt eXX   )()1( 110   
A Prais-Winsten transformation is used to keep the first observation (as the 
Cochrane Orcutt method uses first differences in the explanatory variables to 
calculate  , the coefficient of autocorrelation).  
 
The model, being integrated of I-1, will explain the variation in the difference 
of the dependent variable, 1
 tt FF . The specification is now: 
ttttttttt uIMIMYYYYCFF   )()()()( 1
2
1
2
11  
ttt uu   1  
This does not change the underlying theoretical pattern: Growth in income will 
positively affect fertility changes, up to a turning point; thereafter the relationship 
will be negative. 
 
The results of the Prais-Winsten regressions are reported in table 3.5 and
 indicate the presence of and inverted U income-fertility relationship for 6 out of 11 
countries tested. These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany 
and Switzerland. For Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and England 
and Wales there is no evidence for the inverted U hypothesis in the aggregate level 
data. For those countries where a significant income fertility relationship was 
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detected, turning point income values and corresponding years were calculated. For 
all of these countries the turning point in the income-fertility relationship occurs 
after the onset of fertility decline (as indicated by the Zivot Andrews tests). 
Therefore the macro level evidence for a causal relationship between income growth 
and fertility decline, acting via a threshold effect, is non existent. The 
microeconomic theory fails this ‘weak’ test. These results are roughly consistent 
with Winegarden and Wheelers previous analysis (1992). 
 
Table 3.5: Prais Winsten Regression Results 
Country GDPpc GDPpc 
Squared 
Infant 
Mortality 
Constant Rho Adj.  
R2 
Austria 3.66E-04** -5.69E-08* 6.50E-04** -3.82E-03 -0.46 0.01 
Belgium  4.64E-04** -5.38E-08* 4.96E-05 -1.11E-02*** -0.30 0.02 
Denmark  2.68E-05 -1.63E-08 3.94E-04*** -2.38E-04 -0.50 0.14 
Finland  2.00E-03*** -5.51E-07*** 2.73E-04*** -9.26E-03** -0.20 0.53 
France  1.72E-04** -2.49E-08* -1.72E-05 -4.66E-03*** -0.60 0.12 
Germany  6.30E-04*** -1.18E-07*** 2.11E-04 -3.96E-03 -0.48 0.21 
Netherlands  3.68E-04 -5.51E-08 -1.13E-04 -4.74E-03** -0.77 0.02 
Norway  -6.61E-05 2.24E-09 1.19E-04 -7.73E-04 0.04 -0.04 
Sweden  1.91E-04 -3.96E-08 5.92E-04*** -2.52E-03 0.02 0.08 
Switzerland  2.16E-04*** -2.92E-08*** -3.67E-06 -4.29E-03** 0.03 0.43 
England  1.39E-04 -1.61E-08 -1.56E-04 -4.42E-03*** -0.42 0.01 
Significance: * P<0.10, ** P<0.05, *** P<0.01 
.  
Table 3.6: Turning Point Years 
Country Tuning point GDPpc Turning Point Year 
Year of Structural 
Break in Fertility 
Austria 3220 1907 1903 
Belgium  4315 Post 1913 1874 
Finland  1815 1907 1887 
France  3446 1912 1776 
Germany  2671 1895 1877 
Switzerland  3705 1899 1884 
 
To summarise, income growth cannot be directly related to fertility decline 
at the macro level, even when allowance is made for a non-linear income-fertility 
relationship with varying country specific income thresholds. This analysis fails to 
find the macro level evidence for the Economic theory of fertility. In common with 
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the Princeton project, the level of analysis is highly aggregated and fails to account 
for within country variation. 
 
Section 3.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has re-examined the macro level economic correlates of the
fertility transition in Europe. Relative to the EFP’s results, the re-dating of the onset 
of fertility decline for ten European countries resulted in earlier estimates of the 
fertility transition for every country tested. However, the level of economic 
development still varied widely at the year of fertility decline. Testing the 
microeconomic theory of fertility for its implied macro level patterns resulted in its 
failure via both a ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ test. 
 
This analysis suggests a number of ways forward. Firstly, dis-aggregation is 
essential as the national level data hides a great deal of within country variation. 
However, the economic theory needs to provide some explanation of why fertility 
declined at different points in time for many countries in Europe. The theory does 
not fit the empirical record at the national level, and this needs to be explained. 
Further, the economic theory should explicitly incorporate important elements 
evident from other disciplines, as discussed in chapter two. Most importantly, I 
believe, is the incorporation of evolutionary reasoning with respect to fertility 
decisions. Couples do not decide on a family size in isolation (as they do in the 
microeconomic theory of fertility) but are influenced by their reference groups. 
Movements in variables such as the degree of economic inequality can shift the 
‘rules’ on social mobility and introduce new climates of social competitiveness. Here 
is where we may find the most important economic variable related to couples 
family size – not absolute income or wealth but relative socio-economic status.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter underlines the point that we cannot link the 
conventionally used measures of socioeconomic development to the onset of fertility 
decline in 19th century Europe. However, I believe that we have not specified 
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correctly the relevant socioeconomic measures that determine aggregate and 
individual fertility. In particular, I would like to propose the level of economic 
inequality and the environment for social mobility as being highly relevant 
variables for the understanding of fertility decisions. These ideas are discussed, 
developed and tested in chapter six of this thesis.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Below I have charted my estimates of annual marital fertility ( g
I
). Inspection of these 
charts reveals the reliability of the technique employed, and also the considerable inter-
censal variation.  
Figure 3.4: Comparison of Annual Fertility Estimates with Census Year Estimates 
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Figure 3.4 ctd. 
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Figure 3.5: Graphs of Structural Breaks in the Time Series of Marital Fertility (Ig) 
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Are we measuring the right thing? From the economic model of fertility, surely the 
NRR is the best measure of fertility 
 
Figure 3.6: The Net Reproduction Rate in the 'Developed World' 1540-2050 
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Figure 3.4 plots the net reproduction rate for the ‘developed’ world of the 21st 
century from 1540 to 2050 (post 2000 rates are of course projections). Examining the 
very long run raises issues that are hidden by analysing the 19th century alone. Visually, 
a sustained decline is evidenced from the 1820s. The data used here was from England 
(1540-1910), and this date is far earlier than the any previous dating (including that 
undertaken in this chapter) of the fertility transition in England. Further, the most 
striking pattern in the graph is the presence of an inverted ‘U’ fertility pattern from 
1750-2000. Just as the industrial revolution is beginning in England, we have a 
coincident rise in the level of net fertility, related to both underlying increases in births 
per women and improvements in mortality conditions. This suggests that fertility must 
be analysed over the very long run. Constricting analysis to the period of decline may 
not be the ideal empirical strategy. In chapter 4A, Greg Clark and I analyse the wealth-
fertility relationship at the individual level over the very long run in England, 1500-
1914. 
 
The net reproduction rate, a measure of fertility adjusted for mortality, shows 
very different patterns than the index of marital fertility (as illustrated in figure 3.7). For 
instance, no decline in the NRR is visible for Germany before World War I, even though 
the index of marital fertility enters a sustained decline in 1877. The NRR must be 
considered the best estimates of realized fertility. In this sense it is the closest 
demographic measure for the number of surviving children demanded in the 
theoretical economic models. The disaggregated analyses in the rest of this thesis 
concentrate on measure of fertility such as the NRR. 
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Figure 3.7:  Net Reproduction Rate in Europe, 1801-1911 
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 Sources for Table 3.3: 
For France, 1800 value used for Urbanisation,  
For Germany, 1882 values used 
Sources:   
GDP 
Maddison, A., The world economy: historical statistics (2004) 
.  
Population   Rothenbacher, F., The European population, 1850-1950 (2002)  
      
Labour 
force Sectoral shares Bairoch The working population and its structure (1968),  
  
Female labour 
force 
participation Bairoch, P. and Goertz, G. Factors of Urbanisation in the Nineteenth Century Developed Countries: 
  Urbanisation  A Descriptive and Econometric Analysis Urban Studies (1986) 
Education Enrolment Mitchell, B.R., International historical statistics: Europe, 1750-2000 (2003) 
  Schooling'  Lindert, P Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century (2004)  
  Literacy Flora, P, Kraus and Pfenning, W., State, economy and society in Western Europe 1815-1975 (1987) 
France, Agriculture proportion and 1800 Infant Mortality rate (Watkins 1986 p.394). 
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Chapter 4: Marital Fertility and Wealth in England, 1800-1914 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter uses the wills of 3,000 English testators, from 1800-1920, for the analysis of 
the relationship between wealth and fertility during the demographic transition. The 
methodology employed to extract relevant data from the source material is described in 
detail. Following this, robustness checks are employed, and the testator dataset is 
checked for representativeness with respect to the general population. The analysis 
discovers two large and opposing patterns – a positive association of wealth and net 
fertility and a negative association of occupational status and net fertility. I demonstrate 
that it was the poorest members of the top occupational status classes who restricted 
fertility first in England. This suggests that the decline in fertility may have been related 
to a desire to avoid downward social mobility. Through analysing the changing 
relationship between occupational status and wealth, this hypothesis is supported. 
 
Section 4.1: Introduction 
 
England and Wales experienced sustained aggregate fertility decline in 1877. Chapter 
3’s national Analysis failed to find any economic correlates with this transition. In fact, 
fertility decline followed the Industrial Revolution in England and Wales by over a 
century. Further, tests for a Beckerian inverted U income –fertility relationship failed to 
find any support for this mechanism as a causal force in the fertility transition. 
However, the study of fertility at such a high level of aggregation must be accompanied 
by a micro level analysis for a complete picture. This chapter analyses the link between 
wealth and fertility at the individual level for the period of fertility decline in England. 
 
The fundamental research question of this chapter is to ask: Was there a 
relationship between wealth and fertility during the demographic transition in 
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England? There is no previous work on this question, although this relationship is a 
central theme in explanatory models of the fertility transition, for example the 
microeconomic theory of fertility and demographic transition theory. It is theorized that 
as the absolute level of real wealth increases, people will switch from demanding child 
quantity to child quantity. Is this what happened in England during the 19th century? 
For these models to be valid we must observe a strong and significant association 
between wealth and fertility pre-transition, which then switches to a negative 
association. With individual level data collected here, we can analyse smaller and 
smaller sub-groups. Following the thorough account of the data collection and 
generation processes, I test the data for these patterns. 
  
The primary source for both the wealth and fertility information is the wills of 
male testators who died during the 19th century in England. These types of records have 
limitations and this chapter outlines them fully in a comprehensive data and data 
generation section (section 4.3). This section details the methodology employed to 
extract wealth and fertility information along with robustness checks on the final data. 
Regarding fertility, it must be noted at the outset that wills can only record net fertility. 
This is because wills were a legal device to determine the destination of an individual’s 
cash and property wealth. These bequests, of course, would only be designated to 
surviving children at the time of the writing of the will. Wills represent a much 
underutilized resource in the analysis of net fertility and wealth and status.   
 
Table 4.1: Children Born Per Married Man, 1891-1911, England 
 
Occupation 
 
1891 
 
1901 
 
1911 
Professional 4.9 4.7 3.8 
Miner 6.7 6.5 5.9 
Construction labourer 6.4 5.6 5.4 
General labourer 6.4 6.4 5.2 
Agricultural labourer 6.6 5.9 4.9 
Source: Garret et al 2001. 
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Any trace of this pattern seems to have disappeared by the 19th century, as the 
table 4.1 illustrates. The professional classes have significantly smaller family sizes than 
those of the rest of the population. A pattern is implied by these observations: 
Somewhere between the 17th and 19th century, the relationship between net fertility and 
wealth, or occupational status, reverses. The purpose of this chapter will be to describe, 
account and explain the changing nature of the wealth-fertility relationship in England 
during the 19th century. 
 
Higher occupational status implies higher wealth. However, occupational status 
certainly does not equal wealth.  The consensus in the literature points to a negative net 
fertility-occupational status relationship during the 19th century in England (discussed 
in the next section). However this does not necessarily mean that the relationship with 
wealth is negative too. Further, a possible source for the decline in fertility may be the 
changing relationship between status and wealth itself. A pre-modern static society 
typically exhibits a high degree of association between status and wealth. As economies 
modernize, the old rules break down. Industrialists and others rise to challenge the 
aristocracy for the level of wealth held. These dynamics may spur elements of the 
population to employ family limitation as a strategy to either achieve upward status, or 
wealth, mobility. Others may be induced to practice family limitation in order to 
preserve status, or the concentration of wealth. Examining the link between status, 
wealth and fertility can enlighten these propositions about the demographic transition 
in England. 
 
The rest of this chapter is comprised of five sections. Section 4.2 provides some 
background on previous research into the wealth-fertility relationship in England. 
Section 4.3 details the methodology employed to generate the data from the primary 
sources and also its summary characteristics. Section 4.4 analyses the mechanics behind 
the fertility patterns, while section 4.5 evaluates explanations for the English fertility 
transition. Section 5.6 Concludes. 
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Section 4.2: Background 
 
As mentioned previously, high socio-economic status is strongly associated with 
increased reproductive success before the demographic transition. During the transition 
the relationship appears to turns negative. Skirbekk (2008) has recently collected 
multiple studies on this relationship, and his findings, in terms of the reproductive 
advantage of the high status groups relative to the low, for England, are listed in table 
4.2. Each study reported here used a different definitional schema, and Skirbekk 
transformed the underlying data to be comparable with other studies. Quite simply he 
divided the mean number of children for the top status group by that of the bottom. 
The reported numbers can be interpreted as the percentage difference between the top 
and bottom status groups. These collated estimates display a high degree of variance 
but the overall pattern is strikingly clear. Before the 19th century, membership of the top 
status group was associated a substantially bigger family than that of the bottom status 
group. Some time during the mid 19th century this relationship flips, and status is 
negatively associated with family size. Nowadays, this relationship appears to be non-
existent. 
 
 What were the characteristics of the studies behind these numbers? Here I 
briefly summarise a selection of the research behind table 4.2. Hollingsworth analysed 
1908 individuals who were the direct descendants of ‚British kings, queens, dukes or 
duchesses‛ born between 1330 and 1954 (1957 p.4). The calculated family sizes were 
incorporated by Skirbekk into his analysis (2008) and he compared these numbers with 
those of the general population. These values showed that this elite group held a 
massive reproductive advantage over the general population. Hughes (1986) compared 
fertility of farmers and skilled craftsmen for eight Lancashire parishes between 1753 
and 1812. He found a small advantage for farmers in terms of children ever born, but a 
more significant advantage in terms of net fertility, children successfully raised to 
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maturity84. Scott and Duncan (2000) studied the parish of Penrith in Cumbria (Northern 
England) from 1600-1800, distinguishing between elites (landowners, merchants, etc.), 
tradesmen (Blacksmiths, Butchers, etc.) and subsistence (subsistence farmers) 
categories85. Elites had significantly higher marital fertility than subsistence farmers (a 
total marital fertility rate of 7.6 and 6.0 respectively) and marginally higher marital 
fertility than tradesmen (6.9). Given that infant mortality was considerably lower for 
the elites (especially amongst girls); this would have resulted in net family sizes 
significantly larger for the elite groups relative to both the tradesmen and subsistence 
farmers (Scott and Duncan 2000 p.75). 
  
Table 4.2: The Reproductive Advantage of Status in England, 1270-1970 
Period 
Fertility of high relative 
to low status group 
Author 
1270 114.29% Razi (1980) 
1350 3.70 to 60.00% Hollingsworth (1957) 
1600 26.67% Scott and Duncan (2000) 
1700 24.15 to 96.30% Hollingsworth (1957), Hughes (1986) 
1850/51 -19.03 to + 65.00% Hollingsworth (1957), Innes (1938) 
1861 -15.53% Thompson and Lewis (1965) 
1871 -15.31% Innes (1938) 
1881 -57.14% Newsholme and Stevenson (1906) 
1891 -25.04% Innes (1938) 
1911 -37.61% to -35.67% Vining (1986), Haines (1989) 
1951 -44.82% Haines (1989) 
1955 -33.71% to 9.66% Scott (1958) 
1970 0.00% Pérusse (1993) 
Source: Skirbekk 2008 
                                                
84 Surviving to age 21 (Hughes 1986 p.111). 
85 The mean values for the value of inventories at death were £293 for elites and £44 for tradesmen (Scott 
and Duncan 2000 p.73). 
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 The appearance of a sudden reversal in the status-fertility relationship can be 
focused upon by reference to the 1911 ‘fertility’ census of England and Wales. The 1911 
census of England and Wales was the first British census to include questions on 
duration of marriage and on numbers of ever born and surviving children. This 
allowed the breakdown of fertility trends not only by locality but by occupation, and 
also by ‘occupational class’.  Stevenson’s analysis (1920) of the 1911 census data clearly 
demonstrated the lower fertility rates of the top ‘social class’. His designation scheme is 
used, and detailed in full later, in this analysis. The occupational scale ran from those at 
the top class I (the professional and upper classes), class II (an intermediate class, 
farmers and shop keepers), class III (skilled workmen) and classes IV and V (the 
working classes). For marriages dating from the 1850s, class I register by far the lowest 
rates relative to the other classes (1920 p.416). In general, Stevenson described the 
fertility decline as spreading ‚from above downwards‛, with the lower infant mortality 
rates of the higher social orders failing ‚to compensate for their low fertility‛ (1920 
p.431). Since Stevenson, many other scholars have used the 1911 census data to detect 
class-fertility trends (Innes 1938,, Haines 1989, Woods 2000). The following chart, figure 
4.1, plots surviving children against occupational class for different marriage periods. 
This chart follows very closely the style and content of a similar chart in Woods (1984 
Figure 3, p. 185), which neatly summaries the class-fertility story86. 
 
As already noted – class I always have the lowest fertility rates. The general 
decline in overall fertility rates (net rates graphed above) can be seen by the falling level 
of the line joining the social classes in each marriage cohort between 1851 and 1886. 
Secondly, the slope of the relationship, which starts out relatively flat, becomes sharply 
                                                
86 In using the 1911 census data in any analysis, two potential biases must be taken into account. Firstly, the 
sample consists only of women (and also their husbands) who survived to census night. This has the effect 
of selecting for couples with lower mortality. As Haines points out, this has the effect of biasing fertility 
(and class fertility differential) estimates downwards as those women who have high mortality because of 
frequent life course pregnancies will be excluded from the sample (1989 p.311). Secondly, differential age at 
marriage patterns between classes could result in the fertility divergence. Stevenson standardised all 
fertility measures for this and his results stood firm. 
 106 
negative for the later marriage cohorts87. This pattern indicates a widening of class-
fertility differentials during the period of fertility decline, and this pattern is supported 
by Haines later work with the same data (1989 p. 321).  
 
In summary, previous work on class fertility differentials in England and Wales 
indicate the presence of a strong negative class-fertility relationship during the period 
of fertility decline. This pattern has been noted for other fertility transitions. As Haines 
states ‚It appears, for England and Wales, the United States, France, and Norway, at 
least that fertility decline was ‘led’ by the middle and upper classes. Social and 
economic elites apparently did act as leader in modifying this most basic of activities- 
human reproduction‛ (as quoted by Woods (2000 p. 119)). 
 
Figure 4. 1: Class-Fertility Differentials, 1860-80, England 
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Source: GRO 1923: Census of England and Wales, 1911, Volume XIII: Fertility of 
Marriage, Part II, p. xcvii. 
                                                
87 The class-fertility relationship would be even greater if gross fertility were used here (children ever 
born). The use of surviving children serves to flatten the relationship between social class and fertility 
(Woods 2000 p.119). 
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The purpose of this analysis is to add to the existing literature by including an 
important and under researched economic variable into our empirical knowledge of the 
demographic transition in England. This variable is the level of real wealth held at the 
time of death. To generate this data, I had to construct a sample and, of course, a 
sampling strategy. The next section fully details this process. 
 
Section 4.3.1: The Data and Data Generation Methodology 
 
The wills used in this study come from a range of sources and the strategy was to 
collect at least 400 wills for each decade of the second half of the 19th century, and 200 
per decade for the first half. The major distinction in the sources is due to the 
administrative changes in 1858. Before 1858, probate of a will could be granted at a 
number of different ecclesiastical courts. For wealthier individuals, whose property lay 
in multiple parishes, a higher court such as the prerogative court of Canterbury or York 
was required for the administration of the will. After 1858, the granting of probate for 
all wills in England and Wales was the responsibility of the principal probate registry in 
London. Thus, all post 1858 wills were collected from the principle probate registry in 
London. Pre 1858 wills were collected from the National Archives at Kew and the local 
history archives at Essex. Additional wills were added to the database from amateur 
genealogists who had posted transcripts on the internet. Please see the reference section 
for a complete listing of all the sources used.  
 
Wills were sampled for testators dying in Essex, Ipswich and Surrey. Figure 4.2 
reports the number of observations by county of origin for the death cohorts of 1820 to 
1910. In contrast to other European countries, English regional fertility patterns varied 
little during this period. As Wilson and Woods state "In Victorian England and Wales 
demographic variations were local rather than regional (1991 p.414). Further, Wrigley 
and Schofield stress the ‚remarkable homogeneity of the patterns‛ observed in the data 
for individual English parishes (1991 p.510) For this reason, it makes sense to focus in 
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on representative English counties, with the appropriate level of heterogeneity with 
respect to the urban and rural population. 
 
Figure 4.2: Geographical Composition of the Sample 
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Source: Wills Database 
 
Figure 4.3 plots the level of marital fertility in the sample counties alongside that 
of England and Wales as a whole. Essex has high marital fertility relative to the national 
level, but the time trend is identical. Surry and Suffolk have marital fertility levels 
which almost exactly match the national trend, but with a steeper decline for surrey 
towards the end of the 19th century. These observations are consistent with analysis of 
the coefficient of variation in marital fertility in England. This variation is exceptionally 
low relative to other European countries. 
 
The location of these counties is plotted in figure 4.4 alongside a closer map 
displaying the urban/rural composition at the 1910 census (urban areas are displayed in 
black, rural in white). The thick black area in between Surrey and Essex is London.
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Figure 4.3: The Index of Marital Fertility, 1851-1921 
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Source: Coale and Treadway 1986 pp.88-93, raw data available at 
http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/pefp/demog.asp 
 
Figure 4.4: Map of the Sample Counties and Urban/Rural Parishes 
 
 
 
 
Source: GBHGIS 2009. 
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Table 4.3 reports the urbanization rates for the sample counties, and England 
and Wales as a whole. For most of the sample period (deaths 1800-1920), the sample 
counties are relatively more rural than the national average. However, each of the 
counties is rapidly converging to the national trend. By 1901, Essex is more urbanized 
than the national average and Surrey is not far behind – the urbanization rates for these 
three units differ by less than 10%. Suffolk is consistently more rural than the other 
sample counties and the national trend. It must be noted that the entire Suffolk sample 
is from Ipswich, and is therefore urban. Research in historical demography has 
consistently found significant urban-rural demographic differentials. In the substantive 
analysis section of this chapter, a testator’s origin is controlled for (section 4.4), and 
urban-rural differences are explored fully. 
 
Table 4.3: Urbanisation in England, 1871-1901 
Year 
England 
and 
Wales Essex Surrey Suffolk 
1871 0.62 0.35 - 0.34 
1881 0.68 0.52 0.54 0.35 
1891 0.72 0.67 0.60 0.38 
1901 0.77 0.78 0.71 0.47 
Source: Coale and Treadway 1986 pp.88-93, raw data available at 
http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/pefp/demog.asp 
 
A consistent strategy was employed when coding the wills and the 
methodology employed is illustrated by reference to a specific example in the 
following. 
 
Will Coding Example: A typical will 
The Pre 1858 wills used in this study contained only copies of the will itself. Each post 
1858 will would contain a front-sheet and transcript of the individual’s will.  The front-
sheet was the source for the following information 
1. Date of probate 
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Figure 4.5: Example of the Front Sheet of a Post 1858 Will 
 
Source: Will of John Birdseye, Gentleman. Date of Grant Entry: 23/03/1872 at the 
Principal Probate Registry London, Folio 149. Available at First Avenue House, High 
Holborn, London. 
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2. Name of deceased 
3. Address and occupation of deceased 
4. Date of death 
5. Executor of will (recorded if family member) 
6. Person granted probate (recorded if family member) 
Gross value of the effects (Post 1880 wills also record a ‘net’ value). Pre 1880 wills 
record the estimated value of the deceased’s estate in value bands – see the  discussion 
later in this section.  
7. Duty band valuation 
8. Indicator of the possession of leasehold property 
 
Information points 1-8 are illustrated in the following example of the front sheet of 
the will of John Birdseye, gentleman of Kelvedon who died in 1872. This front-sheet 
information corresponded to the information recorded from the Probate indices at the 
Principal Registry of the Family Division, First Avenue House, High Holborn, WC1 
6NP, London. This information was used to locate individuals in the relevant last 
census before death. Only those who could be found in the census made the sample 
and the census coding will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Once the front sheet and census information were recorded, the will was read 
carefully and a systematic technique was employed to extract the relevant information 
for the study. From the will, the following information was recorded (Note: not every 
will provided complete information for each variable). 
1. Name 
2. Wife’s name 
3. Marital Status  
Either ‚M‛ – married, ‚W‛ – widowed, or ‚S‛- single. Where no wife or children are 
mentioned, individuals are recorded as single 
4. Father, mother, brother or sister 
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Used to identify father-son relationships in the data 
5. Named Sons 
6. Named daughters 
7. Number of married daughters 
8. Number of children under 21 
9. Number of grandchildren 
As the estimated value of the estate reported on the front-sheet omitted property, it was 
crucially important to record all mentions of property in the will. The following 
indicators were measured for all wills: 
10. Mention of Real property? 
11. Number of houses 
12. Number of town houses 
13. Number of London houses 
14. Number of ‘Mansions’ 
15. Number of business premises, mills. Etc. 
Further, it was important to include all mentions of land.  
16. Mention of land? 
17. Number of parishes that land is held in. 
18. Number of land holdings 
19. Minimum total land area 
For a small number of the Pre 1840 wills in the database, no estimate of the gross value 
of the estate was available. In this case, I employed an alternative strategy. I coded the 
wills for all information that could indicate the level of wealth held. The variables 
searched for were: 
20. All bequests to the poor 
21. All bequests to related individuals 
22. All bequests to others 
23. Annuities to wife 
24. Annuities to others 
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Finally, I added indicator variables for the quality of the family and wealth 
information. For example, a complete will with detailed and full family information 
and specific mentions of property could be used for the analysis of wealth and fertility. 
If the mentioned property was non-specific, but family information was complete – the 
recorded data could be included for calculating an overall fertility rate but not for the 
analysis of wealth and fertility together. Similarly those with accurate wealth 
information but incomplete family information could contribute to the wealth 
description but not the wealth-fertility analysis. 
 
Figures 4.6-.8 illustrate examples of wills coded, with the indicated numbers 
corresponding to the fields listed previous. The first example is (as before) the will of 
John Birdseye, gentleman of Kelvedon. 
 
Figure 4.6: Example will – Segment 1 
 
Source: Will of John Birdseye, testator database. 
 
The opening lines of this will, as with 99% of all other wills in the sample 
provide information on abode, occupation and close family. John Birdseye (1) names 
his son John (2) and daughter Sarah (3) as executors of his will. Further, a life assurance 
policy of £200 is mentioned and given to his daughter. The sum total of bequest 
information such as this was used for the earlier wills because no estimate of the estate 
valuation was provided (pre 1840s).  
 
In segment 2, John Birdseye mentions his wife Mary (2), indicating his marital
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Figure 4.7: Example will – Segment 2 
 
Source: Will of John Birdseye, testator database. 
 
Figure 4.8:  Example will – Segment 3 
 
Source: Will of John Birdseye, testator database. 
 
status – married (3). Property is also described in this section. John holds 2 houses – one 
at Broad Street Green (a village in Essex) and one at Kelvedon (10, 11), as well as one 
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piece of freehold land at Inworth, Essex (16, 17, 18). Towards the end of the will 
(segment 3), John Birdseye states he has ‚five children‛ and lists each of them (5, 6). In 
most cases, testators indicated whether their daughters were married or single, as John 
does here (7). In some cases, testators indicated if their children were under 21, and also 
mentioned grandchildren. All of this information was recorded in the database. Finally, 
the date of the will was recorded. The will of John Birdseye contains accurate wealth 
information and also complete family information. This will can be used to understand 
the wealth fertility relationship. It is of approximately average length. 
 
Once the index data had been collected, testators were searched for in the 
respective last census before death. The UK censuses from 1841-1901 were used. Online 
resources such as www.ancestry.co.uk and also the National Archives at Kew were 
relied upon to link the testators in the sample to their last census before death. As I 
have already mentioned, I first collected the Probate index data for Ipswich and Essex 
testators from First Avenue House. Then I searched for these individuals in the relevant 
census. This strategy ensured that all my observations are linked to the census returns. 
However, For the 1840s it was not possible to link a satisfactory number to the census. 
Therefore many 1840s testators were included in the analysis without census 
information. Dates of births were inferred for these individuals. 2135 out of 2319 post 
1840 wills were linked to the census (92%). 
  
Figure 4.9: 1871 Census Entry for John Birdseye 
 
Source: UK Census of 1871, at www.ancestry.co.uk accessed 26/02/2009
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Figure 4.9 illustrates a typical census entry. Again, the testator used is John 
Birdseye, gentleman from Kelvedon (died 1872). Testators would be linked to the 
census using Name, Address, spouse and occupation. Where there was ambiguity, the 
testator was dropped from the sample. This meant that common names such as ‚John
Smith‛ were rarely selected88. Once a testator was identified in the relevant census, the 
following information was recorded: 
1. Census year 
2. Surname, Name 
3. Residence 
4. Age at census 
5. Occupation 
6. Place of birth 
7. Spouse name 
8. Spouse’s age 
 
Once age at census had been recorded, the probate and census sources could be 
cross referenced to give each testator a year of birth. For John Birdseye, table 4.4 reports 
all the information derived from the primary sources: 
 
The Reported Cash Value of Testator’s Estates 
After an individual’s death, those seeking to act on authority of their will needed to be 
granted an act of probate. For tax reasons, the testator’s estate was valued. The 
executors or administrators of the wills submitted estimates, and because of a fine for 
undervaluation "the gross valuation was always likely to be an upper estimate of an 
individuals worth" (Owens et al. 2006 p.386). What was included in this valuation? The 
probate duty was exclusively payable on personalty and not realty. Thompson 
                                                
88 There are two John Smiths in the database. One could not be linked to a census entry but his family and 
wealth information are included in the sample with an inferred year of birth. The other ‚John Smith‛ was 
linked to a census entry via a very specific address – ‚Skinners Farm, Theydon Mount‛ and a spouse called 
‚Susannah‛. 
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Table 4.4:  Example Data from John Birdseye 
Variable Value 
Name John Birdseye 
Date of Death 24/02/1872 
Will 'Gross Val £ 600 
# of Houses 2 
# of Land Holdings 1 
# of Children 5 
# of Sons 3 
# of Daughters 2 
Son 1 John 
Son 2 Jonathon (checked)89 
Son 3 Thomas 
Daughter 1 Sarah 
Daughter 2 Elizabeth 
Number of Daughters Married 1 
Probate Occupation Gentleman 
Census Age 65 
Year of Birth 1806 
Age at Death 66 
Spouse Mary 
Spouse's age 63 
Spouse's year of birth 1808 
Census Occupation Retired baker and confectioner 
Place of birth Feering, Essex, 
Census Residence High st., kelvedon 
Census Year 1871 
ASSETS Complete 
CHILDREN Complete 
County Essex 
Source: See figures 4.5-9 
 
summarises the issue succinctly: 
 
‚The law was that only personalty was liable to probate duty, and hence probate 
valuations were confined to the personalty assets left at death. All cash and near cash, 
and all moveable property, had the character of personalty, which thus included the 
moveable machinery, stock-in-trade and goodwill of a business, as well as the stocks 
                                                
89 Verified, not double entry. 
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and shares, furniture, pictures, plate, and other chattels that an individual possessed. 
Real property, which was excluded from probate evaluations, comprised land, and 
everything permanently attached to land, such as buildings and fixtures inside 
buildings like fixed plant and machinery that was deemed to be immovable‛ 
(Thompson 1992 p.363) 
 A further weakness of using the probate valuations to infer wealth is the 
possibility that the probate valuations may miss inter vivos gifts, which may include 
significant transfers of holdings before death, specifically to avoid the payment of death 
duties (Rubinstein 1991 p.150). A thorough bibliography of critiques of using probate 
valuations as measures of wealth is given by Owens et al 2006 p.384.  
 
 There is a debate in the historical literature over the validity of using probate 
valuations as true measures of wealth. This debate is illustrated by the exchanges 
between W.D Rubinstein and M.J. Daunton90. However, their differences mainly 
focused upon the usage of the probate registry for research into the very rich. The 
closest study the author has knowledge of is the recent paper by Owens et al. (2006). 
They conclude that the probate valuations are a "reasonably good estimate of true net 
worth" (p.401), at least for the 1810 to 1840 period. 
 
 This study relies on the probate valuations as being strong indicators of true 
wealth. While the mentioned difficulties may serve to distort individual estimates of 
true wealth, there is no reason to believe that the sample as a whole should suffer from 
any significant bias. For the vast majority of the wills used for analysis, a cash valuation 
was available. To this were added estimates of bequeathed property and freehold land, 
which were derived from the will itself. The legal and administrative requirements for 
the cash valuation changed over the sample period, with the major change coming in 
1881. 
 
                                                
90 See for example: Daunton 1989 and 1991, and Rubinstein 1991. 
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Figure 4.10: Observed Gross Value bands for 1858-1880 Wills 
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Source: Wills Database 
 
Before 1881 the estimated value of the estate was reported as being under a 
certain threshold (e.g. under £50, £100) etc. The difference between these bands 
decreases as the estimated wealth decreases: There are four observed bands between £0 
and £100, and there are four observed bands between £50,000 and £100,000. This issue 
is important as it blurs the differentiation between the ‘super rich’ at the top of the 
wealth distribution. However, this analysis is primarily interested in the broad 
characteristics between different groups in the entire wealth distribution. Therefore 
wide ‘wealth-groupings’ are used in the analysis. These wide divisions help to alleviate 
the inaccuracy of some of the underlying estimates of net worth. Figure 4.10 illustrates 
the observations at the pre 1881 tax bands. 
 
After 1881, an estimate was made for both gross and net valuations of testator’s 
estates. Gross valuations omitted any account for debts that the testator was liable for at 
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Figure 4.11: Gross and Net Estate Valuations 
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Source: Wills Database 
 
the time of his death. The net figure corrected this. What was the impact of accounting 
for due debts on the valuations of the estates of English testators? Figure 4.11 plots 
gross wealth against net wealth for 699 post 1881 testators (whom held a gross wealth 
of under £4000). The strong correlation is confirmed by the results of a simple OLS 
regression detailed in table 4.5. The gross value of a testator’s estate explains over 96% 
of the variation in net probate values. Further, the gross value of a person’s estate is a 
highly significant predictor of the net value with significance at the 1/1000 of a percent 
level. The constant could be interpreted as reflecting an average level of debt – although 
its scale is large. An OLS regression without a constant produced an almost identical 
result with respect to the variance explained and the significance of the gross value in 
explaining the net value of estates. This evidence is supportive of arguments made by 
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Rubenstein91 (1977, 1991) and Owens et al. (2006) that where net valuations are 
unavailable, gross probate valuations are acceptable estimates for the true net worth of 
testators. 
 
These changes had to be accounted for in the calculation of total testator wealth 
 
Table 4.5: OLS Regression on Net Probate Value 
   
Gross Probate Value 0.918*** .907*** 
Constant -812.208*** - 
 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.962 .962 
Observations 714 
Data source: Wills Database 
 
The best measure of wealth collected was the net probate valuation of the 
personalty (cash/movable goods). However, the pre 1880 wills only contained the gross 
estimate was available. This was converted to a net measure using the parameters of 
the observed relationship of gross to net valuations where both were available. A 
coefficient of .907 (without a constant) explained over 96% of the variation in the 
relationship between gross and net wealth (table 4.5). For the wills where the probate 
valuation was reported in terms of a maximum duty band, this maximum was also 
multiplied by .907. For 110 wills, no probate valuation was available. For these wills, 
the sum total of all cash bequests and annuities was used to estimate personalty wealth. 
The relationship between this value and the estimated gross probate was estimated 
using 163 observations where both were recorded. The OLS regression is reported in 
table 4.6, and the parameter applied to the sum of cash bequests and annuities was 1.12. 
Following this, the values were multiplied by .907 to estimate a net wealth measure. 
 
                                                
91 Rubenstein estimates that the difference between the gross and net value of an estate, was on average 5 to 
15% (Owens et al 2006 p.387). 
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Table 4.6: OLS Regression on Gross Probate Valuation 
   
Sum of Cash Bequests 
And Annuities 
1.06*** 1.12*** 
Constant 1671.728 - 
 
Adjusted R-Squared .780 .793 
Observations 163 
 
The nominal values of the real estate, bequests and estimated personalty were 
converted to real values using annual price indices from ONS (2009 table 3.6) and 
decadal values from Clark (2005a). The price indices were adjusted to reflect 1850 
prices, and the ONS series was adjusted to equal the Clark series in 1850. The resulting 
annual Clark adjusted ONS series are used in this analysis. Figure 4.12 illustrates the 
trends in the prices series used during the 19th century.  
 
Figure 4.12: The Price Series used in the Analysis 
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 Following this process, estimates of real property and freehold land were added 
to the cash valuation. As detailed in the first part of this section, wills were read and 
coded for all mentions of property: the number of houses and land holdings, the size of 
land areas and the location of these assets was recorded. The houses were multiplied by 
estimates for the average value of housing in real prices for each decade of the 19th 
century. A different value was determined by location: London, urban or rural. The
 source for this house price data was (Clark 2002). 
 
The construction of the database required the coding of 2862 wills. Of these, 
1833 were judged to contain reliable and complete information on real property and 
land held by the testator before death. About 14%, or 257, of the sample testators’ 
bequeathed land. In nearly half of land bequests (108), the area of land was indicated. 
The area of the remaining 149 land holdings was estimated by relating the observed 
areas to features coded for in every will. Experimentation was employed to find the 
best functional form, with a judgment on the goodness of fit made through the 
proportion of variation explained by the model. The following formulation was 
employed: 


191121.0*061.0*01.0
*57.0*13.5.0)(
IDSTATUScDFARMERDTOWNALITYSQRTPERSON
NPARISHESNGSNLANDHOLDIAreaLog
i
i
 
Where )(AreaLog  is the natural logarithm of the area of land bequeathed, 
NGSNLANDHOLDI  is the number of land holdings mentioned in the will, 
NPARISHES  is the number of parishes in which land is held, ALITYSQRTPERSON  is 
the square root of the cash personalty (in real terms), DTOWN  is an indicator variable 
for town residence, DFARMER  is an indicator variable for farming occupations, and 
1911IDSTATUS  are indicator variables of each of the eight 1911 occupational classes 
(with 9 representing unknowns)92. The regression was performed upon 108 
                                                
92 The estimated coefficients were: Occupational class I (the highest class and the reference category): 0, 
class II (which included farmers): 0.69, class III: 0.32, class IV:-0.73, class V:-1.95 and class IX (unknown): 
0.56. Classes VI-VIII (textile workers, miners etc) were not represented in the sample.  
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observations, and had an 2R  of .18. The estimated coefficients were then used to infer 
land areas for the 149 testators who left land, but gave no indication of the area. The 
estimated land areas were then converted to a real valuation using Clark’s (1998) land 
price series. 
  
 The sum of the price series adjusted cash, property and land valuations 
represented the total real wealth of the testator. The estimated values are plotted 
against year of death in figure 4.1393. For analysis, this distribution of estimated total 
real wealth is split into quartiles. This is to allow a non-parametric analysis of the 
wealth differentials with respect to fertility and nuptiality, age at death and the other 
demographic variables used in this analysis. Through employing this methodology, a 
rigid structural form on the relationships between these variables is not imposed. 
Further, the division of the wealth distribution into quartiles helps to control for the 
inevitable margin of error in each wealth estimate. A calculated difference in the total 
real wealth of testators of £100 may not be informative here, but membership of the 
bottom quartile as opposed to the top quartile indicates a huge difference in real 
wealth.  
 
An OLS regression of year of death on total real wealth failed to find any 
significance for a time trend in real wealth over the sample period, as illustrated by the 
broken line in figure 4.13. The regression had an adjusted 2R of 0.0003. Because there 
was no time trend in the data, the pooled wealth distribution was split into quartiles. 
Table 4.7 reports the summary statistics for these quartiles in constant 1850s pounds. 
                                                
93 The square root of real wealth is used to compress the values together for visual representation. 
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Figure 4.13: Total Real Wealth (Square Root) by Year of Death 
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Source: Wills Database 
 
Table 4.7: Real Wealth Division, Summary Statistics 
Wealth 
Group Obs. 
Mean 
Wealth 
(1850s £) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(1850s £) 
Minimum 
(1850s £) 
Maximum 
(1850s £) 
1 375 142.12 75.90 0.56 272.10 
2 339 508.53 145.86 273.78 826.44 
3 369 1611.81 567.09 831.09 2721.00 
4 345 12784.94 20429.97 2733.12 225842.40 
Source: Wills Database 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, historical demographers have 
always found large urban/rural demographic differentials. The location of the testator 
in this sample is a crucial piece of information and must be controlled for. In assigning 
testators to urban or rural status, I use a simple cut of above and below a population of 
5,000 for the town in which they lived. The median date of death for testators in my 
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sample was 1874, and I cross referenced named towns in the probate/census records 
with the 1871 census94. Those who lived in towns with a population of over 5,000 were 
coded as urban, those who lived in a town under 5,000 were coded as rural and those 
who lived in London received a special categorization. Table 4.8 reports the location of 
the sample testators with respect to this coding. For the sample as a whole, nearly 60% 
are from urban areas. This figure varies by decade of death, and the variance reflects 
the changing source counties for the testators, and also the rapidly increasing 
urbanization in this period. The rates also reflect the addition of the Ipswich testators, 
who were all urban dwellers. 
 
Table 4.8: Testator Locations 
Decade 
of 
Death 
Rural 
Ob. 
Urban 
Obs. 
Urbanization 
Rate 
Sample Source 
(County) 
1820 103 83 0.45 Surrey 
1830 105 86 0.45 Surrey 
1840 69 19 0.22 Essex 
1850 81 10 0.11 Essex 
1860 164 96 0.37 Essex and Ipswich 
1870 160 269 0.63 Essex and Ipswich 
1880 136 258 0.65 Essex and Ipswich 
1890 110 260 0.70 Essex and Ipswich 
1900 100 327 0.77 Essex and Ipswich 
1910 45 50 0.53 Essex and Ipswich 
 
Total 
 
1073 1458 0.58  
Source: Wills Database 
 
Finally, a year of birth was constructed using the sample data. For the vast 
majority of wills, it was possible to link testators to the relevant last census before 
death, and calculate both an actual age at death and an exact year of birth. For 726 wills, 
                                                
94 Table 4 - Area, Houses and Inhabitants, 1861 and 1871, in the Parishes and Places comprised in each 
Superintendent Registrars District and each Registrars Sub-District. 
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this was not possible as they either could not be found in the original enumerator’s 
returns or the link was unsure. For these observations an age of death (and therefore a 
year of birth) was inferred from the observed relationship between testator 
characteristics and age at death. Again, the appropriate functional form was chosen by 
experimentation: 
 
DWIDOWERDSINGLEYEARDEATHAGE *23.10*975.0*093.073.55   
Where AGE  represents age at death, YEARDEATH  represents the year of death95.  
DSINGLE  is a categorical variable representing single status (never married, no 
children) and DWIDOWER  is a categorical variable representing widowers. The 2R of 
this regression was .095. 
 
Figure 4.14: Inferred and Actual Age at Death 
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Source: Wills Database 
                                                
95 The year of death was adjusted by subtracting 1800. 
Inferred 
Actual 
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Figure 4.14 illustrates the inferred and actual values for age at death used in the 
sample.  The vast majority of inferred values are pre 1850, and the trend in these values 
is constructed (via the application of the regression parameters) to follow the linear 
trend in age at death post 1850. Being single shifts a testators value down slightly, while 
being a widower shifts his estimated age at death up significantly. Theses estimated 
ages at death are used to form birth cohorts for the testators, and the numbers of 
testators by cohort of birth is reported in table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9: Numbers of Testators by Year of Birth 
Decade of Birth Observations 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1761 1784 1804 1824 1844 1865
Estimated Year of Birth
Actual Year of Birth
 
1750 23 
1760 178 
1770 237 
1780 230 
1790 310 
1800 317 
1810 382 
1820 378 
1830 334 
1840 211 
1850 107 
1860 36 
Source: Wills Database 
 
Section 4.3.2: Robustness Checks for the Data 
 
This section tests the validity of the data generated by asking five questions. Firstly, 
how representative are these testators? Following this, I ask if the timing of the wealth 
valuation biases the estimates – in other words I test the data for the presence of life 
course wealth accumulation patterns. Thirdly, I check the average time between the 
writing of a will and death. Most crucially for the fertility analysis, I then ask: Were all 
children included in the will? Finally, I check the nuptiality patterns for consistency 
with census estimates. 
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How Representative are these Testators? 
Pre existing evidence on the proportion of the population leaving wills is thin. 
Fortunately, I was able to reconstruct an estimate for this using Ipswich testators. 
Complete death registers were extracted from Razzell, Davies and Garrett (2007 
Sociological Study of Fertility and Mortality in Ipswich, 1872-1910 [computer file]). Using 
this information I cross checked with the indices to the probate registry at First Avenue 
House in High Holborn, London. I searched for all men who died with an age at death 
of over 25 years between 1872 and 1910. Table 4.10 reports the results of this exercise: 
 
Table 4.10: Proportion of Ipswich Males Leaving a Will 
Decade Number 
Searched 
Number 
found 
Proportion 
found 
1872-9 1355 161 0.12 
1880-9 1449 204 0.14 
1890-9 1207 201 0.17 
1900-9 1019 116 0.11 
Source: Wills Database 
 
The proportion of Ipswich’s male population leaving a will ranges from apx. 
11%-17%. This estimate must be considered a lower bound. I only searched for 
deceased males in the probate register for the year of their death. Some testator’s wills 
are proved in the next calendar year after their death. This is particularly likely for 
those dying towards the end of the year. My own estimates indicate that 2.5% of wills 
granted are granted in the next calendar year (after the year of death). Further, I 
searched for males who died over the age of 25. If I had searched for those over 50 or 
60, the proportion leaving wills is likely to be substantially higher. 
 
This lower bound of 11-17% is not a random sample of the wider population. As 
Lindert puts it: 
‚The probate population is a biased segment of society, over representing the elderly, 
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the middling agricultural classes, and Merchants‛ 
(1986 p.1133). 
 
One way to compare the characteristics of the sample data is to find nationally 
available measures. One such measure is the occupational distribution of the 
population. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 1911 census of 
England introduced a ‘social class’ ladder – a division generated from the occupation 
category and designed by T.H.C Stevenson96. This ‘Social Class’ system of occupational 
designation consists of eight classes, and is described in table 4.11.  
 
Table 4.11: Stevenson’s Occupational Class System 
 Definition Examples 
Class I Upper and Middle class Commercial and Railway 
Clerks, Insurance Agents - 
Not artisans 
Class II Intermediate Class Shopkeeping trades 
Class III Skilled Workmen Carpenters, Plumbers, 
Blacksmith 
Class IV Undetermined (skilled/Unskilled) 
Working Class 
Cooper, Fisherman, 
Gardener 
Class V Unskilled Workmen Brickmaker, Labourer, 
Chimney Sweep 
Class VI Textile Workers Colthworker, Weaver 
Class VII Miners Coal Burner, Coke Porter 
Class VIII Agricultural Labourers Agricultural Labourers,  
Source: [Census of England and Wales 1911] (GRO 1923 page lxxvi-lxxvii and Table 30, 
pp28-143) 
 
As the table show, the class system descends in social order from classes I-V, 
with classes VI-VIII representing special occupational groups.  
 
Using the 1911 census occupation classification schema, table 4.12 reports the 
occupational characteristics of the sample data alongside that of the general population 
                                                
96 Superintendent of Statistics in the Office of the General Registrar, supervised the analysis of the 1911 
census (Haines 1989 p.307). 
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Table 4.12: The Occupational Distribution of the Sample 
1911 
Occ. 
Class 
General Population Testators 
Census Year Decade of Death 
1881 1891 1901 1911 1870 1880 1890 1900 
I 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.25 0.34 0.38 0.35 
II 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.40 0.37 0.31 0.30 
III 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.22 
IV 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 
V 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 
VI 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
VII 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
VIII 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs. Population 272 267 209 170 
Source: Wills Database 
 
Figure 4.15: Census and Sample Occupational Distribution 
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for the census years 1881-1911. Figure 4.15 pools this data and presents it visually. It is 
of no surprise that the testator group is strongly biased towards those in the high status 
occupations, classes I and II according to Stevenson’s schema. The testator sample has 
2.6 times the number of Class I occupations and 2.3 times the number of class II 
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occupations that you would expect from a random sample of the population. Every 
other occupational class is underrepresented. The sample has about .78 times the 
representation of class III, .58 times the representation for class IV and .27 the 
representation for class V. The ‘special’ occupational categories, classes VI-VIII are not 
represented in this sample.97 The exercise reveals, as expected that the testator sample is 
heavily biased towards those in the highest status occupations.  The empirical solution 
to this problem is to build as large a database as possible. The methodological solution 
is to control for each occupational class, and this is performed in the next section. 
 
The Life Course 
Economic theory tells us that, on average, people will tend to accumulate wealth over 
the life cycle. Past a certain age, for example the age of retirement, people will dis-save. 
Is there evidence for this life course behaviour in the testator database? Figure 4.16 
plots the square root of total wealth against age at death. A quadratic fit between the 
data points is also included.  There is a strong and highly significant positive 
association of age at death and the level of total (cash and real estate) wealth. This is 
confirmed by the results of an OLS regression of age at death on the square root of real 
wealth (table 4.13). As figure 4.16 illustrates, the strength of this relationship falls 
strikingly as age of death rises.  There is no evidence for dis-saving from this pooled 
sample.  
 
Table 4.13: OLS Regression on Total Real Wealth (Square Root) 
   
Constant 15.93 0.321 
Age at Death 0.394*** 0.918 
Age at Death Squared  -.004 
Adjusted 2R  0.013 0.013 
Observations 1383 
Source: Wills Database 
                                                
97 The representation for class VI in the testator sample is apx. 0.11, but the number of underlying 
observations is very small to be useful for analysis. 
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Figure 4.16: The Life Course and Total Wealth 
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Source: Wills Database 
 
The estimated coefficients for age at death and age at death squared fail to be 
significant at the 5% level. The implied turning point, or age at death, where the 
negative association of age at death and wealth ‘kicks’ in was calculated to be at 
approximately 114 years. This is an unfeasibly late age for dis-saving to be a serious 
bias in the reported values of real wealth.  
 
Time between writing will and death 
In order to be a justifiable record of completed net fertility (and perhaps accumulated 
wealth over the life cycle) it is necessary that these wills are written within a short 
period before death. For a sub-sample of the testator database, I calculated the time (in 
years) between the writing of the will and the date of death. Table 4.14 reports the 
results of this exercise. Over 56% of the testators write their will in the year before, or in 
the year of, death. Only in 12% of testators is this gap longer than 10 years. 
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Table 4.14: Time between Writing of Will and Death 
Number of Years between 
Writing Will and Death 
Proportion of Testators 
Same Year 0.36 
1 Year 0.21 
2 Years 0.08 
3 Years 0.05 
4 Years 0.05 
5 Years 0.05 
6 Years 0.04 
7 Years 0.01 
8 Years 0.02 
9 Years 0.02 
>10 Years 0.12 
Observations 466 
Source: Wills Database 
 
Were all children included in the will? 
The primary measure for net fertility in this study is the sum total of named children in 
testator’s wills. For this to be meaningful, it is essential that there is no systematic 
under-reporting, or omission of children for whatever reason, from the will. After 
reading nearly 3,000 wills, my firm intuition is that omission was minimal. Testators 
would always mention all surviving offspring. In the extremely rare case where 
children were estranged from their father, it was noted and some bequest, often much 
less than the other children, was made. Typically, married daughters would receive less 
than sons. This may have been due to previous exchanges, such as a dowry at the time 
of marriage.  
 
An empirical test for omission is to calculate a sex ratio. The sex ratio is the 
number of males to females, usually quoted as the number of males per female, in a 
population. If omission was present, we would reasonably expect it to be sex biased, i.e. 
married daughters would be omitted at the expense of sons.  Table 4.15 reports the sex-
ratio for named children in testator’s wills and that of the general population at the 
census following the testator’s decade of death (e.g. the 1840 value represents the
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census date of 1851 and so on). 
 
Table 4.15: The Sex-Ratio of Named Testator Children Compared with the General 
Population 
Decade of 
Death/Census 
Boys 
 
Girls 
 
Boys per 
Girl 
 
Sex Ratio 
of 
Population 
1820 113 135 0.46  
1830 143 135 0.51  
1840 119 124 0.49 0.46 
1850 177 171 0.51 0.49 
1860 182 192 0.49 0.49 
1870 310 279 0.53 0.49 
1880 222 243 0.48 0.48 
1890 214 231 0.48 0.48 
1900 253 266 0.49 0.48 
 
Total 
 
1733 1776 0.49 
 
0.48 
(Average) 
Source: Wills database and  Rothenbacher 
 
The rising sex ratio in the general population may reflect the decline in infant 
mortality during this period (which was male biased as infant mortality was always 
higher for males - a hypothesis derived from observations in James 1987 p.742). It is 
important to note that the data presented in table 4.15 is not directly temporally 
comparable. This is because the sex ratio at the census will reflect the sex ratio for the 
entire population, whereas the sex ratio for the testators represents their offspring – a 
generational slice which contributes (with other generations) to the observed 
population sex ratio. The sex ratio for the testators exhibit no tendency towards 
systematic over or under representation. The rising values between 1820 and 1850 are 
reflected in the census figures for 1840-1870. For two decades, the testators have a sex 
ratio corresponding to (slightly) more males than females. Overall the sex ratio for 
named children in the sample is 0.49, exactly what we would expect from a random 
sample of the English population during this period. This evidence rules out any sex
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biased omission from the testator database. 
 
Nuptiality and Wealth 
How representative is the nuptiality structure of the testator sample? Tables 4.16 and 
4.17 report the proportion of never married testators and the proportion of never 
married males in the population as a whole. From 1760-1800, the sample over 
represents unmarried men. This may be due to the potential higher incidence of will 
writing amongst those with no obvious heir. After 1800, there is a huge fall in the 
number of unmarried testators. This is due to a slightly different sampling strategy for 
the post 1858 wills. For the years after 1858, the strategy was to link every observation 
to a census record. To do this, links would often be based on the first name of a spouse, 
which would be recorded in both sources. Before 1858, all wills were included in the 
sample. Figure 4.17 reports the trend in testator nuptiality with respect to decade of 
birth. This mis-representation must be controlled for, and any simple average 
calculation must be treated with a high degree of scepticism. The best solution to this 
problem is to examine marital fertility independent of the proportion married for each 
testator class.  
 
Between wealth groups, there is no consistent pattern. Marriage rates are 
highest for wealth group 3 overall, but relatively flat between the wealth quartiles. For 
the period before 1800, the large proportion of testators unmarried is largely confined 
to the bottom half of the wealth distribution. For comparison, table 4.18 reports the 
marriage rates of the different occupational classes. Again the variation is relatively 
minor (apx. 3%), except for occupational class V, the unskilled working class, who have 
a sharply decreased incidence of marriage (apx. 8%).  
 
Do Richer Men marry Younger Wives? 
Over 72% of testators marry younger women than themselves, with 10% marrying 
women of the same age and 18% marrying older women. Do richer testators
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Table 4.16: Proportion Single, Urban and Rural by Wealth Group 
  Wealth Group 
 All 1 2 3 4 
All 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.11 
Before 1800 0.18 0.24 0.22 0.12 0.13 
After 1800 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.10 
Rural 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.09 0.11 
Urban 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.11 
Source: Wills Database 
  
Table 4.17: Population Nuptiality Trends from 1851 
 
Proportion 
Single 
Age at Marriage 
Census Male Female Male Female 
1851 11.36 12.36 26.94 25.77 
1861 10.44 12.07 26.39 25.39 
1871 9.6 12.18 26.43 25.13 
1881 9.52 12.05 26.6 25.3 
1891 9.85 12.53 27.06 25.96 
1901 10.86 13.78 27.31 26.27 
1911 11.91 15.97 27.65 26.25 
Source: Wrigley and Schofield, 1981 p.437 
 
Table 4.18: 1911 Census - Proportion Married per 1,000  
 
Proportion  
Married98 
% difference 
 to Average 
Population  .824 0.00% 
Occupational Class  
I .829 0.61% 
II .849 3.03% 
III .851 3.28% 
IV .850 3.16% 
V .758 -8.01% 
VI .842 2.18% 
VII .819 -0.61% 
VIII .735 -10.80% 
Source: GRO 1923 p.lxxix, table XXXIV, Garret et al. 2001 p.223. 
                                                
98 The proportion married at age 45-55. 
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marry younger women than poorer testators? For 675 observations, it is possible to 
compare both husband and wives year of birth (actual census observations, not 
inferred). An age difference is calculated by subtracting wife’s year of birth from 
husband’s. Where this is positive, the wife is older, where it is negative, the wife is 
younger. To determine the association between the wealth groups and the age 
difference of spouses, an OLS regression was run with spouse age difference as the 
dependant variable and wealth quartiles as categorical independent variables. Table 
4.19 reports the results of this exercise. 
 
Table 4.19: OLS Regression on Spouse Age Difference 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Constant 0.512*** 0.570 
Wealth Group 1 0 (Ref.) - 
Wealth Group 2 0.512 0.826 
Wealth Group 3 -1.180 0.824 
Wealth Group 4 -3.508*** 0.843 
R2 0.033 
Observations 675 
Source: Wills Database 
 
There is a strong and highly significant association between the top wealth 
quartile and younger spouses. The regression indicates that membership of this wealth 
group is associated with a wife 3.5 years younger than that of the reference category – 
Wealth Group 1 – the poorest testators. This effect only seems to apply to those at the 
very top – the coefficients on Wealth Group’s 2 and 3 fail to be significant at the 
standard levels. Unfortunately, the limitations of the wills database do not allow 
further investigation. Was this association a result of greater remarriage amongst the 
wealthier testators? If this were the case, we should expect to find a lower proportion of 
widowers amongst the testators in the top wealth quartile. A superficial glance at the 
data does not support this. The proportion of widowers amongst the testators ranges 
from approximately .20-.28, and is highest for the richest testator group – Wealth Group 
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4. These results imply that richer testators marry younger wives and the rate of 
remarriage is unassociated with this observation. 
 
 Interestingly, this result diverges from what we would expect from status. The 
female age at marriage differentials reported by Garret et al. show that, on average, the 
lower social classes (using the 1911 schema) married younger wives (Table 5.2.1 2001). 
The difference is striking, with respect to class V, unskilled workers, and class VIII, 
agricultural labourers marrying women two and three years younger than the 
population average respectively. The top status groups – the middle and upper classes, 
professionals, married the oldest wives. This relationship runs in the reverse direction 
to that of wealth. 
 
Table 4.20: Proportion of Marriages Childless, Urban and Rural by Wealth Group 
  Wealth Group 
 All 1 2 3 4 
All 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.32 0.28 
Before 1800 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.25 
After 1800 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.29 
Rural 0.32 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.24 
Urban 0.31 0.35 0.30 0.33 0.27 
Source: Wills Database 
 
Table 4.20 reports the proportion of childless marriages for the testator sample. 
The proportion of testators childless is far higher than what we would expect from a 
random sample of the population. This pattern cannot be representative of the general 
population. Calculations of the proportion childless by duration of marriage in England 
and Wales, from the fertility census of 1911, are reported in table 4.21. For the general 
married population, the proportion childless is on average about 17%. As testators are 
more likely to have long marital durations (their fertility is measured at the end of their 
life), we should expect their childless proportion to be less than 17%. However, about 
33% of the married testators are childless. The figure is lower for the pre-1800 era, and 
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in general is greater for the poorer testators. This figure certainly reflects a higher 
propensity to make a will if a testator had no obvious heirs. Another concern is the 
possibility that testators wrote a will before they had a family. As I have shown 
however, over 80% of wills were written five or less years before death, and 88% were 
written under a decade before death. This cannot be the source of the bias. For this 
analysis, some control must be constructed for this effect.  
 
Table 4.21: Proportion of Marriages Childless (1911 Census) 
Duration of  
Marriage 
Proportion 
Childless 
0-5 0.39 
5-10 0.16 
10-15 0.13 
15-20 0.11 
20-25 0.10 
25-30 0.09 
30-40 0.08 
40-50 0.07 
50+ 0.06 
All 
 
0.17 
Source: Murphy 2008 
 
Section 4.4: Analysis of the Wealth-Fertility Relationship 
 
This section analyses the wealth-fertility relationship. Firstly, the estimated net fertility 
of the testator sample is compared with published estimates of the net fertility rate for 
England over the course of the 19th century. Next, raw averages are constructed for each 
of the wealth quartiles. Following this, negative binomial regressions determine with 
greater power the statistical significance of the wealth fertility relationship. Finally, the 
results are analysed. 
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How well do the Testator Fertility Estimates Match Existing Estimates of Marital 
Fertility? 
Wrigley and Schofield have published cohort based estimates of the Net Reproduction 
Rate (NRR) in England from 1540 to 1820. This measure adjusts fertility for expected 
mortality risks. The average number of daughters born per woman (the gross 
reproduction rate) is multiplied by the probability of a girl reaching maternity. The 
fertility estimates for the testator sample is based upon named children in the will, who 
would have survived to near the time of their father’s death. Dividing these estimates 
by two to approximate daughters per testator, we can form direct comparisons with the 
Wrigley and Schofield Net Reproduction Rates.   
  
 Before this could be done, two adjustments to the testator estimates were 
required. Preliminary analysis demonstrated that the testator sample over represented 
childless marriages. To correct for this an average family size was calculated for 
testators with at least one child. This number was multiplied by 0.92 to correct for the 
omission of childless marriages99. This gave a figure applicable to all marriages. To 
correct for the omission of single men, this number was then multiplied by 0.9, as 0.1 of 
the sample were unmarried at death. The small differentials in proportions married 
between the occupational classes reported in table 4.18 supports the legitimacy of this 
adjustment100. Figure 4.17 charts Testator Fertility and the Wrigley-Schofield NRR 
estimates for the English population.   
 
 The testator fertility rates closely track those of the population NRR estimates. 
The average difference between the measures for the cohort years of 1750-1850 is 
slightly over 1%. This evidence confirms the reliability and validity of the testator wills 
as a source for the calculation of fertility levels.    
                                                
99 0.92 was chosen as 8% of marriages of marital duration of 30-40 years are childless (table 19). Assuming a 
mean age of marriage of 27 and a later death for the spouse, the mean testator marriage duration was 38.1 
years. 
100 This does not apply for occupational class V – unskilled workmen, who were significantly more likely to 
be single at death than the population as a whole (apx. 24% vrs 17%) Source: As table 4.16. 
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Figure 4.17: Testator Fertility Compared with Population NRR 
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Source: Wills Database and Wrigley 1997. 
 
Table 4.23 reports the Raw and unadjusted Averages of completed marital 
fertility for the four wealth groups before and after 1800 (decade of birth) and for rural 
and urban testators. The number in parenthesis is the average for testators with at least 
one child. There appears to be a strong and consistent reproductive advantage for the 
rich with respect to the raw, unadjusted averages presented here. Relative to the lowest 
and poorest wealth group, the top wealth quartile has 26% more surviving children 
over the sample as a whole. This value varies over the period and between urban and 
rural environments. The differential is only 8% greater before 1800, and is 33% greater 
after 1800. For rural dwellers, membership of the top wealth quartile is associated with 
a completed level of marital fertility 63% higher than that of the lowest quartile. The 
urban differential is far smaller – only 13%. The values calculated for testators with at 
least one child are higher and follow the same trend as the values calculated over all 
married testators. 
 144 
Table 4.22: Urban and Rural Fertility, by Wealth Group 
  Wealth Group 
 All 1 2 3 4 
All 2.28 
(3.47) 
2.05 
(3.00) 
2.12 
(3.34) 
2.33 
(3.79) 
2.59 
(3.82) 
Before 1800 2.77 
(3.58) 
2.52 
(3.21) 
2.74 
(3.36) 
3.06 
(3.66) 
2.74 
(3.69) 
After 1800 2.04 
(3.37) 
1.89 
(3.30) 
1.79 
(3.16) 
1.95 
(3.32) 
2.52 
(3.67) 
Rural 2.26 
(3.63) 
1.71 
(3.00) 
1.93 
(3.34) 
2.55 
(3.79) 
2.79 
(3.82) 
Urban 2.18 
(3.32) 
2.12 
(3.39) 
2.12 
(3.17) 
2.07 
(3.24) 
2.41 
(3.55) 
Source: Wills Database 
 
Negative Binomial Regressions on Net Fertility 
In order to investigate the wealth-fertility relationship on a deeper level than simple 
averages, this section analyses the wealth-fertility relationship in a regression 
framework. The dependant variable is net fertility: the number of named children in a 
testator’s will. To account for the over representation of childless marriages, two 
regressions are run. The first is based on all marriages and the second is based on 
marriages with at least one child. This methodology can confirm whether perceived 
wealth effects are acting through differentials in the proportion of childlessness, or are 
acting on the net total of children directly. To account for the impact of early mortality, 
a categorical variable is constructed. On average, males married at 27 during the 19th 
century, and females married at 26. This implies that from the age of 27, men had a 
potential fertility span of 24 years, assuming female fecundity ends at age 50. This 
implies that for most men, their fertility life ended at age 51. After this age, additional 
children are unlikely, based on the potential fecundity of their spouse. However, an age 
of death earlier than 51 implies that males died during their reproductive span, and 
because of this early mortality, their net fertility estimate is biased downwards. Some 
control must be included for this effect. For those men who died before the age of 51, a 
dummy variable is included in the regression. The inclusion of this variable can also 
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confirm whether any perceived wealth effects act independent of differential mortality 
between the wealth groups (as noted, there is a significant and positive association 
between age at death and wealth – see table 4.13). The variable is a rough 
approximation for the effects of early mortality as for a large proportion of the pre 1850 
(year of death) testators, age of death is inferred, and is never less than 51. The variable 
can only capture the effects post 1850, and its true significance is certainly greater than 
that revealed in the regression results. A non linear time trend is also included in the 
model through categorical variables representing the decade of birth (1750-1860). 
 
The wealth effects are included in the model as categorical variables 
representing each of the wealth divisions or ‘groups’. As discussed, these wealth 
groups are based on even quartiles of the wealth distribution and ascend in wealth 
from wealth group 1 (the poorest testators) to wealth group 4 (the richest testators). 
Wealth group 1 is the reference category here, and all coefficients are relative to this 
poorest testator quartile. Wealth is included as a categorical variable in order to allow a 
non-linear association with fertility to be modelled. Further, the strength (and direction) 
of the wealth-fertility relationship is allowed to vary between urban (towns greater 
than 5,000 people) and rural (towns/villages less than 5,000 people) via an interaction 
term between the wealth categories and an urban dummy. The results therefore report 
main wealth effects, an urban effect, and marginal wealth effects for urban dwellings. 
These coefficients must be summed to understand the true effects. Finally, a negative 
binomial regression model is used as the dependant variable is a count variable (1, 2, 3 
etc.). The model to be estimated is 
 




DEDBIRTHDECAdHDEARLYDEAT
DURBANUPDWEALTHGROcUPDWEALTHGRObaNETF
i
i
i
i
i
i *
 
Where NETF  is net fertility, UPDWEALTHGROb
i
i  are categorical variables 
representing the wealth quartiles, DURBAN  is an urban dummy, HDEARLYDEAT  
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represents death under 51 years and DEDBIRTHDECAd
i
i  are categorical variables 
representing the decade of birth (1750-1860). The results of this model are reported in 
table 4.24. 
 
Table 4.23: Negative Binomial Regression on Net Fertility 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
 
All 
Marriages 
(1) 
At least 1 
Child 
(2) 
Wealth Group 1 0.00 0.00 
Wealth Group 2 0.046 
(0.155) 
0.086 
(0.108) 
Wealth Group 3 0.336* 
(0.142) 
0.231* 
(0.096) 
Wealth Group 4 0.402** 
(0.148) 
0.228** 
(0.098) 
Urban Dummy 0.213* 
(0.139) 
0.115* 
(0.096) 
WG2*Urban -0.104’ 
(0.199) 
-0.149 
(0.136) 
WG3*Urban -0.47 
(0.188) 
-0.298 
(0.127) 
WG4*Urban -0.366 
(0.191) 
-0.201 
(0.127) 
Died under 51 -0.441** 
(0.139) 
-0.186 
(0.105) 
Constant 0.973** 
(0.307) 
1.165*** 
(0.182) 
 
Observations 1220 794 
Pseudo 2R  0.020 0.009 
*   P<0.05, **  P<0.01, *** P<0.001 
 
Table 4.24 reports the results of regressions (1) and (2). Regression (1) is based 
upon all married testators. In order to account for the over representation of childless 
marriages in the testators’ sample, regression (2) repeats the same regression, but this 
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time only for marriages with at least one child. This exercise serves as a robustness 
check for the wealth-fertility patterns exposed by regression (1). The decadal (of birth) 
categorical variables are included in the regression but not reported, with a decade of 
birth of 1810 serving as the omitted category.  
 
Early mortality is controlled by the inclusion of a variable representing an age of 
death under 51 and is negative in both regressions. This early mortality dummy is 
highly significant in regression (1) but not in regression (2). The wealth effects are 
allowed to be different between urban and rural testators. For rural testators there is a 
large and significant positive association with net fertility. To more clearly see the 
wealth and urban rural net fertility differentials, the coefficients from regression (2) are 
exponentiated to give expected numbers of children per wealth group. Further, a 
constant coefficient representing the average marriage rate and childless rate are 
applied so that these figures can be readily interpreted as the expected number of 
children per male in 1810, married or unmarried, and surviving to at least age 51. These 
values are reported in table 4.25. 
 
Table 4.24: Expected Numbers of Children from Regression 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 4 
Rural 2.66 2.89 3.35* 3.34** 
Urban 2.98 2.80 2.78 3.06 
*  All coefficients significant at 0.05 level 
** All coefficients significant at 0.01 level 
 
There is a clear and significant positive association between wealth and net 
fertility for rural testators.  The richest testators here (Wealth Group 3 and 4) have net 
fertility levels 25% above those of the poorest (Wealth Group 1). The significance is 
denoted in table 4.25 by indicators representing the joint significance of all coefficients 
used to calculate the expected value at the standard levels. These indicators represent a 
 148 
statistically different value for expected children relative to the reference group, wealth 
group 1. Net fertility rises as wealth quartile ascends in value. Between the top wealth 
quartiles, there is no evidence here for fertility differentials.  For urban dwellers, the 
picture is very different. There expected values for net fertility in urban areas are 
statistically indistinguishable between the wealth groups. There is no systematic 
positive (or negative) relationship between net fertility and wealth in the towns – net 
fertility is flat as wealth group ascends. Comparing urban and rural net fertility rates, 
an urban residence was associated with increased net fertility for the poorest testators. 
For the rest, net fertility was lower in the towns than it was in the countryside101. 
 
For 19th century England, the country side was held in the rigid grip of a 
Malthusian fertility pattern. In cross section, those who held more resources had 
greater net fertility than those who had less. Is this result robust? How does this square 
with the clear (if slight) negative association of net fertility and occupational status in 
the 1911 census? Table 4.26 reports the results of the same regression, but this time 
controlling for occupational status. Occupational status is included as a categorical 
variable, and descends in status from I to VIII. The positive wealth-fertility relationship 
is confirmed in regressions (3) and (4). However, the most interesting outcome of this 
exercise is the coexistence of a very strong, and highly significant, negative relationship 
of net fertility with occupational status. Net fertility rises as occupational status 
decreases. 
 
Table 4.27 reports the expected numbers of surviving children per wealth group 
and occupational status class. This matrix can be used to deduce the varying levels of  
net fertility within the testator sample. For rural testators, net fertility increases with 
wealth, and decreases with occupational class. The group with the lowest fertility are
                                                
101 The positive wealth fertility relationship was also confirmed by the inclusion of the square root of real 
wealth. Despite imposing a parametric relationship upon the data, this variable was highly significant with 
a p-value less than 0.001. 
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 Table 4.25:  Negative Binomial Regression on Net Fertility, with Status 
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Variable 
All 
Marriages 
(3) 
At least 1 
Child  
(4) 
Wealth Group 1 (Ref.) 0.00 0.00 
Wealth Group 2 0.084 
(0.157) 
0.125 
(0.109) 
Wealth Group 3 0.388** 
(0.144) 
0.272** 
(0.097) 
Wealth Group 4 0.543*** 
(0.152) 
0.304** 
(0.101) 
Urban Dummy 0.193 
(0.141) 
0.116 
(0.097) 
WG2*Urban -0.087 
(0.2) 
-0.171 
(0.137) 
WG3*Urban -0.454* 
(0.188) 
-0.325* 
(0.128) 
WG4*Urban -0.403* 
(0.192) 
-0.219 
(0.127) 
Occ. Class I -0.563*** 
(0.17) 
-0.404*** 
(0.111) 
Occ. II -0.405* 
(0.164) 
-0.386*** 
(0.106) 
Occ. Class III -0.12 
(0.175) 
-0.286*** 
(0.112) 
Occ. Class IV -0.17 
(0.187) 
-0.281* 
(0.12) 
Occ. Class VI 0.046 
(0.464) 
-0.172 
(0.277) 
Occ. Class V (Ref.) 0.00 0.00 
Occ. VIII -0.300 
(0.33) 
-0.147 
(0.223) 
Died under 51 -0.46*** 
(0.138) 
-0.192 
(0.105) 
Constant 1.064*** 
(0.341) 
1.507*** 
(0.206) 
Observations 1220 794 
Pseudo 2R  0.026 0.014 
*P< 0.05, ** P< 0.01, ***P< 0.001  
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Table 4.26: Net Fertility by Wealth and Status 
Occupational 
Class 
Wealth Group 
1 2 3 4 
Rural 
V 3.73 4.23 4.90 5.06 
IV 2.82 3.20 3.70 3.82 
III 2.81 3.18 3.68 3.80 
II 2.77 3.13 3.63 3.75 
I 2.50 2.83 3.29 3.39 
Urban 
V 4.19 4.75 3.97 4.56 
IV 3.16 3.59 3.01 3.44 
III 3.15 3.57 2.99 3.43 
II 3.11 3.52 2.95 3.38 
I 2.81 3.19 2.67 3.06 
Rural
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those testators with the highest status occupations but the lowest wealth. The group 
with the highest fertility is the richest testators, who also have a low occupational class 
(Class V – unskilled workmen)102. For both urban and rural unskilled workers, net 
fertility is higher than 3.5 children for all wealth quartiles. For the rest of the urban 
sample, the wealth effects are more muted than they are for the rural dwellers103.  
 
Overall however, the result is striking. This analysis has unearthed two strong 
and significant co-existing effects on net fertility – a large positive relationship with 
wealth, and a large negative relationship with occupational status. 
 
Section 4.5: Explaining the Pattern 
 
The results for section 4.4 strongly indicate a positive relationship between wealth and 
fertility and a negative relationship between occupational status and fertility. 
Establishing the timing of the decline in marital fertility within the testator group is 
difficult as the data constrains us to examine completed net fertility. As illustrated in 
chapter 3, marital fertility rates can decline significantly before they impact upon the 
net fertility rate – the closest existing demographic measure to the calculated testator 
rates used here.  
 
However, it is entirely possible to isolate social group fore runners of the 
fertility transition in England via the status and wealth matrix of net fertility. As 
discussed the highest net fertility levels were those of the richest unskilled workmen in 
the rural areas (a net fertility of 5.06). As significant departure from these rates can be 
interpreted (although with caution) of evidence for the initiation of fertility decline.   
 
                                                
102 The results for occupational classes VI-VIII are omitted here as the observations. 
103 The results are easier to interpret by examining bar charts of the data contained in table 4.24 (charts 
adjoin the table). Intriguingly, the patterns observed in the rural class-wealth fertility differential 
correspond exactly to Mace’s schematic representation of the relationship between wealth and fertility 
(2000 p.390, figure 26.2 (d)).  
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On this logic, the social group forerunners of the English fertility transition were 
the poorest members of each occupational status group above class V – unskilled 
workers. Further all the members of wealth group 4, the richest testators, could be 
considered as candidates for the role of social group forerunner of the English fertility 
decline. The relationship between wealth and fertility has broken down in the urban 
areas. Perhaps the rural areas represent a pre-transitional equilibrium, and the urban 
dwellers are further down the line in entering a sustained fertility decline. 
 
What is the reason for this remarkable rural (or pre transitional) pattern? Could the 
‘positive’ wealth effect merely reflect differentials in infant mortality between the 
wealth groups? The answer is no. The measure of fertility used is net of infant and child 
(and indeed early adult) mortality.  
 
Was this pattern a result of Beckerian dynamics? Do those with lower fertility 
exhibit evidence of a quantity-quality trade-off? The answer is an emphatic no. In 
Becker’s model, the quantity-quality trade-off is triggered by increased wealth. As 
wealth increases there should be a threshold level, beyond which people switch from 
demanding extra children to increasing expenditure per child. If this truly reflects what 
is happening, we should find a positive effect of wealth at low levels of wealth, and a 
negative effect thereafter. The effect does not appear in the testator data. For all wealth 
quartiles beyond the reference category, wealth group 1, there is a positive effect on the 
associated level of net fertility. Whoever is substituting quality for quantity, it is not the 
rich in England in the 19th century.  
 
This conclusion is not a result of an arbitrary pooling of testator’s into quartiles 
of the wealth distribution. When the testators are divided into vintiles, the main result 
still holds. Figure 4.18104 shows the main quartile wealth effects (in terms of extra 
children per wealth division, relative to the lowest) alongside the vintile effects. 
                                                
104 These are calculated from a similar regression to that presented in table 4.23. 
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Splitting the testator sample into vintiles introduces more error in the estimated effects, 
but for those vintiles greater than 10 (the top half of the wealth distribution), the 
positive wealth effect is strong and consistent.  
 
Figure 4.18: Main Wealth Effects 
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As discussed, the only testators to have an estimated net fertility below three (or 
very close to 3.00) are either the middle or professional classes (occupational class I), or 
the poorest members of each of the status classes I-IV (wealth group 1). Why are these 
groups reducing their family size?  
 
It is a reasonable proposal that all of these variables, wealth, status and fertility, 
are in fact endogenous. Status can determine wealth, wealth and status can determine 
fertility. What is happening to the relationship between wealth and occupational status 
in 19th century Britain? The Victorians witnessed the full unleashing of the industrial 
age. Railway, factories and mining brought huge transformations to the English 
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landscape. The social and economic transformation was enormous. The Industrial 
Revolution brought new economic opportunities and changed the traditional system of 
acquiring wealth. Inherited land and status surely meant less at this time than it had 
before. The old world was gone. Dynamic entrepreneurs could generate wealth for 
themselves and invest in human capital for their offspring.  
 
What was the relationship between occupational status and wealth? And was 
this changing over the 19th century in England? Figure 4.19 shows the average wealth, 
by occupational status class, before and after 1800 (based upon testator year of birth). 
Two values were calculated – one for the entire wealth distribution, and another for the 
bottom three quarters. This was done to ensure that outliers, individuals with 
extremely high wealth, were not driving the results.  
 
Figure 4.19: Wealth and Status, Before and after 1800 
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For the top occupational status class, there appears to be a breakdown in the 
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strength of the relationship between wealth at death and occupational status. This is a 
striking collapse, representing a reduction of apx. 38%. When calculated for the bottom 
3/4s of the sample, the reduction is nearly 30%. It is this group which has the lowest 
fertility in the sample. Could this change, a result of the industrial revolution, be the 
reason for the reduction in fertility? Within this class, those with high wealth have 
higher fertility than those who are relatively poorer. Could these poor, high status 
testators be restricting fertility in order to avoid a dilution in their wealth? In other 
words, are they motivated by intergenerational concerns over the concentration of 
wealth amongst their offspring?  
 
Occupational status groups II (shopkeepers, merchants), III (skilled workmen) 
and IV (semiskilled workmen) all have an increased mean level of wealth associated 
with their status class. These increases, along with the simultaneous decrease in this 
value for the highest status group, imply the breakdown of the relationship between 
inherited status and final wealth at death. More empirical observations from the 
testator database support the notion that inherited status is declining in importance as a 
determinant of wealth. Land and property, traditionally the most unequally distributed 
asset (and especially so in England) is declining in importance as a proportion of 
wealth, as figure 4.20 illustrates. 
 
In summation: by examining the relationships between wealth, status and 
fertility, we can see that the most clearly identified fertility decline group, occupational 
status class I, experience a step decline in the mean value of their estates at death. 
Within this group, it is the poorest, the members of wealth group 1, who have the lowest 
fertility. It is speculated that this low fertility is a result of a desire to preserve the 
concentration of wealth within a family and between offspring. 
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Figure 4.20: Proportion of Testators Leaving Property, 1820-1910 
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Section 4.6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the primary original contribution of my thesis. The testator 
database has been described in full and thorough robustness checks have been 
performed upon this new data. For the first time, we can examine the economic 
correlates of the English fertility decline at the individual level. The analysis has 
revealed two important and opposing effects on fertility – a positive wealth effect, and 
a negative status effect. It is speculated, with support from the database, that the low 
fertility of the jointly highest status and poorest in wealth testators is a result of the 
desire to avoid downward social mobility. In order to confirm this hypothesis, a formal 
theory is constructed and tested with the testator data, in chapter 6. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4  
Expected number of Children from Regressions 3 and 4 (4 in parenthesis), no 
marriage/childless adjustment 
 
 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
Wealth 
Group 4 
Rural 
Occ Class I 1.65(3.02) 1.79(3.42) 2.43(3.97) 2.84(4.1) 
Occ Class II 1.93(3.34) 2.1(3.78) 2.85(4.39) 3.32(4.53) 
Occ. Class III 2.57(3.39) 2.79(3.84) 3.79(4.45) 4.42(4.59) 
Occ. Class IV 2.44(3.4) 2.66(3.86) 3.6(4.47) 4.21(4.61) 
Occ. Class V 2.89(4.51) 3.15(5.11) 4.27(5.92) 4.99(6.11) 
     
Urban 
Occ Class I 2(3.39) 2.17(3.85) 1.87(3.22) 2.3(3.7) 
Occ Class II 2.34(3.75) 2.55(4.25) 2.19(3.56) 2.69(4.08) 
Occ. Class III 3.11(3.8) 3.39(4.31) 2.91(3.61) 3.58(4.14) 
Occ. Class IV 2.96(3.82) 3.22(4.33) 2.77(3.63) 3.41(4.16) 
Occ. Class V 3.51(5.06) 3.82(5.74) 3.29(4.8) 4.04(5.51) 
 
Expected Number of Children from regressions 1 and 2, no marriage/childless 
adjustment 
 
Wealth 
Group 
1 
Wealth 
Group 
2 
Wealth 
Group 
3 
Wealth 
Group 
4 
All Marriages 
Rural 2.65 2.77 3.70 3.96 
Urban 3.27 3.09 2.86 3.39 
At least 1 Child 
Rural 3.21 3.49 4.04 4.03 
Urban 3.60 3.38 3.36 3.70 
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Nuptiality: Long Run trends 
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Source: Wrigley and Schofield 1981 p.260 
 
Wrigley and Schofield calculated along run estimate of the proportion never married in 
England via ‘back projection’ from information recorded from parish registers. The 
series reports remarkably high levels for men born in the 17th century, with a peak in 
1651 (over ¼ of men born between 1646 and 1661 never married) preceding a large 
decline until apx. 1736 before a smaller increase to the male cohort of 1811.  
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Table 1: Testator Sample by Occupational Class 
Class 
Observations,  
1820-1911 
Proportion 
 of Sample 
I 666 0.23 
II 1,015 0.35 
III 437 0.15 
IV 232 0.08 
V 109 0.04 
VI 8 0.00 
VII 0 0.00 
VIII 34 0.01 
No Occupation listed 420 0.14 
Total  2921 1.00 
 Source: Wills Database 
 
Table 2: Non Property Holding Testators, Amount of Bequest 
Gross 
Bequest 
Observations  Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
<50 43 0.04 0.04 
50-100 97 0.10 0.14 
100-200 136 0.14 0.28 
200-300 93 0.09 0.37 
300-400 67 0.07 0.44 
400-500 42 0.04 0.48 
500-1000 174 0.17 0.66 
>1000 343 0.34 1.00 
    
Total 995 1  
Source: Wills Database 
Table 3: Age at Death 
  Wealth Group 
 All 1 2 3 4 
All 65.11 64.89 66.13 67.77 70.16 
Before 1800 74.78 75.71 76.3 75.06 76.45 
After 1800 62.98 62.72 62.89 65.90 68.52 
Rural 64.73 63.98 64.79 66.53 70.50 
Urban 65.37 65.53 67.03 68.75 70.03 
Source: Wills Database 
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Chapter 4A: Malthus to Modernity (with Prof. Greg Clark) 
 
The testator database detailed in chapter 4 has been linked to similar data collected 
by Professor Greg Clark. We have worked together to produce a long run database in 
order to examine the wealth fertility relationship from 1500-1910. 
 
Abstract 
The Industrial Revolution seemingly involved two profound changes, separated by 120 
years: the classic Industrial Revolution of 1770, and the Demographic Transition of 1890.  
The first was the appearance of higher innovation rates, creating modern output 
growth.  The second was a decline in fertility, first in the upper classes, and then among 
the masses, that channelled all economic growth into higher living standards.  That 120 
year chasm has been unbridgeable in unified accounts of the transition to modern 
growth.  Measuring wealth and net fertility from wills we show that the Demographic 
Transition actually began at the same time as the Industrial Revolution.  Net fertility 
among the rich fell rapidly towards modern levels for marriages formed after 1800.  But 
aggregate fertility rose in these years, because net fertility among the poor increased to 
equal that of the rich.  Only in the 1890s did aggregate fertility rates begin to decline.  
 
 
Section 4A.1: Introduction 
 
The two great events that created the modern economic world were the Industrial 
Revolution and the Demographic Transition.  The Industrial Revolution increased rates of 
growth through the supply for the first time of a constant stream of innovations.  Before 
the Industrial Revolution, however, all technological progress had been absorbed in 
raising the stock of people, not in raising living standards.  In the pre-industrial 
demographic regime, at least in England, higher income groups had substantially 
higher net fertilities.  Had the pre-industrial demographic regime continued then much 
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of the accelerated efficiency advance of the economy would similarly have been 
consumed in maintaining ever larger populations.  Eventually in England, for 
marriages formed in the 1890s and later there was a substantial decline in gross fertility 
levels, and hence a dramatic slowing of population growth rates.  After 1910 most 
economic growth went into raising living standards, not increasing populations.   
 
 The Industrial Revolution can be dated to 1770-1800, while the Demographic 
Transition is a phenomenon of the years 1870-1910.  Thus there is a 100 year gap 
between these two events.  Figure 4A.1, for example, shows the number of surviving 
children per woman in England by decade from the 1540s to the 1910s from Wrigley 
and Schofield.  Only in the late nineteenth century is there any sign of a decline in net 
fertility.  The Industrial Revolution itself is associated with an increase in net fertility 
which led to an unprecedented fast rate of population growth in England in these 
years.  
 
Figure 4A.1: Net fertility trends in England, 1540s-1910s 
 
Source: Wrigley and Schofield, 1981, 528-9, table A3, Wrigley, 1969, 196, Table 5.16. 
  
 Attempts to develop unified models of the transition to modern economic 
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growth, particularly those that emphasize human capital investment, have grappled 
unsuccessfully with this huge delay in the onset of the Demographic Transition.  In 
particular in England the Industrial Revolution coincided with an increase in fertility, 
not a decline. 
 
 Here we show that starting with the generation born in the 1770s there were in 
fact significant changes in fertility in Industrial Revolution England.  In particular 
economically successful men switched from levels of net fertility of 4-5 children, to 
levels of 2.5-3, close to the general population.  This important switch does not show in 
the aggregate data because at the same time the net fertility of poorer individuals, the 
bulk of the society, increased in these years to equal that of the rich.   
 
 Thus by the time of the onset second fertility transition in 1870-1910 the net 
fertility of the poor is if anything higher than for the rich.  This creates the false 
impression that the fertility regime of the early and middle nineteenth century 
somehow represents the entire pre-industrial period.  In fact it is a very different 
regime, and close to that of the modern world.  Amazingly, despite the enormous 
quantities of research into the demographic experience of pre-industrial England, we 
seem to have missed a profound transformation in the demographic regime that was 
occurring simultaneously with the Industrial Revolution. 
 
Section 4A.2: The Data 
 
We know a lot about aggregates levels of gross and net fertility in England from 1540 
onwards from parish records (until 1837), then from general birth registration.  Parish 
records however, reveal nothing of the economic and social status of parents.  Thus we 
have little or no information on both gross and net fertility as a function of wealth and 
social status before a report associated with the 1911 census that correlated fertility with 
occupational status for marriages formed from 1851 onwards.  
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 Figure 4A.2 shows what this 1911 report suggests.  It shows net fertility for 
marriages of 25 or more year’s duration by social class, where the lower numbers are 
higher classes, by marriage cohort starting in 1851-60.  Before 1871 it seems that there is 
little or no difference in fertility by social class, with the net fertility of all these groups 
relatively high.  The conventional picture for England before 1871 is thus that fertility 
within marriage was unregulated for marriages formed before 1871, with only the lat 
average age of marriage, and the substantial percent never marrying limiting gross 
fertility.  There was only one fertility transition which began sometime after 1871. 
 
Figure 4A.2: Net Fertility by Social Class, Married Men, 1851-86 
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Source:  Census of England and Wales, 1911, Volume XIII: Fertility of Marriage, Part II, 
p. xcvii. 
 
 Here we develop a source which allows us to examine both gross and net 
fertility as a function of wealth and social class for cohorts born before 1820.  This is the 
wills of male testators.  Men only were used since for most of the period women had 
only residual claims on their property after marriage, and left wills typically only if 
single or widowed.    There are millions of extant wills in England for the years after 
1400, and a significant fraction have been transcribed and abstracted.  The wills before 
1858 come mainly from local Ecclesiastical courts in Essex, Suffolk and Surrey (before 
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1858 church courts handled all matters of wills and testaments).  Some also come from 
the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, which handled estates of higher value with assets 
distributed across a wider area.  After 1858 the wills come from the records of the 
Principal Probate Registry in London has all probated wills in the south of England 
after 1858.   
 
 For wills after 1841 we are also able to link many testators to individual census 
records giving the age of the testator, and their spouse, at death.  For the earlier wills 
we can get the age at death for a subset of the testators from parish records giving 
baptisms and marriages. 
   
Description of data collection for Wealth and Fertility Project 
From 1858 onwards, all wills proved in England are recorded at the Principal Probate 
Registry in London105. For this sample, it was decided to collect data on individuals 
residing in Essex and Ipswich. For Essex, the Probate year books were searched for 
males from these counties, who left either a will or probate. This was done for 1862, 
1872, 1882, 1892 and 1902. The probate registers allowed the identification of 
individuals via name, address, occupation and spouse. This information was then used 
to link each individual to his census entry of the previous year. The original 
enumerator’s returns were used for this purpose106. The sample was increased further 
by linking probate records of 1912 to census records of 1902.  
 
 In order to efficiently build a sample with the most information per record, only 
those testators successfully linked to the census were selected for the sample. As 
successful linkage was often based upon the name of a spouse, there was a bias towards 
selecting married men for this period for the Essex half of the sample. For Ipswich, 
census and registry information was taken from digitized census and vital registration 
                                                
105 For further infor;qtion see http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/infoabout/civil/probate/registries.htm 
106 The census returns were obtained from www.ancestry.co.uk. 
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data from the UK data archive dataset SN 5413 - Sociological Study of Fertility and 
Mortality in Ipswich, 1872-1910 compiled by Ros Davies and Eilidh Garrett107. The 
strategy here was to search only for those individuals who were already linked from 
the vital register (death record) to the census. Again, there may be a bias here towards 
an overrepresentation of married men if a criterion for the linking between the census 
and the death record was the name of the deceased’s spouse. Ultimately, 2,000 records 
from Essex and Ipswich, all containing both probate and census information, formed 
the post 1858 sample.  
 
Will Coding 
The reported gross evaluation of wealth in the probate indices omit any property value 
held by the testator. Further the census sources lack information on lifetime fertility 
history. Therefore, each will in the sample was read thoroughly and coded for 
mentioned property, land and named children. Property was described into the 
database as being located in towns, in London or if they were business premises (such 
as grocer’s or carpenter’s shop). Land acreage was also noted. Surviving children were 
counted and a judgment was made on whether the will could be considered as a 
reliable source for both property and family information. 
 
 For those testators where we do not have a direct estimate of age at death we 
can infer this from the observed features of the testator such as their marital status, 
numbers of children reported in the will, numbers of grandchildren, whether one of 
their parents is alive, and whether they have a child aged 21 or above.  Appendix 1 
reports the various methods used to fill in missing values for testators.  The regression 
used to predict age has an R2 of 0.49.  Thus we are able to form cohorts of male testators 
by birth year. 
 
                                                
107 Associated publications: Drake and Razzell (1997), Garrett and Davies (2003) and Razzell and Spence 
(2006). 
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 The assets of testators were estimated in two ways.  For many wills probated in
 1786 and later we get an estimate of the ‚personalty‛ – assets other than real estate – 
from estate tax declarations.  We add these to estimates of real estate from houses and 
land mentioned in the will to get a total value of the bequest.  In only about 20% of 
cases where land was bequeathed was the area of the land indicated.  But we are able to 
approximate the area from other details of the will such as the testator’s occupation and 
cash bequests.  Appendix 2 details how the area of land bequeathed was estimated in 
the remaining 80% of cases. 
 
 The major flaws with using probate valuations as true measures of wealth other 
than real estate are the omissions of settled property and debts and credits (Owens et al 
2006, 384). Before 1898, the reported probate valuations are estimates of "the gross value 
of an individual’s unsettled personal property", and were estimated for tax purposes 
(Owens, Green, Bailey and Kay 2006, 383). After 1898, settled property was included 
(Rubinstein 1977, 100). The executors or administrators of the wills submitted estimates, 
and because of a fine for undervaluation "the gross valuation was always likely to be an 
upper estimate of an individuals worth" (Owens et al. 2006, 386). 
 
 This "gross" estimate omitted any debts or credits due by, or to, the deceased 
individual. For the period after 1881, Rubenstein estimates that the difference between 
the gross and net value of an estate, was on average 5 to 15% (Owens et al 2006, 387). 
Before 1881, effects are reported as an approximation, under a certain set threshold 
level (e.g. under £50, under £100). As Owens et al. noted, the effect of these tax 
bandings is to inflate the already rough estimates of wealth (Owens et al. 2006, 387).  
 
 For earlier years the estimated assets of testators were constructed from the 
information in wills by adding together the cash payments directed by the testator, 
with the estimated value of houses, land, animals, grain bequeathed by the testator.  
For a subset of 506 wills we have both estimates.  In these overlapping cases the 
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bequests estimated in the second fashion are 0.66 of the bequests estimated in the first 
way.  For consistency the first set of estimates was thus multiplied by 0.66.  All values 
were deflated to a common price level of the 1630s to get a unified measure of the real 
bequest over the entire period. 
 
 In the course of the years 1500-1914 the real rate of return on assets in England 
declined significantly.  The annual real purchasing power associated with a £1 of assets 
thus declined significantly over time as interest rates fell.  We thus calculated an 
expected ‚bequest income stream‛ for each testator over time as a better way of 
quantifying the average value of the bequest. 
 
 Table 4A.1 summarizes by period the numbers of men for which we have 
information on assets at death and numbers of surviving children by half century birth 
cohorts.  We have 7,155 wills coded so far, with about 200 per decade for men born 
between 1700 and 1850. 
 
 We also coded the occupations of the testators into seven socio-economic status 
categories.  These differ from the more modern socio-economic status classification 
because of the prevalence in status descriptions on wills even as late as the late 
nineteenth century of such terms as ‚yeoman,‛ ‚husbandman‛ and ‚gentleman.‛  But 
they do seem to capture socio-economic differences.  Table 4A.2 shows for men born 
before 1770 by socio-economic status average assets, the percent literate (as revealed by 
a signed will), and average age at death.  Average assets and literacy were strongly   
correlated with the assigned socio-economic status.   
 
There was also some correlation of the estimated age of death, with gentry testators 
on average dying five years later than labourers. 
 
Table 4A.3 shows similar correlates of socio-economic status with assets and
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Table 4A.1:  Summary of the Wills Data, by birth period 
 
Period 
 
 
N 
 
Ave 
Assets 
(£) 
 
 
Ave Asset 
Income (£) 
 
 
Ave Age 
at Death 
     
1450-99 200 246 17.0 53 
1500-49 615 440 31.6 57 
1550-99 1,943 366 26.2 55 
1600-49 267 689 43.7 54 
1650-99 553 769 38.6 61 
1700-49 1,164 504 26.7 63 
1750-99 1,176 1,530 66.5 65 
1800-49 1,146 3,240 152.3 66 
1850-79 53 2,065 106.7 -* 
     
Note: *The 1850-79 cohort has a censored age distribution. 
 
average age at death for men born after 1770.  Again socio-economic status correlates 
strongly with average assets, and is also correlated with average age at death.  Now the 
average for the gentry is 70, as opposed to 64 for labourers. 
 
Table 4A.2:  Social Status, Assets and Literacy, pre 1770 births 
 
 
 
Social group 
 
 
N 
 
 
Average 
assets (£) 
 
 
%  
literate 
 
Ave Age 
at Death 
 
Gentry 
 
265 
 
3,882 
 
90 
 
61 
Merchants/ professionals 213 1,264 96 57 
Farmers 1,586 517 61 61 
Traders 497 393 74 58 
Craftsmen 942 329 64 59 
Husbandmen 639 161 36 57 
Labourers /Servants 
 
216 104 23 55 
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 The numbers of surviving children for each testator were estimated from the 
wills in three ways.  First there are wills where all the children were recorded.  Here we 
counted dead children who had produced children of their own as ‚surviving‛ children 
also.  Next there were earlier wills where girls tended to be omitted.  In wills written 
before 1550 substantial numbers of daughters are omitted where there is a male heir.  
Thus the average family which reported one male heir after 1550 reported 1.55 
daughters, but before 1550 only 0.89 daughters.  We thus have to infer the number of 
daughters for wills before this date.  We do so by multiplying each reported daughter 
in a will by 1.49, to get an estimated total number of daughters.  Finally there are wills 
where besides the children specified there were also indications of an unspecified 
number of additional.  Where we could determine in a will that the number of children 
was ‚≥ n‛ we estimated the expected number of children from the average of wills in 
this category (see the appendix).   
 
Table 4A.3:  Social Status, Assets and Average Age, post 1770 births 
   
 Estimating net fertility from wills will always tend to produce a lower
Social group N Average assets 
(£) 
Ave Age at Death 
 
Gentry/Independent 
 
187 
 
8,326 
 
70 
Merchants/professionals 335 4,392 67 
Farmers 368 1,750 66 
Traders 465 1,783 64 
Craftsmen 350 865 64 
Husbandmen 99 457 66 
Labourers/Servants 
 
65 253 64 
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bound estimate, since the errors will typically be the omission of some children from 
the will.  But the wills will show relative net fertility levels by asset wealth, by socio-
economic status, and over time. 
 
Table 4A.4: Net Fertility Averages (outside London) 
 
Birth 
period 
 
 
N 
 
% 
Single* 
 
 
Ave. 
children 
married 
 
 
Ave 
children  
all 
     
1450-99 200 3 3.49 3.39 
1500-49 589 3 3.40 3.30 
1550-99 1,967 11 3.20 2.85 
1600-49 236 17 3.15 2.61 
1650-99 307 13 3.28 2.85 
1700-49 1,083 15 3.07 2.61 
1750-99 1,139 17 3.05 2.53 
1800-49 1,140 -# 2.78 - 
     
Notes:  *The percent single includes some childless widowers whose earlier marriage 
was not revealed by the will.  
 #The sample in these years was collected in such a way that single men were less likely 
to be sampled.    
 
 Table 4A.4 shows by birth half century the percentage of men dying never 
married, as well as the average number of surviving children per married or widowed 
man, for men dying outside London.108  If a man is a widower without any surviving 
children, then there may be no evidence in the will of his earlier marriage.  Thus the 
estimate of the percentage single is an upper bound.  The final column shows the 
overall implied net fertility for testators.  If we compare these net fertility rates to the 
national totals calculated by Wrigley and Schofield, shown in figure 4A.1, we see that 
the net fertility of testators is above that of the general population until the 1750-99 
                                                
108 London had a distinctive and different demographic regime for men born before 1810. 
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cohort when it drops substantially below.  Below we will derive a more precise estimate 
of net fertility by decadal birth cohorts for the poorest testators that we can compare to 
the national averages.  
 
Section 4A.3: Characterising the Wealth Fertility Relationship 
 
For birth cohorts earlier than the 1770s, and thus typically for marriages formed before 
the 1800s, there is a strong positive association in all periods between wealth at death 
and net fertility.  But with surprising rapidity this association disappears for the 
generations of men born in the 1770s and later.  That disappearance involves both a 
substantial decline in the net fertility of the richer testators after 1770, but also a modest 
but quite significant increase in the fertility of the poorest testators. 
 
To demonstrate this we divide testators into rough quartiles, based on the implied 
income stream from the assets of the sample of testators as a whole.  Thus in each 
period the poorest group are those with an implied asset income below £6 per year (in 
1630s prices), the richest are those with implied asset incomes above £31.  We then 
estimate for ever married men the coefficients of the regression 
 
   
 
where N is the number of surviving children, DINCQj an indicator for each of the four 
asset groups, D1770 an indicator for a testator born after 1770, and DLON, DTOWN 
and FDARM indicators for testators living in London, some other town, or on a farm 
(with these effects being estimated separately for cohorts born before 1760, 1760-1809, 
and 1810 or later).  Table 4A.5 shows the estimates of these various effects for the whole 
panel of wills. 
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Also shown are the implied levels of net fertility for men of the four wealth 
classes who were resident in country villages before and after 1770.  The wealth effect 
on net fertility is very powerful statistically and quantitatively for men born before 
1770, but completely absent for those born after this.  Wealthier men born before 1770 
also have net fertilities well above those of men in the general population.   After 1770 a 
completely new relationship between wealth and fertility emerges, much more like that 
of the modern world, where if anything the testators as a whole now have lower 
fertilities than the general population.   
 
 The change in behaviour for both groups is remarkably fast.  Table 4A. 6 shows 
by twenty year periods around 1770 the net fertilities of the richest and poorest 
testators.  The drop in net fertility for the rich is immediate after the 1770 birth cohort.  
The rise in fertility by the poorest group is potentially a little more protracted.  While 
measured net fertility rose for the 1770-89 cohort, it was not any higher for the 1790-
1809 cohort, so that the true date of transition could be anywhere between the 1770 and 
1810 cohort. 
 
 Table 4A.5:  Children per married man by wealth 
Coefficient Estimate Standard 
Error 
Implied 
Level 
Constant 0.880 .027  
Assets 1 0.000 - 2.41 
Assets 2 0.198** .035 2.94 
Assets 3 0.348** .034 3.41 
Assets 4 0.555** .036 4.20 
Assets 1 – 1770 0.191** .046 2.92 
Assets 2 – 1770 -0.039 .055 2.83 
Assets 3 – 1770 -0.168** .051 2.89 
Assets 4 – 1770 -0.373** .041 2.89 
DLON pre 1760 -0.675** .068  
DLON 1760-1809 -0.221 .135  
DTOWN pre 1760 -0.203** .048  
DTOWN 1760-1809 -0.145** .051  
DFARM pre 1810 0.122* .027  
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Table 4A.6: Net Fertility by Birth Cohorts109 
 
Birth 
Cohort 
 
 
Obs 
 
N 
poor 
 
N 
Rich 
1690-1709 179 2.54 3.78 
1710-29 315 2.32 3.79 
1730-49 499 2.41 4.20 
1750-69 350 2.37 4.29 
1770-89 384 3.17 3.06 
1790-1809 459 2.39 2.37 
1810-29 508 3.05 2.97 
1830-49 302 2.68 3.06 
1850-69 46 2.90 2.88 
 
Table 4A.7: Net Fertility by First Marriage Cohorts 
 
Marriage 
Cohort 
 
 
Obs 
 
N  
poor 
 
N  
Rich 
1720-39 176 2.52 3.89 
1740-59 345 2.27 3.74 
1760-79 502 2.37 4.42 
1780-99 330 2.50 4.15 
1800-19 397 2.98 2.97 
1820-39 458 2.67 2.41 
1840-59 528 2.90 2.88 
1860-79 255 2.83 3.17 
 
 The change is indeed even slightly more abrupt statistically if instead we 
organize testators by the estimated date of their first marriage.  In this case it is 
marriages formed in 1800 or later which first show the absence of a wealth gradient to 
net fertility.  Table 4A.7 shows the transition measured in terms of first marriage 
cohorts. Figure 4A.3 shows the implied net fertility of the top quartile by wealth of male
                                                
109
 Because N is a count variable the regression was estimated as a negative binomial.  The estimated 
coefficients thus have to be exponentiated to get the fertility levels by asset class. 
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testators, by decade of marriage, from the 1500s to the 1870s, adjusting for location and 
the share of men single.  In comparison is shown the implied net fertility of all men in 
England from Wrigley and Schofield.   Rich testators have a significantly higher net 
fertility than the population of England as a whole until the 1800s.  Then their net 
fertility falls below that of the general population.  Their fertility falls just as that of the 
general population increases.  
 
 Since wealth was associated with social class, before 1800 high status groups 
such as the gentry, professionals and farmers had higher fertility than low status 
groups such as labourers.  After 1800 this status differential ends.  However fertility 
seems to attach to social status only because of the average wealth differences between 
the different groups.  Once we control for wealth, status differences in net fertility 
disappear before and after 1800.   
 
Figure 4A.3: Net fertility, general population and rich testators 
 
Note: The observation for testators for the 1500s is the average of the 1490s and 1500s 
first marriage cohorts, and so on. 
Source:  As figure 4A. 1.   
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 The mechanics of the convergence in fertility of rich and poor testators for 
marriages after 1800 is unclear.  Table 4A.8 shows mean ages of marriage for male 
testators, outside London, by asset class before 1800, and 1800-59.   The age of marriage 
is estimated for this group by matching them to parish and non-conformist records of 
marriages, births, and baptisms.110  The age of first marriage did not differ by asset class 
before 1800.  But after 1800 a statistically significant gap opens up between the age of 
marriage of the poorest and richest testators, with the rich marrying later. 
 
Table 4A.8: Mean Marriage Ages by Asset Class, pre and post 1800 Marriages, Male 
Testators 
 
Assets  
 
 
N 
 
Pre  
 
 
N 
 
Post 
     
1 67 28.1 74 26.8 
2 106 27.2 45 27.3 
3 101 27.8 46 28.3 
4 113 27.7 116 29.8** 
     
** - significantly greater than for the poorest testators, and for rich testators before 1800, 
at the 1% level.   
 
Table 4A.9: Mean Marriage Ages by Asset Class, pre and post 1800 Marriages, Wives 
 
Assets 
 
 
N 
 
Pre  
 
 
N 
 
Post  
     
1 32 24.0 57 23.1 
2 46 24.8 34 23.9 
3 53 24.0 32 24.1 
4 63 23.1 90 25.0* 
     
* - significantly greater than for the poorest testators post 1800, and for rich testators 
before 1800, at the 5% level. 
                                                
110 The matching was done using a very imperfect source, the International Genealogical Index.  This has a 
sampling of birth, baptismal and marriage records for English parish and non-conformist registers.  
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 The age of the wife, however, is more important in determining potential births 
from a marriage. Table 4A.9 shows that similarly for women before 1800 there is no 
sign of differences in first marriage age by asset class.  However after 1800 the first 
wives of the richest men average 2.2 years older than those of the poorest men, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  Thus the timing of marriage 
can perhaps explain something of these fertility trends, though the effect is not great 
enough to explain all the change. 
 
 Using the link to parish records of births and baptisms we also estimate for a 
subset of testators, survival rates for children by wealth class for marriages before and 
after 1800.  For each testator we have the number of births identified in the parish 
records, as well as the number of those children still alive at the time of the will.111  
There will be many missed births in this linkage.  Births were not recorded, or people 
moved between parishes with surviving registers and those without, or people moved 
between the established church of England.  So we just have a sampling of the births for 
each father.  
 
 In this estimation we also control for a number of factors: residence (London, 
other towns, rural areas, and specific farm residence), gender, time period (pre 1650, 
1650-1699, 1700-49, 1750-99), and time since birth.  Table 4A.10 shows these estimates. 
 
 Before 1800 the higher wealth classes have a significantly better child survival 
rate, 70% surviving to 15-29 as opposed to about 62% for the poorer.  After 1800 this 
differential disappears, with the survival rate for the children of the poorer testators 
rising to nearly 70%.  We can compare these rates to those estimated from parish burial 
records.  Before 1800 these suggest 65% of those born live to age 20-24.  In 1861 that 
                                                
111 In this exercise we counted as survivors only children still living at the time of the will, not those dead 
but with surviving children of their own. 
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proportion had increased slightly to 69%.112  Our survival rates underestimate survival, 
since some surviving children were omitted from wills.  But even taking this into 
account, wealth differences in survival, and changes in survival rates over time, can 
play little role in explaining net fertility changes after 1800. 
 
Table 4A.10:  Survival Rates, 15-29 years since birth, by Asset Class, pre and post 1800 
 
Asset Group 
 
 
Fathers 
 
Births 
 
Survivors 
(fraction) 
 
Survival 
Rate 
(corrected) 
 
 
PRE 1800 
    
1 192 663 0.60 0.63 
2 244 951 0.61 0.61 
3 293 1,300 0.68 0.69** 
4 314 1,469 0.68 0.71** 
 
All 
 
1,043 
 
4,383 
 
0.65 
 
0.66 
 
POST 1800 
   
 
 
 
1 46 152 0.70 0.71 
2 49 159 0.69 0.68 
3 64 222 0.68 0.69 
4 115 450 0.65 0.66 
 
All 
 
274 
 
983 
 
0.67 
 
0.69 
     
Note:  ** = Significantly different than for asset class 1 at the 1% level. 
   
 Table 4A.11 shows the gross fertility rates the data in table 4.10 implies by 
wealth classes before and after 1800.  For the richest groups there is still the clear 
implication that their gross fertility fell significantly in marriages formed after 1800.  
For the poorest, taking into account better survival, gross fertility seems to have risen 
modestly.    
                                                
112 Wrigley et al.,1997, pp.262, 291.  Woods, 1982, 377. 
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Table 4A.11: Net and Gross Fertility, pre and post 1800 
 
Asset  
Group 
 
 
Net 
Fertility 
Pre 1800 
 
 
Gross 
Fertility 
Pre 1800 
 
Net 
Fertility 
Post 1800 
 
Gross 
Fertility 
Post 1800 
 
     
1 2.37 3.76 2.84 4.00 
2 2.96 4.85 2.54 3.74 
3 3.46 5.01 2.80 4.06 
4 4.25 5.99 2.83 4.29 
     
All 3.26 4.93 2.75 4.45 
     
 
Section 4A.4: The Mechanics of the Fertility Patterns 
 
Fertility among the rich could have been reduced as a combination of two different 
forces.  The first is ‚spacing‛ – adopting practices that increase the interval between 
births.  The second is ‚stopping‛ – keeping birth spacings the same but terminating the 
sequence of births earlier.  This could in part arise just as a product of a later age of 
marriage for women.  The demographic transition of the late nineteenth century has 
been attributed to ‚stopping‛ primarily.  It is interesting thus to ask which force 
explained this earlier decline in the fertility of the rich. 
 
 For a subsample of testators we can examine spacing versus stopping through 
observations on the first to second child birth interval, and the interval between 
marriage and the last observed birth.  Table 4A.12 shows these statistics.  Given our 
partial data from links to parish records we estimate only the 1-2 birth interval for first 
marriages, and the time from first marriage to the last observed birth with the first wife.  
The 1-2 birth intervals clearly suggest that the differences in gross fertility between rich 
and poor before 1800, and the declining gross fertility of the rich after 1800, are not 
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explained by any differences in spacing of births.  This interval is stable over time, and 
does not differ between income classes before of after 1800.  Earlier stopping, or 
differences in the age of marriage, must explain the lower fertility of the poor before 
1800, and the decline in fertility of the rich after 1800. 
 
Table 4A.12: Birth Intervals, marriages pre and post 1800 
 
Asset 
Group 
 
 
N 
 
Interval 
births 1-2 
 
N 
 
Interval 
marriage-
last 
 
 
Births 
observed 
PRE      
1 103 2.23 165 9.5 3.9 
2 157 2.23 212 11.6* 4.4 
3 189 2.36 245 12.0** 4.9 
4 192 2.20 244 13.2** 5.5 
 
All 
 
641 
 
2.26 
 
866 
 
11.7 
 
4.8 
POST      
1 33 2.19 64 9.5 3.9 
2 24 2.40 43 9.6 3.7 
3 18 1.99 35 10.5 4.5 
4 57 2.21 96 10.5^ 4.4 
All 132 2.21 238 9.9^ 4.1 
Note:  ** = Significantly different than for asset class 1 at the 1% level.  * = Significantly 
different than for asset class 1 at the 5% level, ^ = Significantly different than for before 
1800 at the 5% level. 
 
 Given our partial data on birth dates calculating the time to the last birth is 
much more difficult.  If, for example, of n births in a family the timing of only 1 is 
observed, then on average the calculated fertility span would be half the actual fertility 
span.  Our estimates of this will thus have a downward bias.  Since we typically 
observe for this sample 80 percent of births, that bias will not be too great.  The table 
reports the average time between marriage and the last observed birth. Though an 
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underestimate of the likely true fertility span, but is not far from an analogous figure 
for the general population reported in Wrigley et al113. (1997).   
 
 Before 1800 the higher fertility of the rich shows up in a higher fertility span.  
For asset group 4 this was 13.2 years compared to 9.5 for asset group 1, a quantitatively 
and statistically significant difference.  The lower family sizes of the poorer testators 
were mainly explained by an earlier cessation of reproduction.  Similarly when the 
fertility of the rich declined after 1800, this was associated with the earlier stopping of 
births after marriages commence among the rich.   
 
 Part of the change might come mechanically from the later age of first marriage 
among the wives of the richest men after 1800.  But we can also estimate, for a much 
smaller sample, the average age of wives at the last observed birth.  This is shown in 
table 4.13.  Again the small numbers make any conclusions tentative.  But the average 
age of wives at last birth fell after 1800, and fell in particular for those in the higher 
wealth classes.  This implies that the declining gross fertility of the rich after 1800 was 
not only the result of later marriage by wives, but also the result of earlier stopping of 
fertility.  Again for the poorest of the testators there is no sign of any changes in 
behaviour before and after 1800.   
  
 If all of the differences in fertility over time and between wealth classes were 
caused by differences in starting and stopping behaviour then when we estimate the 
reproductive span controlling for the number of children these other variables should 
have no effect.  That is if we run the regression 
 
e 
                                                
113 We infer we observe 80 percent of births in this sample, from the ratio of children in the will with known 
birth dates to all children in the will.  Thus in 80 percent of these cases the last birth observed will be the 
true last birth.  Assuming a constant later birth interval of 2.5 years this implies an average 
underestimation of just over 0.6 years of the true reproductive span.  
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Table 4A.13: Age of wife at last observed birth, marriages pre and post 1800 
Asset 
Group 
N 
PRE 
Age of wife at 
last observed 
birth 
N 
POST 
Age of wife at 
last observed 
birth 
1 20 34.3 48 33.7 
2 42 34.5 31 32.8 
3 41 38.1 23 33.1** 
4 51 36.8 69 35.2 
All 154 36.2 171 34.1** 
** - significantly lower than for pre 1800 at the 1% level.   
 
the coefficients bi and ci should all be insignificantly different from 0.  This indeed is the 
result we find.  Grouping families into those of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8+ observed 
children we find the observed reproductive span is heavily dependent on the number 
of births observed.  Figure 4A.4 shows the pattern for the poorest group of testators 
before 1800.  But once observed births are controlled for it does not change for 
marriages after 1800, and it does not vary across wealth classes.  A family with eight or 
more births observed would have a predicted reproductive span of 19 years for the 
poorest testators before 1800, and 18.8 years after 1800.  For the richest testators before 
1800 the predicted span would be 19.2 years, after 1800 19.1 years. Thus the major 
observed direct correlate of the earlier fertility differences, and the later convergence in 
fertility, is variations in the reproductive span of marriages.  
 
Figure 4A.4: Observed Births and the Reproductive Span 
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Section 4A.5: Why Fertility Declined 
 
The wills data clearly indicates that a Demographic Revolution accompanied the 
Industrial Revolution.  Net fertility within marriage fell sharply for the richest testators, 
starting with marriages commencing in the 1800s.  This occurred, however, at a time of 
generally increasing fertility rates amongst the poorer population, concealing this trend 
in the aggregate data.  The source of the decline in the fertility of the rich implies that it 
had to be partly a conscious control of fertility, through coitus interruptus or other early 
birth control methods. 
 
 Could this just be a product of income?  That is, could the general rise in 
incomes in the Industrial Revolution have led the population into the range where for 
the richest they entered a level of income beyond which the modern negative 
association of income and fertility finally emerged?   
 
 Evidence from the years before 1800 suggests this cannot be the explanation.  
For these years we can split up the testator population into even finer gradations of 
assets, and examine whether at very high asset levels even before 1800 net fertility 
declines.  The answer is a resounding ‚no‛.  For the years before 1800 no matter how 
high we go in the asset range, net fertility continues to climb. The richest testators 
before 1800, those with asset incomes exceeding £200 per year (in 1630s prices), had an 
average of five surviving children, as figure 4A.5 shows.  This group had average asset 
incomes well above the asset group 4 in our sample after 1800, yet they had nearly 
double the net fertility of that later group.  Income alone cannot explain the change in 
fertility behaviour for marriages 1800 and later. 
 
 Further casting doubt on the role of income, estimates of both income per 
person and real wages suggestion that it was only in the 1820s that there was any 
significant rise in real incomes and real wages as a result of the Industrial Revolution.  
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Figure 4A.6 shows the real wages of craftsmen in England for the years 1720-1914.  The 
change in marital fertility clearly predates any significant income increases, and occurs 
more rapidly than a gradual rise in incomes would induce.   
 
 The increasing importance of human capital in the production of income again 
will not help explain the 1800 Demographic Revolution.  For a start, for those whose 
income depended largely on the possession of land or houses – landed proprietors and 
rentiers – always had an even stronger incentive to limit fertility if they wanted to 
maintain the living standard of their children.  The family assets would get divided up 
among the children, so that with more than two children average expected assets per 
child would decline.114  In a world where education was the key to income, since there 
was a maximum cost of education, the richest could afford to have as many children as 
they wanted and still give them all the maximum possible amount of education. 
 
Figure 4A.5: Asset Income and Net Fertility before 1800 
 
 Another potential explanation of a decline in net fertility among high income 
groups is a decline in child mortality.  For the testators where we observe ages we see a 
fairly steady increase between 1580 and 1914 in the average age of death.  The average
                                                
114 Spouses would also bring assets to marriages, so that a child with half the assets of a parent would on 
average end up in a family with assets equal to that of the parental family. 
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Figure 4A.6: Real Wages of Building Craftsmen, 1720-1914 
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Source: Clark, 2005. 
 
age of testators rose from about 55 in 1600 to 68 by 1910.  However this trend is gradual 
while the change in net fertility is more sudden.  Nevertheless one idea is that in pre-
industrial society men had to have as many children as possible in order to maximize 
the chance of an heir.  The hazards of survival meant that even with relatively high net 
fertility rates a substantial fraction of men would die with no child to inherit.  As infant 
and child mortality declined, eventually families could ensure an heir with many fewer 
children.  There was more certainty that if a child was born he would survive to 
adulthood.  Consequently net fertility declined. 
 
 The empirical content of this idea would be that declining net fertility for the 
rich in the later nineteenth century would be associated with a larger fraction leaving at 
least one surviving child.  Table 4A.14 contains a simple test of this idea.  It records the 
estimated probability of a man leaving a surviving child at different epochs and asset 
levels.  Before marriages commenced in 1800 and later rich men were left without a  
child as heir far less often than poor men.  However after 1800 the chance of a rich man
 leaving a child as heir declined significantly from around 0.91 to 0.79.  Thus the
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interpretation that the changed behaviour of the rich was a response to declining 
mortality rates cannot be sustained.  As table 4.10 showed there is actually no sign of 
any improvement of the survival rate of children pre and post 1800.  
 
Table 4A.14: Wealth at Death and Chances of a Surviving Child 
 
Period of 
marriage 
 
Assets 1 
 
Assets 2 
 
Assets 3 
 
Assets 4 
     
1490-1799 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.91 
1800-1859 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.79 
     
Note:  These odds were estimated from a logistic regression.  
 
 The surprisingly sudden change in the pattern of fertility with wealth makes it 
hard to explain through economic variables which were all changing only slowly in 
England in these years, even though it is the period of the Industrial Revolution.  This 
suggests an alternative explanation in the form of some social or ideological movement.  
One possibility, for example, is that the decline in fertility among the rich was a reaction 
among the economically successful to the widespread publicity afforded Thomas 
Malthus’s Essay on a Principle of Population, first published 1798, but re-issued in five 
revised editions until the author’s death in 1834.  It is generally believed that public 
discussion of birth control in England dated only from the late nineteenth century.  It 
was only in 1876 that Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant were prosecuted for 
republishing Charles Knowlton’s pamphlet advocating birth control, The Fruits of 
Philosophy.  But the evidence here suggests that there had to be some diffusion of 
contraceptive practices much earlier than this. 
 
 However, interestingly, we would expect such a social or intellectual movement 
to be associated with occupations or professions more than with incomes.  However 
fertility fell as much among rich farmers in our sample as it did in more urban and 
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professional occupations such as physicians, schoolmaster, clerks, and engineers.  Even 
if we include our seven occupational indicators in the regression, along with the log of 
asset income, differentiating  pre and post 1800, there is still a sharp change in the 
association between income and fertility after 1800.  Before occupations do not have 
differential fertility, once we control for asset incomes.  After the slope on asset income 
fall to one fifth of its previous level, and occupations remain insignificant predictors of 
net fertility. 
 
 The source of this remarkable change in fertility behaviour around 1800 thus 
remains largely unidentified. Aggregate fertility declined in France long before 
anywhere else in Europe.  Fertility regimes within differed here by locality to a far 
greater extent than they did in England (The coefficient of variation in the index of 
marital fertility for France is 4 to 6 times that of England and Wales for the 19th 
century).115  One of the authors, Cummins, has recently analysed the wealth fertility 
relationship for the period of transition in France (marriages formed 1748-1819).  
Demographic data from the Enquete Henry was linked to wealth at death data from the 
Tables des Succsessions et Absensces for four villages in the nineteenth century.  Cummins 
shows a strong positive association between assets and wealth for villages where 
aggregate fertility levels were high.116 Where fertility was declining, the wealth fertility 
relationship switched from positive to sharply negative.   
 
 As with England, these results show that wealth had a large positive effect on 
reproductive success in the pre-transitional era and fertility limitation by the top wealth 
category precedes aggregate fertility decline.  Thus the transformation witnessed here 
for England seems likely part of a general transformation occurring in the switch from 
pre-industrial to modern fertility regimes.  The French Fertility transition, however, 
occurred in the absence of any significant structural change in the economy and with 
                                                
115 At the county and department  level. 
116 The result holds for both ‘gross’ and ‘net’ fertility (which takes child mortality into account). 
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income per capita levels significantly below those of England. The French fertility 
decline also was associated with the appearance of longer birth intervals, that is of 
spacing rather than stopping.  Cummins’ research suggests that movements in 
economic inequality and relative incomes may have a relationship with the onset of 
fertility decline.  
 
Section 4A.6: Conclusion 
 
While there is still much work to be done on the precise mechanisms and causes, we 
demonstrate above that pre-industrial fertility patterns did not survive unchanged in 
England until marriages of the 1870s as has been conventionally believed.  Instead there 
was an important and rapid change in fertility patterns by wealth, for marriages 
formed after 1800.  Up until then the richest English men were producing five surviving 
children at a time when men in general produced only 2.5 surviving children.  Within a 
generation the fertility of the rich fell to be no greater than, and perhaps less than, that 
of the general population.  A Demographic Revolution thus accompanied fairly closely 
the Industrial Revolution.  Now united temporally, the two events may also be more 
plausibly linked causally. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4A 
Imputing missing values 
 
In forming the data base of fertility, wealth at death and date of birth we had to assign 
values in a number of cases where data was missing: dates of birth, area of land 
holding, numbers of children (where only a partial count was given). 
   
1.  Ages and marriage dates 1500-1858 
 
Where we cannot locate the information in parish registers or the census we assign each 
testator a date of birth and marriage date through the following means.  For these years 
we have the following information from parish records on birth dates, marriage dates, 
and age at first child. 
 
Table 4AA.1: Birth Information 
 
Group 
 
 
N 
Birth date also 
N 
   
Birth date 841 - 
Marriage date 876 335 
Age at first child 934 375 
At least one of above 
 
1,635 - 
 
 This reveals that the average age at marriage was 28, and average age at the 
birth of the first child 29.1.  Using the cases where we could assign age at death years 
since birth, years since first marriage plus 28, or years since first birth plus 29.1 with 
some experimentation the following regression was found to be the best fit for age: 
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AGE = 9.42 + 0.0264DEC+1.174N +6.92DCHILD>21 -  9.625DCHILD<21 + 
5.62DGRANDCHILD –  6.52DSINGLE + 5.73DWIDOWER – 6.81DPARENT + 
6.05*DNEPH  
         n = 1,111, R2 = 0.495 
 
where DEC = birth decade (1520-1820)  
N = number of surviving children 
DCHILD>21 = indicator for at least one child known to be more than 21  
DCHILD<21 = indicator for at least one child known to be less than 21 
DGRANDCHILD = indicator for at least one known grandchild 
DSINGLE = indicator for testator never married 
DWIDOWER = indicator for testator widower 
DPARENT = indicator for at least one parent known to be alive 
DNEPH = indicator for a living niece or nephew 
 
2. Ages and marriage dates 1846-1914 
 
Post 1846 we sometimes collected more limited data on relatives and children’s ages, in 
which we estimated missing ages from the regression 
AGE = 62.37 + 0.08D1870 + 1.15D1880 + 0.79D1890 +  3.00D1900 + 3.20D1910 + 0.36N 
– 0.79DSINGLE + 9.11DWIDOWER   
         n = 1,497, R2 = 0.11 
where D1870, <D1910 are indicator variables for the death decades 1870-9 to 1910-9. 
 
 
 
Land Areas, 1500-1858 
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While land was bequeathed in 2,108 of the wills in our sample, in only 534 cases, one in 
four, was the area of the land indicated.  To infer the area in the other 1,574 cases we 
estimated for cases where area was indicated, that area as a function of other features of 
the will.  For wills pre 1860 where we collected information on monetary bequests this 
was the number of houses bequeathed, the number of additional parishes the land was 
described as lying in, the total amount of cash and goods bequeathed, an indicator for 
the literacy of the testator, an indicator for whether the testator lived in a town, an 
indicator of whether the person engaged in farming, and indicators for each 
occupational group.  The functional form that best fit the observed cases was chosen by 
experiment.  Thus the estimated expression was 
 


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where HOUSE1 was an indicator set to one if one house was bequeathed, HOUSE2 an 
indicator for two houses,  HOUSE3 an indicator for three or more houses, MOREPAR 
an indicator for land left in more than one parish, BEQROOT the square root of the 
value of cash and stock bequeathed, DLIT an indictor for a literate testator, 
DLITUNKNOWN an indicator for someone whose literacy is unknown, DTOWN an 
indicator for a town dweller, DFARMER an indicator for someone engaged in farming, 
and OCCUPi  indicators for the  six occupational groups defined above other than 
labourers.  DFARMER was set to one if the testator left farm animals or grain in the 
will, or left farm implements.  There were 408 observations with this complete 
information, and the R2 of this regression was 0.52.  
 
To normalize for changes in the price level over the years 1585 -1836 the 
‚BEQROOT‛ variable in the above equation was constructed using the actual cash 
bequests in the will normalized by the average price level in each of the decades 1580-9, 
1590-9, 1600-9, 1610-9, 1620-9 and 1630-9.  To this was added the value of the stock left 
calculated using a standard set of values normalized to the 1630s: horses £5, cattle £4, 
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sheep £0.5, pigs £2, wheat (bu.) £0.21, barley/malt (bu.) £0.10, oats (bu.) £0.07, 
peas/beans (bu.) £0.12, silver spoons £0.375, gold rings £1.   
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Land Areas (1846-1914) 
 
 Where we did not collect monetary bequests we estimated areas from the 
regression 
 
PAR2 was an indicator for land in two parishes, PAR3 and indicator for land in three or 
more parishes, SQRTDUTY the square root of the real value of the personalty estimated 
in probating the will.  There were 173 observations with which to estimate the 
parameters of this regression, and the R2 was 0.38. 
 
Real Estate Value (1880-1914) 
 
In some cases we get no information of the real estate in the will, such as when the 
testator simply leaves all their property to one recipient without specifying the details.  
In such cases we could still estimate the total value of the real estate from the 
characteristics of the testator and the probate estimate of personalty.  This real estate 
value, however, is truncated at 0.  So we use a Tobit estimate with a lower bound of 0.  
Where we have probate estimates of the (net) personalty after 1880 the equation 
estimated was  
 
       n = 333, pseudo R2 = .006 
REAL is the value of real estate (in 1630s prices), PROBATE the personalty (in 1630s 
prices), and DLON, DTOWN indicators for residence in London or another town.  This 
implies that for testators outside London or a town after 1880, the expected value of real 
estate is 0 until the probate value of the will is £593 (in 1630s prices).  Though REAL is 
highly significantly associated with PROBATE, as can be seen the Pseudo R2 is very 
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low.  That is, the amount of the variation in REAL that we can explain with the 
equation is very low.  
 
Real Estate Value (1750-1880) 
 
For 1750-1880 we have estimates of the probate value of the estate, but in terms of tax 
bands that the value falls within.  For this period also occupations were significantly 
linked to real estate.  The predictive Tobit estimation was thus, 
REAL = -332 + 0.079DUTY + 308DLON - 273DTOWN + 72STAT1 + 268STAT2 + 
309STAT3 + 331STAT4 + 303STAT5 – 65STAT6 + 802STAT7 
       n = 1,804, pseudo R2 = .004 
DUTY is the maximum of the tax band the personalty fell within (in 1630s prices), and 
DSTAT1,<DSTAT7 indicators for social status.  This implies that for testators outside 
London or a town before 1880, the expected value of real estate is always positive for 
gentry, but only positive for other occupations when the duty estimation rises above a 
certain minimum. Again the Pseudo R2 is very low. 
 
 Table 4AA.2 shows the shares of real estate versus personalty in the total value 
of the bequest where we have complete information on each element.  Though we can 
estimate real estate values only very poorly from the probate or duty value, fortunately 
over time real estate was becoming less and less important as a share of bequests.  Thus 
even those wills where we have only the personalty values directly should give a 
reasonable guide to the total value of the bequest. 
 
Probate Value (1500-1858) 
 
Before 1858 there are many cases where we have no direct information on the value of 
the personalty from the probate or the duty declaration.  In these cases we estimate the 
value of the personalty from the monetary gifts and goods bequeathed in the will, using 
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the 255 cases where we have both the monetary and goods bequests and the probated 
value.  The only feature of the will that was a good predictor of the probate value was 
the cash bequeathed within the will.  Thus 
  PROBATE = 40 + 1.60CASH 
         n = 255, R2 = 0.23 
where CASH was the real value of monetary gifts and goods bequeathed within the 
will. 
 
 Table 4AA2: Share of Different Elements in the Total Bequest 
   
 
Period 
 
 
Share Real Estate 
(probate value) 
 
 
Share Real Estate 
(duty value) 
 
 
Share Cash and goods 
(probate value) 
 
 
1750-1880 
 
- 
 
0.35 
 
0.28 
 
1880-1914 
 
0.21 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 196 
Chapter 5 - Marital Fertility and Wealth in Transition Era France, 1750-1850 
 
Abstract 
 
The spectacularly early decline of French fertility is one of the great puzzles of 
economic history. There are no convincing explanations for why France entered a 
fertility transition over a century before anywhere else in the world. This analysis links 
highly detailed individual level fertility life histories to wealth at death data for four 
rural villages in transition-era France, 1750-1850. The results show that it was the 
richest groups who reduced their family size first and that they used ‘spacing’ 
strategies to achieve this. In cross section, measures of the environment for social 
mobility are strongly associated with the fertility decline. The evidence presented here 
demonstrates that socioeconomic status mattered during the early French fertility 
decline. This study is a first step towards re-establishing the French experience as 
paramount in our understanding of Europe’s demographic transition.  
 
Resume 
 
La baisse précoce et spectaculaire de la Fécondité des mariages en France reste l’une des 
grandes énigmes de l’histoire économique. On ne peut expliquer de manière 
convaincante pourquoi la France entama sa transition de la fertilité plus d’un siècle 
avant le reste du monde. Cette étude met en relation des données biographiques très 
détaillées sur les comportements individuels en matière de fertilité avec une base de 
données sur les niveaux de fortune au décès pour quatre villages en zone rurale durant 
la phase de transition française (1750-1850.) Les résultats de cette analyse montrent que 
les catégories les plus aisées de la population furent les premières à réduire la taille de 
leur famille en ayant recours à un espacement des naissances. Dans notre échantillon, 
les variables du milieu et de la mobilité sociale sont fortement associées à la baisse de la 
fertilité. Nos travaux mettent donc en évidence le rôle important du statut socio-
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économique dans la baisse de la fertilité. Cette étude constitue un premier pas vers le 
rétablissement de l’expérience française comme une étape essentielle de notre 
compréhension de la transition démographique européenne. 
 
Section 5.1: Introduction 
 
Economic explanations for the European fertility transition, such as demographic 
transition theory (Notestein 1945), micro economic theory (Becker 1960, 1991) and more 
recently unified growth theory (Galor 2004) have treated the early French fertility 
decline as ‘noise’, the extreme tail end of a normal distribution. This is the intellectual 
equivalent of treating Britain as the exception in explaining the Industrial Revolution117. 
At the time fertility fell (apx. 1800); France was by far the largest country in Europe, 
excluding Russia, with a population of almost 30 million people representing 27.7% of 
the total population of Western Europe (calculated from Maddison 2003).  
 
This analysis links highly detailed individual level fertility life histories to wealth 
at death data for four rural villages in transition-era France. The period of analysis is 
approximately 1750-1850 (based on those who died 1810-70). The study presented here 
is the first to analyze the wealth-fertility relationship during the period of the French 
fertility decline. The quality of the data collected allows for an in-depth investigation of 
the wealth-fertility relationship between different demographic regimes, the mechanics 
behind these patterns and also allows the testing of various hypotheses for why fertility 
declined in France.  
 
Background 
 
Over the past two centuries, fertility in most of the World has undergone a 
sustained and seemingly irreversible transition. Today, a low fertility regime is the 
                                                
117 Comparison borrowed from Van de Walle 1974 p.5. 
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norm in the developed world, with some regions (particularly in Europe) experiencing 
sub-replacement fertility. This demographic transition enabled the productivity 
advances of the Industrial Revolution to be transformed into higher living standards 
and sustained economic growth. Understanding the revolution in fertility behaviour 
between the Malthusian and the modern eras has therefore been a central research 
question. Despite this interest, researchers of the transition have not approached a 
consensus for the causal mechanisms behind the decline of fertility.  
 
The European fertility project (EFP) led by Ansley Coale at Princeton University 
during the 1970s and ‘80s set out to provide an empirical base for demographic 
transition theory. However, the EFP concluded that the decline of marital fertility 
during the late 19th century was almost completely unrelated to socioeconomic changes 
(Watkins 1986 p.448). Time (the decade of the 1890s), as opposed to any socio-economic 
measure, was the best indicator for the onset of sustained fertility decline. Therefore, 
the transition was an ‘ideational change’ and not an economic adaptation. Recent 
criticisms have somewhat diluted the authority of the Princeton view. Brown and 
Guinnane (2007) argue that the EFP’s conclusions were biased by the level of 
aggregation. The sub-national districts used (departments, counties, cantons etc.) were 
too large and internally heterogeneous to be useful as distinct fertility regimes. Further, 
the socioeconomic data collected was not the most relevant to parent’s fertility 
decisions.  
The implications for further research are clear: To go beyond the EFP two issues 
must be addressed. Firstly, the level of aggregation, and secondly, the relevance of the 
socioeconomic data. The study presented here directly addresses these two concerns 
via an individual level analysis of fertility behaviour with real wealth information.  
 
A central feature of the European demographic transition is the exceptional early 
fertility decline of France. The reasons for this spectacular break from the historical 
pattern and divergence from European trends have never been fully explained. Figure  
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Figure 5.1: The index of Marital Fertility, 1740-1911, France 
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Source: Weir 1994 p.330-1 
 
5.1 tracks the trend of the index of marital fertility – fertility relative to an observed 
maximum (that of an early twentieth century religious group, the Hutterites, who 
married early and prohibited contraception). From the late 18th century on, fertility 
appears to begin a steady and consistent decline from very high levels (80-90% of the 
Hutterites) to very low levels (almost 30% of the Hutterites). Econometric testing for 
structural breaks in this series places the transition at 1776. This is nearly a century 
before anywhere else in Europe (Belgium (1874)), and 101 years before England and 
Wales (1877) (see Cummins 2009 (forthcoming) for details).  
 
There have been relatively few previous studies of the relationship between 
economic status and family size at the individual level for France at this period. Weir, 
using the Henry demographic data, examined the income-fertility relationship in 
Rosny-Sous-Bois, using tax records for 1747. In a cross-sectional analysis, he found no 
difference in marital fertility behaviour between the income groupings.  Fertility was 
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high and varied little between his three income stratifications, although the evidence 
does suggest a reproductive advantage for his highest group relative to his lowest (7.3 
to 6.2 births per family respectively) (Weir 1995 p.15). Weir’s sample size was very 
small however – he only had a total sample of 47 families to analyze. Hadeishi, with a 
larger sample size and also using tax records, studied the town of Nuits in Burgundy 
from 1744-1792, and found a positive relationship between marital fertility and income 
(2003 p.489). My analysis adds to this literature by linking pre-existing historical 
demographic data to new wealth data collected from various Archives Departmentales in 
France. The geographic and socioeconomic scope, along with the sample size, is far 
greater than previous studies. This will allow the identification of differential fertility 
patterns between socioeconomic strata with greater power. Further, there has been no 
previous study (to the author’s knowledge) which has examined the wealth-fertility 
relationship during the period of the demographic transition in France (post 1790s).  
 
The rest of this chapter is comprised of five sections. Section 5.2 details the data 
and its summary characteristics. Section 5.3 is a detailed examination of the wealth-
fertility associations. Section 5.4 analyses the mechanics behind the fertility patterns, 
while section 5.5 evaluates explanations for the French fertility transition. Section 5.6 
Concludes. 
 
Section 5.2: The Data 
 
The demographic data118 to be analysed is taken from Louis Henry’s national 
random sample of 41 villages, roughly covering a span of over two centuries, from the 
late 17th to early 19th centuries (Weir 1995 p.2). This dataset119 is the result of the 
application of the techniques of family reconstitution to parish registers and the fruition 
of this is a goldmine of individual level information on the demographic characteristics 
                                                
118 I thank George Alter for providing his version of the Henry dataset. 
119 The summary papers for the INED French family reconstitution are: 
Henry (1972), Henry and Houdaille (1973), Houdaille (1976), and Henry (1978). 
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of historical France. Tens of thousands of observations record linked births, deaths and 
marriages. However, only 20% of the sample recorded the husband’s occupation. As 
van de Walle has stated ‚unfortunately, the population of the parishes usually is not 
clearly stratified and most attempts in finding lags in the dates of fertility decline by 
socioeconomic groups have failed‛ (1978 p.264). To understand the relationship 
between wealth and fertility in France at this period, the Henry dataset must be 
augmented with more detailed data. 
 
The source for wealth data are the Tables des Successions et Absences120 (TSA), which 
are stored in the various Archives Departmentales in France. The TSAs were originally 
constructed for tax purposes and recorded all deaths in a locality, along with detailed 
information on date of death, residence, profession, age at death and marital status. 
Uniquely, the value of an individual’s estate at death was noted, with a distinction 
between cash and property holdings. Crucially, the TSAs recorded everybody, 
including those with zero assets at death (typically coded as ‚rien‛). Almost ¼ of the 
individuals in the sample I use fall into this category.  
 
Due to the fact that the property valuation recorded in the TSAs only covered 
property held in the locality, it is possible that the values calculated here are 
underestimates of the true property wealth of individuals. However, this bias only 
affects a small minority of the sample. According to Bordieu et al, 85% of individuals in 
the ‚TRA‛ sample (also based on the TSAs) had one property record, leaving 15% with 
two or more (2004 p.7). Attempts to assess the accuracy of the wealth information in the 
TSAs are limited by the fact that ‚very few alternative sources exist‛ (Bourdieu et al. 
2004 p.25). However, Bourdieu et al. test the validity of the Tables against other 
published data and find the TSA to yield consistent results (2004 p.26).  
 
The Henry demographic data set was linked to records from the Tables de
                                                
120 In English: ‚Tables of Bequests and Absent Persons‛ (Bourdieu et al. 2004 p.4). 
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Figure 5.2: Villages in the Sample 
 
 
Successions et Absences. The links were based upon name, profession, sex, age at death 
and date of death. These criteria serve to place close to 100% certainty in the accuracy of 
the links. Ultimately, four villages were selected on the basis that they were the best 
represented after linking. These villages had the properties of holding a significant 
number of individuals dying after 1810 (when the TSAs start to record estimates of 
wealth), and also having the TSAs preserved in the relevant Archive Departmental.  
 
The sample covers the fertility experience of individuals who died roughly 
between 1810 and 1870 and were born between the 1720s and the 1820s. The relevant 
‘fertile period’ covered is therefore 1750-1850, roughly speaking. At this time 
approximately 80% of the French population lived in rural villages of a similar size to 
those in the sample (Sharlin 1986 p.235). Fertility decline in France cannot be 
understood without understanding what was happening in these rural villages. 
However, the sample villages are only 4 out of perhaps 40,000 villages in France as a 
whole. The occupational distribution of these sample villages closely matched that of 
the complete Henry Sample (41 villages). The deviations in representativeness are 
detailed in the appendix.  In order to judge how representative the demographic 
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regimes in these villages are, their fertility pattern relative to the National trend is 
plotted in figure 5. 3. 
 
The National trend in gI (the index of marital fertility), presented in figure 5.3, 
shows a sharp decline from high levels in the 1780-99 period. Interestingly, the sample 
villages display a high level of heterogeneity with respect to the trend in marital 
fertility. Rosny has exceptionally high marital fertility which then proceeds to decline 
dramatically from 1760-79 period to the post 1780s. Both Cabris and St Paul have 
relatively low levels of marital fertility (to the other villages and the National trend), 
with a trend towards decline evident in Cabris from the 1740-1759 period.  
 
The initial trend towards decline in St Paul stalls after 1760, and along with St 
Chely, whose fertility remains high throughout, no trend towards sustained decline is 
evident. The sample villages capture the high level of heterogeneity within France with 
respect to fertility patterns. Two of the villages – Rosny and Cabris – show clear 
evidence for decline, while the other two – St Paul and St Chely – do not share the same 
pattern. Examining the trend from the 1760-79 period to 1800-1819, we see that fertility 
in Rosny falls by nearly 40% and in Cabris by almost 20%. In St Chely and St Paul, 
fertility remains relatively constant. Therefore it is possible to identify two 
demographic regimes amongst the sample villages, a high fertility environment and a 
declining fertility environment. For the analysis, the data from each village will be 
pooled and the varying wealth effects will be tested for by demographic regime.  
 
The wealth variable used in this study has the major disadvantage of being 
measured at death. In aggregate, people tend to accumulate wealth over the life cycle, 
before dis-saving and intervivos bequests to offspring act to reduce the wealth held. 
This will have the effect of biasing the estimates from the TSA downward, with respect 
to true wealth, for those who died after this point. The data I use supports this notion, 
as the figure 5.4 illustrates (based on 672 male observations). 
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Figure 5.3: The Index of Marital Fertility, by Sample Village, Contrasted with the 
National Trend 
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Figure 5.4: Life Course Effects 
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An OLS regression was run with the Square root of real wealth as the dependent 
variable, with age and age squared as the independent variables. The results are 
reported in table 5.1. The reported coefficients on age at death, which are both 
significant at the 5% level, indicate a turning point age of 63.75121, beyond which the 
relationship between wealth and age at death turns negative. There is a possibility that 
the life course pattern of wealth accumulation and subsequent decline may blur the 
true level of wealth of an individual in the sample. However, I consider this probability 
quite small as the slope of the line is so flat. There are no significant negative 
associations revealed by the analysis of the aggregate data between the level of real 
wealth and age at death. In total over 60% of the sample died above 64, and taking their 
value of wealth at death carries a risk of undervaluation due to the life course effects. 
The OLS regression on the square root of real wealth allows us to calculate an average 
bias (assuming the true level of wealth is reached at age 64) based on the average life 
course relationship between wealth and age122.  
 
Table 5.1: OLS Regression on the Square Root of Real Wealth 
Variable Coeff. SE P 
Age at Death 2.04 0.96 0.03 
Age at Death  
Squared 
-0.016 0.007 0.03 
Constant -20.8 29.5 .48 
 
Adjusted  
R-Squared 
0.004 
Observations 672 
 
While the majority of the sample is at risk from underestimation of true wealth 
due to life course effects, any serious bias (>10%) is likely to only affect less than 5% of
                                                
121 Equivalent to the point on the quadratic fit of the wealth and age observations where the slope is equal 
to zero. Calculated via differentiating the regression equation of the quadratic fit, setting equal to zero, and 
solving for age at death. 
122 These numbers are calculated using the deviation of the regression line from a flat line from age 64 
onwards.  
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the sample. Ultimately the analysis presented here will split the wealth distribution in 
three. The possibility of bias from underestimation must be considered minimal as a 
result of such a wide division of the sample. 
 
Table 5.2: Estimated Biases from Life Course Effects 
Estimated Possible  
Downward Bias 
Affected  
Age Groups Obs 
% of Sample 
 affected 
5%+ 64-98 421 61.61% 
10%+ 86-98 42 4.32% 
20%+ 95-98 4 0.15% 
 
Figure 5.5: Real Wealth by Year of Death (Males) 
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There is a statistically insignificant effect of year of death on Real Wealth, with a 
linear fit completely flat for the sample period (figure 5.5). For analysis, the sample will 
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be split into three wealth groups. As there was no time trend in the evolution of real 
wealth during this period, the division of wealth is calculated over the entire sample, 
disregarding sub-period. The choice of three wealth cuts follows Weir (1995) and 
Gutmann and Watkins (1990), and makes sense when we consider that these villages 
were primarily agricultural and the socio-economic stratification, as perceived by the 
population themselves, was probably relatively simple. The division split the sample 
into even thirds, with those dying with  the sum of  0-141 Francs been designated to 
group 1, those with wealth at death between 141 and 2,100 Francs designated into 
group 2, and those with a wealth at over 2,100 been designated to group 3. The nominal 
levels of wealth reported in the Tables were converted to real levels using a cost of 
living index from Lévy-Leboyer & Bourguignon (1990)123.  
 
Raw Wealth Correlations 
Table 5.3 reports the average number of children born and the number of children 
surviving to 10 (‘net family size’). These values represent the actual gross and net 
reproductive success between the wealth groups. The different demographic regimes 
have very different wealth-fertility relationships. Where fertility is high and 
unchanging, the wealth-fertility relationship is positive. The Richest group here has a 
family size over 21% larger than the poorest (over 30% if we measure this in ‘net’ 
terms). Where fertility is declining, the wealth fertility relationship is the reverse. The 
differential between the richest and the poorest group’s family size is now minus 30%! 
(23% in ‘net’ terms). The varying family sizes of the sample follow a clear and direct 
wealth-pattern, once we control for the type of fertility regime revealed by the 
aggregate trends.  
 
The raw averages discussed here say nothing on the mechanics of the fertility 
differentials between the groups.  How was the lower cross sectional fertility of the rich  
achieved in those villages where fertility was declining? Further, why was fertility so
                                                
123 Which was kindly supplied to me by Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur. 
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Table 5.3: Average Children Born and Surviving to 10 Years, per Wealth Group 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non- Decline Villages   
Children Ever Born 4.87 5.90 5.93 
Net Family Size 3.42 4.03 4.47 
Decline Villages    
Children Ever Born 5.50 4.88 3.88 
Net Family Size 4.62 4.14 3.57 
 
low amongst the poorest groups in the villages where fertility was not declining? 
Malthusian logic would immediately propose the female age at marriage, the classic 
European ‘preventative’ check as the driver behind these patterns. Also, differential 
female mortality between the wealth groups could be generating a lot of the variation. 
Does the perceived wealth effect act through these channels? The following section 
details regressions designed to detect the wealth effects controlling for these 
demographic variables and also event dummies such as the French Revolution.   
 
Section 5.3: Deconstructing the Wealth Effects 
 
The equations below detail the components of net family size. Any wealth effects 
on net family size have to operate through differentials in these values.  
 
)50,,,min(
*
FAgeMFAgeDMAgeDEU
FAgeMEUMD
CEDMDMFRNetF
CEDCEBNetF




 
Where NetF is net family size, CEB  and CED  are children ever born and died 
respectively, MFR is the marital fertility rate, MD is the duration of the marriage, 
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EU is the end of the union (marriage), MAgeD  is the husbands age at death, 
FAgeM and FAgeD  are female age at marriage and death respectively.  
 
Further, it can be expected that other forces, operating at the village level, and also 
at the national level (for instance the Revolution and the effects of the Napoleonic 
wars), have an influence upon individual’s fertility choices. To examine the specific 
wealth effects in the sample, a regression framework was established. 
 
The model to be estimated takes the following functional form: 
),,,,,,,.( WealthIMNWARsREVFageDFageMDCCEBf ii  
Where C  represents a constant, D is a fertility regime fixed effect, IM  represents a 
measure of infant mortality, and REV and NWARs are categorical variables 
representing the Revolution and Napoleonic wars respectively. The last mentioned 
‘event’ variables were coded relative to year of marriage, with those with a year of 
marriage in 1789 or later receiving a Revolution effect, and those married between 1802 
and 1814 receiving a war effect. The Wealth variable is included in the regression as a 
categorical variable in order to account for expected non-linearities in the wealth 
fertility relationship.  
 
Any analysis of fertility must account for the impact of child deaths upon parent’s 
fertility decisions. Further, these child mortality estimates must take into account the 
significant likelihood of the omission of child deaths in the death registers. A popular 
way to detect under registration in death records is to examine the frequency of first 
name repetition within a family. Typically, later born siblings would be given the name 
of a previously deceased child. Houdaille has conducted an in-depth analysis of the 
Henry dataset for these features. However, his results are based on the village level and 
will tell us nothing on the wealth differentials within the villages with respect to infant 
and child mortality. One result that is relevant here is the completeness of the death 
records in Rosny, where no under registration was detected at all (Houdaille 1984 p.88). 
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For this study, I employed a simple version of this technique. First, I counted up the 
number of repeated names within a family. This was then compared with the number 
of recorded child deaths. Where the number of repeated names exceeded the number of 
child deaths, I corrected the child deaths upwards to account for the probable omission 
of a death from the records. Table 5.4 reports the corrected and non corrected values by 
fertility regime and wealth division.  
 
There are huge differences in child mortality between the villages. Within those 
were fertility is high, child mortality is high too. Within the villages, child mortality 
varies to a far less extent, with almost no differences between the wealth groups where 
fertility is high. The wealthiest group in the decline villages have child mortality far 
below any other group in the sample, and their rate is half that of the richest group in 
the non-decline villages.  
 
Table 5.4: Child Mortality (until 10 years) by Fertility Regime and Wealth Group, 
Rates per 1000 births 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non- Decline Villages   
Corrected 326.8 342.1 335.1 
Uncorrected 283.1 320.6 314.2 
Decline Villages    
Corrected 201.5 211.0 166.6 
Uncorrected 181.2 197.9 162.0 
 
Is the decline in fertility related to a reduction in child mortality at this period? 
To examine this, I will proceed with a multivariate regression. There is a probable 
endogenous relationship between fertility and infant mortality. Firstly, the number of 
child deaths can never exceed the number of births. This induces a positive correlation 
between fertility and mortality (Guinnane et al. 2006 p. 472). Secondly, parents may 
choose to replace a deceased infant. Any interpretation of a parent’s gross family size 
must therefore factor in the effects of the mortality experience. Following Guinnane et 
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al., I factor in mortality by including the proportion of children dead as an independent 
variable in the regression. This removes the structural correlation between mortality 
and fertility but does not remove the endogenity. 
 
Table 5.5: Negative Binomial Regressions on Children Ever Born 
 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Demographic variables  
Age at Marriage, Female -0.038*** 
(0.005) 
Age at Death, Female 0.035*** 
(0.004) 
Proportion of Children dead 0.269** 
(0.001) 
Event variables  
Revolution -0.149** 
(0.059) 
Napoleonic Wars -.043 
(0.054) 
Wealth Effects   
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 0.181* 
(0.049) 
Wealth Group3 0.145 
(0.093) 
Wealth-Fertility Regime Interactions  
Main Decline Effect 0.085 
(0.078) 
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 -0.291** 
(0.102) 
Wealth Group3 -0.397*** 
(0.104) 
Constant .945*** 
(0.252) 
N 411 
Pseudo R2 0.088 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
*Significant at .05% level 
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As the dependant variable is a count variable and because the data is ‘over dispersed’ 
relative to the Poisson distribution, the appropriate method is to use negative binomial 
regression. The distribution of both gross and net fertility matched the negative 
binomial distribution closely, and a comparison with the Poisson distribution is 
detailed in the appendix.  
 
Table 5.5 details the results of a negative binomial regression on children ever born. 
Female ages at marriage and at death are highly significant and act in the expected 
directions124. The proportion of dead children is also highly significant and its effect is 
large. Intended to capture the effects of infant mortality, a reduction in this value 
decreases the number of children born. The Revolution has a significant negative effect 
on fertility, but the Napoleonic wars are insignificant. The wealth effects are capture by 
interactions in the model, and their ‘net’ effects are reported in table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6: Net Wealth Effects on Children ever born 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non- Decline Villages 5.95 7.14 6.88 
Decline Villages 6.48 5.81 5.04 
 
The ‘net’ wealth effects on fertility in table 5.6 are calculated from the interaction 
coefficients in the negative binomial regressions. A constant age at marriage for females 
(24) and complete life course fertility (surviving to at least 50) is applied for each wealth 
group125.  These values represent the wealth effects on fertility ‘net’ of wealth 
differentials in age at marriage, death and the proportion of children dead. Once the net 
effect is calculated for each wealth group, the coefficient is exponentiated (as the beta 
coefficients of the negative binomial regression are given in logarithms) to give the 
expected numbers for each wealth group.  These numbers can be understood as 
                                                
124 Women who marry later should have fewer children for biological reasons, and women who die during 
their reproductive years should have fewer children.  
125 The average age at marriage for all women in the sample as a whole was 23.8. 
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representing the net wealth effects controlling for the factors listed in the regression, 
and ignoring the effects of the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars. In relation to the 
richest and poorest groups, the strong positive wealth fertility relationship almost 
completely disappears within the non-decline villages. Those in the middle of the wealth 
distribution in the non-decline villages – Wealth Group 2, appear to have the highest 
marital fertility. Where fertility decline has already begun, the net wealth fertility 
relationship is still sharply negative, with the richest groups having over 22% fewer 
births. In summation: Pre-transition villages have a positive wealth-fertility profile, 
whereas transition villages have a negative wealth-fertility profile. This strongly 
implies that it is the rich, the top third of the wealth distribution in these rural villages, 
who are the pioneers of the decline in French fertility. 
 
As mentioned, one feature the regression results highlight is the high relative 
fertility of Wealth Group 2 in the non-decline villages. One postulation on this feature 
could be that a proportion of the richest groups in the non-decline villages are beginning 
to control their fertility, but this proportion is too small to move the size of the wealth 
effect below that of the poorest group.  The quality of the Henry dataset allows us to 
examine in fine detail the mechanics of the wealth fertility differentials, and this is 
described in the next section.  
 
Section 5.4: The Mechanics behind the Fertility Patterns 
 
The results from the regressions demonstrate systematically that economic status 
mattered during the period of fertility decline in France. What were the mechanics 
behind these patterns? The regressions indicate that both the gross family size 
correlations with wealth were independent of marriage age and age at death. The 
significant negative association, particularly for Rosny and Cabris (the ‘decline regime’ 
villages) for marriages after 1800, must therefore represent an implementation of 
fertility limitation strategies within marriage. There are two ways for couples to control 
 214 
their desired family size. Firstly, they can stop bearing children once they reach a 
certain target family size – this is known as ‘stopping’ behaviour. Secondly, they can 
increase their birth intervals–‘spacing’ behaviour. The European demographic 
transition has overwhelmingly been attributed to ‘stopping behaviour’ (Alter 1992 
p.15).  However, the aggregation of those pursuing different reproductive strategies 
may blur the true picture. As van Bavel has stated; ‚research explicitly analyzing 
stopping and spacing has hardly ever differentiated between social status groups‛ 
(2002 p.7). The French fertility patterns discussed here are delineated by economic 
categories, and this section evaluates to what extent stopping and spacing can be 
attributed.  
 
‘Stopping’ Behaviour 
The  Henry demographic dataset allows the calculation of fertility measures such as 
Age Specific Fertility Rates, Coale’s index of marital fertility, the Total Marital Fertility 
Rate and the Coale and Trussell fertility control measures ‚M‛ and ‚m‛ (referred to as 
big and little m respectively). The Coale-Trussell parameters are calculated from the 
Age Specific Fertility Rates and represent deviations from the age pattern of ‘natural 
fertility’. An M value of 1 and an ‘m’ value of 0 indicate no fertility control. Typically, 
researchers look for an ‘m’ value greater than .200 for an unambiguous sign of a 
controlling population. M, is harder to interpret, but may catch ‘spacing’ effects. The 
appendix details the statistical derivation of the Coale-Trussell parameters.  However, 
these measures have been criticized in the literature and are far from fool proof. Table 
5.7 summarizes the calculated Age specific marital fertility rates, Total Marital Fertility 
Rates and the Coale and Trussell fertility control parameters.  
 
The reproductive advantage of the richest group in the non-decline villages is 
emphasized by the high value for M, 0.927. This means that the richest group here has a 
fertility level very close to that of the natural fertility schedule. For the non-decline 
villages, M has decreased and the scale of the decrease is, again, closely related to 
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economic status. The richest have the lowest level of fertility and the poorest wealth 
group have the highest. Focusing on ‘m’ – the parameter indicating significant 
deviation from a natural age pattern of marital fertility, the results indicate no 
unambiguous signs for stopping behaviour in any of the regimes. However, this value 
is largest for the richest group in the decline villages (0.146). Despite failing to be 
significant and above the 0.200 threshold, the value is indicative of a small proportion 
of ‘stoppers’. 
Table 5.7: Demographic Measures by Fertility Regime 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non-decline Villages 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-25 0.364 0.313 0.373 
25-30 0.357 0.360 0.432 
30-35 0.302 0.389 0.349 
35-40 0.268 0.321 0.303 
40-45 0.155 0.176 0.158 
45-50 0.008 0.027 0.000 
Total Marital Fertility 7.75 8.43 8.70 
Coale Trussell Measures 
M 0.802* 0.795** 0.927 
S.E. 0.105 0.087 0.092 
"m" 0.029 -0.141 0.064 
S.E. 0.119 0.095 0.113 
Decline Villages 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-25 0.302 0.250 0.216 
25-30 0.343 0.313 0.261 
30-35 0.313 0.273 0.228 
35-40 0.242 0.209 0.164 
40-45 0.133 0.100 0.084 
45-50 0.009 0.007 0.009 
Total Marital Fertility 7.58 6.82 5.86 
Coale Trussell Measures 
M 0.768** 0.682*** 0.587*** 
S.E. 0.096 0.085 0.087 
"m" 0.058 0.104 0.146 
S.E. 0.107 0.099 0.100 
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Another way to detect ‘stopping’ behaviour is to look at the average age women 
have their last birth. These values are reported for the regime and wealth group 
combinations in table 5.8. The values are calculated only for those women and their 
husbands who died after 50.  The mean age at last birth in populations practicing 
‘natural fertility’ is approximately 40-41 years (Bongaarts (1983) as cited by Kohler et al. 
2002 p.28). Amongst the villages where fertility was not declining, there is no 
significant variation to report. Age at last birth is high, around 37-38 years for all wealth 
groups. For the villages where fertility was declining, the top 2 wealth groups do show 
evidence for ‘stopping’ behaviour; the mean age at last birth is significantly below that 
of the other groups in the sample.  
 
Table 5.8: Age at Last Birth by Fertility Regime 
 Wealth Group 
 
 
1 2 3 
Non-Decline  Villages 37.81 38.62 36.92 
Decline Villages 37.80 35.90 35.37 
 
‘Spacing’ behaviour  
Having established some partial evidence for the presence of ‘stopping’ behaviour 
amongst the wealthiest groups in the sample villages, the question of ‘spacing’ arises. It 
is far easier to detect ‘stopping’ behaviour in population sub-groups then it is to detect 
‘spacing’ behaviour. One way to detect spacing is to model the birth intervals directly 
using a Cox proportional hazards model. The results will describe the effects of the 
covariate independent variables  in terms of a ‘hazard rate’, which is defined as the 
instantaneous probability of the event in question (in this case a birth), and is therefore 
directly related to the length of the birth interval. As the model is intended to reveal 
differences in spacing behaviour, only closed birth intervals are used. The formulation 
of the birth interval model follows previous analyses by Alter (1988), Bengtsson and 
Dribe (2006), Van Bavel (2004a, 2004b) and Van Bavel and Kok (2004). After 
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consideration of the varying inclusion of demographic factors in these studies, it was 
decided to concentrate on those factors most commonly found to affect the birth 
interval. This was done with the aim of producing a parsimonious model which could 
capture the wealth effects (if any) on the duration of the birth interval. The 
demographic factors included were the age of the mother (in five year age bands), the 
duration of the marriage, parity, and the life status of the previous born child. In 
common with the analysis by Bengtsson and Dribe, I include shared frailty at the 
individual level to control for unobserved family-specific heterogeneity in the sample 
(2006 p.736).  
 
The Cox proportional hazards model is based on the following identity: 
)exp()()( 0 xththi    
The hazard rate h  for the thi  individual is a multiplicative function of the baseline 
hazard 0h  and the regression coefficients, x   (Cleves et al 2004 p.147-8). The great 
advantage of the Cox proportional hazard model is that the functional form of 0h  , the 
baseline hazard, is left unspecified. To account for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
individual level a frailty component is included. Rewriting the hazard: 
)exp()()( 0 xthth ii    
Where i represents the shared frailty term, assumed to have mean one and a variance 
estimated from the data (Cleves et al 2004 p.147-8). This is intended to capture mother 
specific effects on the birth interval, constant across all the covariates. As mentioned, 
the results reported in table 5.9 are presented as hazard ratios126.  Where the reported 
coefficient equals 1, there is no effect of that variable on the hazard of a birth. 
                                                
126 The critical proportional hazards assumption was tested by analyzing the Schoenfeld residuals. Using 
stata’s spthtest revealed that there was a deviation from the proportional hazards assumption in the 
original formulation of the birth interval model (table 9). Variable by variable analysis indicated that the 
parity, marital duration and female age grouping variables were driving this violation of the proportional 
hazards assumption. The analysis was repeated omitting these variables and the new wealth coefficients 
were compared with the original models. They were extremely similar in both magnitude and significance. 
Therefore it was decided to report the original model’s results. The proportional hazards assumption was 
also checked graphically using stata’s stphplot command.   
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Table 5.9: Cox Regression on Closed Birth Intervals 
 .coeffe  
.coeffse
 p  
Women's Age   
15-19 0.707 0.177 0.166 
20-24 0.976 0.075 0.756 
25-29 (ref.) 1 - - 
30-34 0.920 0.063 0.223 
35-39 0.743 0.071 0.002 
40-44 0.297 0.043 0.000 
45-49 0.043 0.020 0.000 
    
Parity 1.108 0.025 0.000 
Marital Duration 0.906 0.010 0.000 
Infant Alive 0.168 0.015 0.000 
    
Decline Effect 0.868 0.111 0.268 
Main Wealth Effects    
Wealth Group 1 (ref.) 1 - - 
Wealth Group 2 1.221 0.152 0.108 
Wealth Group 3 1.276 0.170 0.067 
Wealth-Fertility Decline 
Interactions 
   
Wealth Group 1 (ref.) 1 - - 
Wealth Group 2 0.716 0.121 0.049 
Wealth Group 3 0.543 0.095 0.000 
    
Frailty variance 0.298 0.050 0.000 
N – Number of birth 
Intervals 
2186 
Likelihood Ratio 2  83.77 0.000 
 
The Cox regressions on the hazard of a birth place attach high significance to parity, 
marital duration and the presence of an infant. Further, the natural fall off in fecundity 
is reflected by the falling hazard ratios for age groups past the 25-29 reference category. 
The wealth effects are reported as interactions in the regression table. In order to 
calculate the net wealth effects, these values are multiplied, producing the values 
reported in table 5.10. The wealth effects are large. For the non-decline villages, the 
hazard ratio for a birth increases with the wealth category, indicating that the top 2 
 219 
wealth groups have significantly shorter birth intervals than the poorest group. For the 
decline villages, the opposite is true. The richest here have much longer birth intervals 
than the poorest group. The mean birth interval for each wealth group varies with the 
hazard rates, and are also reported in table 5.10. These results strongly indicate that 
spacing played a substantial role in the declining fertility of the richer groups in the 
sample. In comparison with the Coale-Trussell measures and the age at last birth 
calculations, it appears that spacing played a substantial role in the French fertility 
decline. 
 
Table 5.10: Net Hazard Ratios and Mean Birth Interval (Months) by Fertility Regime 
and Wealth Group 
 Wealth Group 
 1 2 3 
Non-Decline Villages 
Hazard rate 1.000 1.221 1.276 
Interval 30.60 27.74 27.57 
Decline Villages 
Hazard rate 0.868 0.760 0.602 
Interval 32.08 33.23 36.41 
 
Figure 5.6 illustrates the age pattern of marital fertility for the richest and poorest 
groups in both fertility regimes (the top and bottom thirds of the wealth distribution 
respectively). As the Coale-Trussell estimates indicated, the age pattern of marital 
fertility does not vary to a large extent between these sub-groups. However, the level of 
the fertility rate at each age group varies enormously. There is a large positive ‘upward 
shift’ in the age fertility schedule between the poorest and richest wealth groups in the 
non-decline villages. For the decline villages, this shift is downward. The Cox model 
reveals that the lower cross-sectional fertility of the richer groups in the decline villages 
is overwhelmingly a result of spacing practices. This is also implied by figure 5.6, where 
the level of fertility at each age group is significantly lower for the richest group in the 
decline villages. 
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Figure 5.6:  The Age Pattern of Marital fertility for Rich and Poor 
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Section 5.5: Why did fertility decline in France? 
 
Any socioeconomic explanation for early French fertility decline must consider that 
England, with a higher level of GDP per capita, a smaller agrarian sector and a larger 
urbanization rate lagged behind French fertility trends by over 100 years. This fact 
undermines demographic transition theory, the microeconomic theory of fertility and 
unified growth theory127. All of these theories rely on changes in income, modernisation 
and the labour force structure of the economy in initiating a substitution of child 
quantity for quality. None of them can explain why France was first. 
 
The French themselves have long been preoccupied with the unusual
                                                
127 At least in explaining the fertility transition. 
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characteristics of their demographic history. An intellectual climate obsessed with 
depopulation and the decline in French fertility arose around the turn of the 20 century. 
Van de Walle briefly discusses this mostly forgotten literature, criticizing its ‚outdated 
and weak statistical content‛, and states that the work amounted to a no more than a 
series of hypotheses (1974 p.6). Some of these hypotheses have survived to today, and I 
focus upon those forwarded by Tony Wrigley and David Weir128. 
 
Neo-Malthusian Explanation 
Wrigley sees the early adoption of family limitation in France as ‚a variant form of the 
classic prudential system of maintaining an equilibrium between population and 
resources to which Malthus drew attention‛. Essentially, the preventative check now 
operated through marital fertility directly and not indirectly through age at marriage. 
The net reproduction rate in France from the late 18th to late nineteenth century was 
always close to 1, suggesting that the population was still finely constrained by 
available resources (Wrigley p.55 1985).  As previously mentioned, almost 80% of the 
French population were rural, and nearly 70% lived off farming at the time of the 
decline (Chesnais 1992 p.335). Chesnais also points out that ‚farming remained 
primitive‛ and that there were numerous indicators of overpopulation (such as increase 
in wheat prices from the 1760s-1820s) (1991 p.336). These features certainly lend 
themselves to a Malthusian interpretation of the fertility pattern. 
 
The testable implication of this hypothesis, as stated by Weir, is that there should 
be a strong positive relationship between real income and fertility (1984a p.31). 
However, this ‘neo-Malthusian’ reasoning for the early decline for French fertility fails 
                                                
128 Another popular explanation for the French fertility decline is the change in the inheritance laws which 
accompanied the Revolution. The Napoleonic code replaced primogeniture with equal partition. In order 
to preserve a concentration of wealth within the family, parents now had to curb their family size, as 
wealth could not solely be assigned to the eldest male. Chesnais questions this interpretation by pointing 
out that other countries adopted the same principles but didn’t experience a fertility decline. Further, 
primogeniture was not practised widely in the North, except amongst the aristocracy, and the South-West 
of France, where primogeniture was common,  had relatively low fertility in the Ancien Regime, and 
followed the same fertility pattern elsewhere post Revolution (1991 p.338).  
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to be supported by the individual level data collected in this analysis. If the restriction 
on births was a response to an economic constraint, we would expect those closest to 
subsistence to initiate fertility control. This is clearly not the case for the four villages in 
the sample. Where fertility is declining, the wealth-fertility relationship is negative. 
Fertility decline here is more pronounced for the richer groups; they are the first to 
employ this new variant of the preventative check, but this is not a ‘neo-Malthusian’ 
response. 
   
The Revolution 
Many scholars (Weir 1984b, and more recently Murphy and Gonzalez-Bailón 2008) 
have explicitly linked the Revolution to the fertility decline. At a superficial (and highly 
aggregated) level, the events are near simultaneous (see figure 5.1). However, 
econometric tests on the aggregate fertility rate place the decline in fertility before the 
Revolution (1776, see Cummins 2009). Further, it is widely accepted that many localities 
began their fertility transition long before 1789 (Chesnais 1992 p.338). In the data 
collected for this analysis, Rosny and Cabris have substantially declining fertility rates 
before the Revolution (see figure 5.3). However, the ideological and socioeconomic 
causes of the Revolution were germinating long before 1789. Could these forces have 
also contributed to the fertility revolution as well as the political? 
 
An economic rationale for the decline in French fertility, associated with the 
Revolution has been forwarded by Weir. He states ‚evidence on fertility by social class 
is scarce, but tends to support the idea that fertility control was adopted by an 
ascendant ‚bourgeois‛ class of (often small) landowners‚ (1984b p.613). The Revolution 
enabled an element of the rural population to increase their control over the land, while 
others lost out and became more reliant on wage labour. For the new rural bourgeoisie, 
children became ‚superfluous as labourers and costly as consumers‛ (Weir 1984b 
p.613). The decline of fertility in France in the early to mid 19th century was primarily 
due to the decline of the demand for children by this new class. It was only after 1870 
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when France joined the rest of Europe in a fertility transition which transcended the 
social order (Weir 1984b p.614).  
 
The results of this analysis support Weir’s hypothesis on the French fertility 
transition. The new class of landowners created by the Revolution would certainly lie 
within the top wealth category as constructed here. The results clearly show, as Weir 
expected, that fertility decline was initiated by this wealthy group. Further, the effect of 
the Revolution on family size is large, negative and significant (see table 5.11). This is 
captured in the negative binomial regressions by coding a categorical variable for those 
who married after 1789. A more precise testable implication of Weir’s hypothesis is that 
those who have greater property wealth should have the lowest fertility. Further, the 
cash component of total wealth at death should be an insignificant predictor for family 
size.  By splitting the wealth measures into the property and cash components we can 
test for this in the sample data. Once the value is separated, the distribution is split into 
even thirds with respect to cash and property separately129. Table 5.10 reports the 
results of a negative binomial regression, similar to the previous exercise, but this time 
dividing wealth into its constituent parts. 
 
The results agree exactly with Weir’s predictions. The wealth category which has  
significantly fewer children is composed of the richest property owners. However, the 
driving factor in his hypothesis is the changing cost of children, due to the 
substitutability of wage labour by poorer socioeconomic groups. This does not uniquely 
identify a particular French characteristic as this process must surely have been existed 
in other countries. At this time, the English population was far less reliant on the 
agricultural sector and children must have been as expensive, if not more so, as they 
were in France.  
                                                
129 The division for property was all those with 0 value at death in group 1, all those with property over 0 
and less than 2000 Francs in group 2, and all those with over 2000 Francs property wealth going to group 3. 
For cash, all those with 0 wealth at death were designated to group 1, those with over 0 and under 155 
Francs in group2, and all those over 155 in group 3. A matrix describing the various groups in terms of 
observations is reported in the appendix to this chapter.  
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Table 5.11: Negative Binomial Regressions on Children Ever Born with the 
Components of Wealth 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Demographic variables  
Age at Marriage, Female 
-0.036*** 
(0.005) 
Age at Death, Female 
0.034*** 
(0.004) 
Proportion of children dead 
0.305** 
(0.102) 
Event variables  
Revolution 
-0.127* 
(0.052) 
Napoleonic Wars 
-0.008 
(0.054) 
Property Wealth Effects   
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 
-0.000 
(0.055) 
Wealth Group3 
-0.157** 
(0.058) 
Cash Wealth Effects  
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0 
Wealth Group2 
0.024 
(0.057) 
Wealth Group3 
0.053 
(0.061) 
  
Constant 
0.948*** 
(0.243) 
N 372 
Pseudo R2 0.069 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
*Significant at.05% level 
 
 
In France, however, serfdom had disappeared by the 18th century, and most
peasants owned their own land, in contrast to most of Europe (Chesnais 1992 p.336). 
The fertility decline originated amongst the wealthiest of this property holding class. 
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According to Chesnais, almost 63% of the population was represented by landowners 
and their families in 1830 while the comparable figure for Britain is 14% (1991 p.337). 
The widespread ownership of land amongst the rural population is a unique feature of 
the French socio-economic landscape at this time. Because of this, economic inequality 
was lower in France than in England during the 19th century (Piketty et al. 2006 p.250). 
This implies that the environment for social mobility was more fluid in 18th and 19th 
century France than anywhere else in Europe. Arsene Dumont, writing a century after 
the onset of the transition, placed social mobility as the ‘raison de etre’ of the French 
fertility decline and termed ‚social capillarity‛ as the phenomenon driving the 
limitation of family sizes (Dumont 1890). The Revolution served ‚to increase the thirst 
for equality and stimulate the social ambition of families, both for themselves and their 
progeny‛ (Chesnais 1992 p.334). The old social stratifications under the Ancien Regime, 
where hereditary rights had determined social status, were weakened by the 
Revolution. All of this served to facilitate individuals’ social ambition, and the 
limitation of family size was a tool in achieving upward social mobility. This 
phenomenon, while associated with the Revolution, originated before the political 
climax of 1789. 
 
The testable proposition of this hypothesis is that fertility should be negatively 
related to the opportunities for social mobility. A crude proxy for the social mobility 
environment is the level of economic inequality. In a society with a large rural, landless 
majority and a small group of elites, the prospects for social mobility are limited. It 
makes no sense to control fertility if family size has no impact upon a family’s relative 
social standing. The economic distance between the bottom and the top status groups is 
too great, and therefore upward social mobility is unattainable for the majority of the 
population. However, changes in the distribution of wealth/income between groups in 
the population reflect a changing environment for the possibility of social mobility. As 
economic inequality declines, fertility is induced to decline also, as parents now realize 
that social mobility is possible and the prospects for it are affected by family size.  
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One way to evaluate the strength of this hypothesis is to examine the level of 
economic inequality in cross section in the individual wealth data collected for 
transition era France. Table 5.12 reports gini coefficients based on total real wealth, by 
village, for the sample. The levels of inequality are very high, and typical of the pre-
industrial era. For the villages where fertility is declining, the gini coefficient is 
significantly lower than where it is not. This suggests that the level of inequality was 
associated with the onset of the fertility transition.   
 
Table 5.12: Gini Coefficients by Village 
 
Gini Coefficient 
(based on deaths 1810-1870) 
Non-decline Villages 
St Paul .861 
St Chely .818 
Decline Villages 
Cabris .705 
Rosny .722 
 
Another way to test the social mobility environment is to examine the relationship 
between father and son’s wealth at death. Where the environment for social mobility is 
more open, father’s wealth should have less importance in the determination of son’s 
wealth, than would be the case where social mobility is limited. For a very small 
subsample, I was able to investigate this relationship. Table 5.13 reports the results of 
an OLS regression on son’s wealth, with father’s wealth as an independent variable.  
 
Where fertility is high and not declining, father’s wealth is a highly significant 
predictor of son’s wealth. This relationship appears to be far weaker where fertility is 
declining. The effective coefficient on father’s wealth in the determination of son’s 
wealth in these decline regimes is one quarter of that of the villages where fertility is 
stagnating (0.864 vs. 0.195). When both father and son’s family size are controlled for, 
the coefficient on father’s wealth in the non-decline villages is ten times its 
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corresponding value in the decline villages (0.798 vs. 0.074). This result strongly implies 
that the strength of the intergenerational transmission of wealth, it’s ‘stickiness’ within
families, and the social mobility environment this implies, is associated with the 
presence of fertility decline. 
 
Table 5.13: Father’s Wealth as Determinant of Son’s Wealth 
 
Decline Regime Villages 56.56* 
(24.47) 
35.42 
(33.89) 
Fathers Wealth (Sqrt) 0.864*** 
(0.177) 
0.798*** 
(0.210) 
Fathers Wealth*Decline Regime -0.669* 
(0.305) 
-0.724* 
(0.349) 
Son’s Family Size 
 
-3.761 
(3.854) 
Father’s Family size 
 
-3.300 
(3.394) 
Constant 2.13 
(20.99) 
62.38 
(52.38) 
Observations 42 40 
Adj. 2R  0.346 0.320 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
*Significant at.05% level 
  
 
 
As I have stated before, demographic transition theory, the microeconomic theory 
of fertility and unified growth theory cannot explain why French fertility fell first in 
Europe because they all predict that fertility should have declined in England before 
anywhere else. Wrigley’s neo-Malthusian response cannot be valid as it was the richest 
groups who reduced their fertility, and Weir’s explanation, again, does not uniquely 
identify France. What was unique to France was the pattern of landholding and relative 
affluence (to the rest of the world). There are many good reasons to suspect that social 
mobility may be a factor behind the decline. The level of inequality and the 
perseverance of wealth within families, both highly related to the social mobility 
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environment were both found to be negatively associated with the presence of 
declining fertility.  
  
Section 5.6: Conclusion 
 
Through linking the Henry demographic dataset to individual measures of wealth, the 
socioeconomic correlates of the fertility transition have been examined in this chapter. 
The principal result is the major shift in the wealth fertility relationship at the 
individual level. Where fertility is high and non-declining, this relationship is positive. 
Where fertility is declining, this relationship is negative. It is the richest groups who 
reduce their fertility first. This result contributes to a revisionist interpretation of the 
European fertility decline. In opposition to the EFP’s conclusions, this disaggregated 
analysis finds strong socioeconomic correlates for the decline of fertility in France. The 
second principal result of this chapter is that spacing strategies in combination with 
stopping strategies, played a substantial role in achieving a lower family size for the 
richest groups, for the villages where fertility was declining. Thirdly, existing theories 
on why fertility declined in France failed to be supported by the empirical data 
collected. However, a fresh look at an old hypothesis, does receive some support. Social 
mobility, as proxied by the level of inequality in the villages and the perseverance of 
wealth within families, is strongly associated with fertility decline.  
 
The evidence presented here demonstrates that socioeconomic status mattered 
during the early French fertility decline but cannot, of course, claim to have cracked one 
of the greatest unsolved puzzles in economic history. The root causes behind the 
World’s first fertility decline are still poorly understood. It is perhaps time to reassess 
conceptual models of the fertility transition. Empirically, a comparative analysis with 
other European countries based upon detailed individual level information can 
hopefully illuminate the mystery of the early French fertility decline. This study is a 
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first step towards re-establishing the French experience as paramount in our 
understanding of Europe’s demographic transition.  
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Section 5A.1: The Source Material 
 
Figure A1: The Source Material 
 
 
The TSAs were photographed and coded, above is a representative page. 
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Section 5A.2: Age Specific Fertility Rates by Wealth grouping and Village 
 
Table 5A.1: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, Whole Sample, Before 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births      
20-24 155 59 241 89 246 93 
25-29 255 93 325 121 368 139 
30-34 283 94 322 108 392 124 
35-39 287 76 323 87 395 89 
40-44 272 44 315 49 396 60 
45-49 261 8 308 10 384 3 
       
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates    
20-24 0.381 0.369 0.378 
25-29 0.365 0.372 0.378 
30-34 0.332 0.335 0.316 
35-39 0.265 0.269 0.225 
40-44 0.162 0.156 0.152 
45-49 0.031 0.032 0.008 
 
Total Marital Fertility 
 7.67 7.67 7.28 
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 0.841 0.841 0.857 
S.E. 1.092 1.077 1.074 
    
"m" 0.029 0.027 0.142‛ 
S.E. 0.098 0.087 0.084 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 25.2 22.8 23.8 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births Corrected 131.1 145.7 136.0 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 2.11 1.80 2.15 
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Table 5A.2: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, Whole Sample, After 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
 
Exposure and Births      
20-24 114 42 138 54 142 49 
25-29 203 67 253 100 243 87 
30-34 231 69 286 101 245 66 
35-39 225 57 281 73 236 46 
40-44 208 18 273 34 230 8 
45-49 182 1 247 2 207 1 
       
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-24 0.368 0.391 0.345 
25-29 0.330 0.395 0.358 
30-34 0.299 0.353 0.269 
35-39 0.253 0.260 0.195 
40-44 0.087 0.125 0.035 
45-49 0.005 0.008 0.005 
Total Marital Fertility 
 6.71 7.66 6.04 
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 0.842 0.945 0.912 
S.E. 1.101 1.091 1.100 
    
"m" 0.235‛ 0.199‛ 0.555*** 
S.E. 0.123 0.102 0.128 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 23.4 25.1 22.6 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 149.9 113.3 163.5 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 1.77 1.91 1.60 
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Table 5A.3: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, Cabris, Before 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births      
20-24 63 26 129 46 136 45 
25-29 89 29 166 63 210 74 
30-34 90 30 163 47 227 67 
35-39 90 21 159 34 226 47 
40-44 86 9 150 22 221 29 
45-49 84 3 145 4 218 3 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates    
20-24 0.413 0.357 0.331 
25-29 0.326 0.380 0.352 
30-34 0.333 0.288 0.295 
35-39 0.233 0.214 0.208 
40-44 0.105 0.147 0.131 
45-49 0.036 0.028 0.014 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 7.23 7.06 6.66 
Ig 0.65 0.65 0.61 
    
Coale-Trussell Measures  
M 0.888 0.824 0.787 
S.E. 1.155 1.112 1.105 
    
"m" 0.221 0.127 0.142 
S.E. 0.177 0.129 0.117 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 21.9 21.2 23.1 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 139.78 146.95 95.38 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 2.50 2.25 1.95 
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Table 5A.4: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, Cabris, After 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births   
20-24 37 13 34 12 48 15 
25-29 62 20 81 31 83 19 
30-34 70 18 102 28 95 22 
35-39 70 13 105 22 88 11 
40-44 70 5 105 9 89 2 
45-49 70 0 100 0 82 0 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-24 0.351 0.353 0.313 
25-29 0.323 0.383 0.229 
30-34 0.257 0.275 0.232 
35-39 0.186 0.210 0.125 
40-44 0.071 0.086 0.022 
45-49 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 5.94 6.53 4.60 
Ig 0.53 0.58 0.40 
    
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 0.826 0.913 0.736 
S.E. 1.212 1.185 1.202 
    
"m" 0.425 0.402* 0.690** 
S.E. 0.238 0.198 0.251 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 23.6 26.4 26.7 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 142.3 137.68 124.53 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 1.80 1.55 1.25 
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Table 5A.5: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, St Paul, Before 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth  
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births      
20-24 43 11 27 8 36 9 
25-29 49 17 36 14 40 13 
30-34 41 12 35 16 40 9 
35-39 39 11 35 13 37 8 
40-44 31 5 35 5 35 5 
45-49 27 0 35 0 34 0 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-24 0.256 0.296 0.250 
25-29 0.347 0.389 0.325 
30-34 0.293 0.457 0.225 
35-39 0.282 0.371 0.216 
40-44 0.161 0.143 0.143 
45-49 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 6.69 8.28 5.80 
Ig 0.62 0.77 0.53 
    
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M .648 0.836 0.606 
S.E. 1.231 1.246 1.267 
    
"m" -0.177 -0.111 -0.046 
S.E. 0.251 0.246 0.281 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 19.6 22.6 17.3 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 45.5 120.6 148.1 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 2.35 2.1 2.25 
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Table 5A.6: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, St Paul, After 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth  
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births      
20-24 32 9 34 12 23 7 
25-29 49 15 37 14 30 13 
30-34 56 10 35 15 26 8 
35-39 55 15 31 8 25 4 
40-44 48 4 30 0 22 0 
45-49 42 1 27 0 16 0 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates    
20-24 0.281 0.353 0.304 
25-29 0.306 0.378 0.433 
30-34 0.179 0.429 0.308 
35-39 0.273 0.258 0.160 
40-44 0.083 0.000 0.000 
45-49 0.024 0.000 0.000 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 5.73 7.09 6.03 
Ig 0.53 0.66 0.58 
    
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 0.637 0.976 0.973 
S.E. 1.256 1.228 1.283 
    
"m" 0.049 0.405 0.670‛ 
S.E. 0.261 0.288 0.381 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 23.1 20.6 26.0 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 76.9 46.0 100.0 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 1.4 2.05 1.75 
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Table 5A.7: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, St Chely, Before 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births      
20-24 25 12 59 25 43 26 
25-29 60 24 80 30 71 35 
30-34 84 25 79 29 75 32 
35-39 88 22 84 29 80 27 
40-44 85 18 85 15 85 20 
45-49 80 3 83 1 77 0 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-24 0.480 0.424 0.605 
25-29 0.400 0.375 0.493 
30-34 0.298 0.367 0.427 
35-39 0.250 0.345 0.338 
40-44 0.212 0.176 0.235 
45-49 0.038 0.012 0.000 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 8.38 8.50 10.49 
Ig 0.74 0.78 0.94 
    
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 0.875 0.896 1.197 
S.E. 1.204 1.156 1.152 
    
"m" 0.013 -0.025 0.113 
S.E. 0.193 0.162 0.158 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 27.3 23.3 25.0 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 240.0 233.3 208.3 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 1.55 1.85 2.5 
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Table 5A.8: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, St Chely, After 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
 
Exposure and Births 
20-24 42 18 57 26 48 22 
25-29 78 26 102 45 87 45 
30-34 87 35 114 48 79 31 
35-39 80 24 110 39 78 26 
40-44 70 7 108 21 74 5 
45-49 50 0 94 2 68 1 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates    
20-24 0.429 0.456 0.458 
25-29 0.333 0.441 0.517 
30-34 0.402 0.421 0.392 
35-39 0.300 0.355 0.333 
40-44 0.100 0.194 0.068 
45-49 0.000 0.021 0.015 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 7.82 9.44 8.92 
Ig 0.72 0.87 0.82 
    
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 0.947 1.023 1.231 
S.E. 1.172 0.128 1.147 
    
"m" 0.164 0.004 0.377* 
S.E. 0.189 0.141 0.176 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 25.5 25.4 24.3 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 188.7 209.8 240.7 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 1.8 1.9 1.75 
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Table 5A.9: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, Rosny, Before 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births      
20-24 24 10 26 10 31 13 
25-29 57 23 43 14 47 17 
30-34 68 27 45 16 50 16 
35-39 70 22 45 11 52 7 
40-44 70 12 45 7 55 6 
45-49 70 2 45 0 55 0 
       
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates 
20-24 0.417 0.385 0.419 
25-29 0.404 0.326 0.362 
30-34 0.397 0.356 0.320 
35-39 0.314 0.244 0.135 
40-44 0.171 0.156 0.109 
45-49 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 8.51 7.33 6.72 
Ig 0.80 0.67 0.59 
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 0.959 0.821 0.956 
S.E. 1.205 1.245 1.223 
    
"m" 0.033 0.069 0.481‛ 
S.E. 0.198 0.249 0.255 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 25.1 22.2 22.9 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 133.8 66.7 69.0 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 2.5 2.45 2.5 
    
 242 
 
Table 5A.10: Fertility Differentials by Wealth, Rosny, After 1800 
 
Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
 Exp. Births Exp. Births Exp. Births 
Exposure and Births 
20-24 3 2 13 4 23 5 
25-29 14 6 33 10 43 10 
30-34 18 6 35 10 45 5 
35-39 20 5 35 4 45 5 
40-44 20 2 30 4 45 1 
45-49 20 0 26 0 41 0 
Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates    
20-24 0.667 0.308 0.217 
25-29 0.429 0.303 0.233 
30-34 0.333 0.286 0.111 
35-39 0.250 0.114 0.111 
40-44 0.100 0.133 0.022 
45-49 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Total Marital 
Fertility 8.89 5.72 3.47 
Ig 0.69 0.52 0.31 
    
Coale-Trussell Measures 
M 1.240 0.733 0.563 
S.E. 1.499 1.354 1.351 
    
"m" 0.536 0.267 0.703‛ 
S.E. 0.459 0.360 0.409 
    
Age at Marriage, 
Female 25.8 23.4 23.8 
Infant Mortality 
Rate, per 1000 
births 111.1 135.3 120.0 
    
Net Reproduction 
Rate (Implied) 1.8 1.335 1 
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Section 5A.3: Occupation and the Sample 
 
Table 5A.11: Occupational Structure of Sample by Year of Marriage 
Code  Freq. Percent 
Year of Marriage<1801 
1  6 2.63 
2  40 17.54 
3  54 23.68 
4  128 56.14 
Total  228 100 
Year of Marriage>1801 
1  3 1.76 
2  27 15.88 
3  48 28.24 
4  92 54.12 
Total  170 100 
 
 
The Representativeness of the Sample Villages: Occupational Structure 
The Henry dataset contained 617 unique occupation descriptions. To compare the 
occupational structure of the sample villages with the national trend, these occupations 
were sorted into 4 categories; elites, professional and land owner class, middle and low 
grade occupations and finally labourers and farmhands. The distribution of the whole 
Henry sample with respect to these divisions is reported in the following table.  
 
Table 5A.12: Occupational Classifications for Sample as a Whole 
Code Definition Frequency Percentage 
1 Elite 318 3.0% 
2 Professional/Owners 998 9.5% 
3 Middle/Lower Occupations 3490 33.1% 
4 Labourers/''Cultivators' 5723 54.4% 
 
The occupational distributions for the villages used in this study are given 
below. There are a number of notable deviations from the national pattern. Cabris 
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contains significantly fewer professionals and landowners while St Paul and Rosny 
have significantly higher labourers and farm workers. Most interestingly however, is 
the relatively small proportion of the bottom occupational division (labourers and farm 
workers) in St Chely. However, the recording of male occupations in the Henry dataset 
was not consistent and the proportion registering an occupation was low. Differences in 
willingness to record occupation, whether by region or by occupational class may serve 
to bias the observed distributions. For this analysis, only the wealth measures are used.  
 
Table 5A.13: Real Wealth by Occupational Coding 
Occ. 
Group Obs. Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Min Max 
1 7 17,045 20,474 46.8 58,096.93 
2 46 4,201 6,069 0 28,340.14 
3 64 1,903 4,418 0 30,995.29 
4 142 1,844 5,898 0 63,270.06 
None listed 417 2,479 6,960 0 74,463.3 
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Table 5A.14: Occupational Structure by Village (blanks are omitted) 
Village Code Freq. Percent 
Cabris  
 1 3 1.73 
 2 43 24.86 
 3 20 11.56 
 4 107 61.85 
 Total 173 100 
St Paul  
 2 2 3.92 
 3 9 17.65 
 4 40 78.43 
 Total 51 100 
St Chely    
 1 5 4.76 
 2 18 17.14 
 3 63 60 
 4 19 18.1 
 Total 105 100 
Rosny  
 1 1 1.45 
 2 4 5.8 
 3 10 14.49 
 4 54 78.26 
 Total 69 100 
 
For the sample I have collected, there was no significant change in occupational 
structure over time (based on year of marriage before and after 1800 –table in 
appendix). The potential inaccuracies of using occupation as a proxy for socioeconomic 
status are illustrated by analysing the distribution of real wealth within the 
occupational classifications. As the following table reports, there is a high degree of 
variance in real wealth at death within the groups. 
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Section 5A.4: The Construction of the Coale-Trussel Parameters 
 
Coale-Trussell Fertility Model 
In the Coale-Trussell fertility model, the shape of the age specific marital fertility 
schedule in relation to that of a population practising natural fertility (m) is interpreted 
as a measure of fertility control. It takes the following form: 
)exp(. aiiaia vmMnR   
Where iaR is the expected marital fertility rate for the ath age group of the ith 
population, an is the standard age pattern of natural fertility av , is the typical age 
specific deviation of controlled fertility from natural fertility. With these definitions it 
follows that iM represents the ith populations fertility level and im measures fertility 
control. (Xie and Pimentel 1992 p.977). 
 
Where iM is close to 1, the population in question has the same age pattern of 
fertility as a population practising natural fertility.  Where im  is close to 1, the 
population is a standard controlling population. Where im  is close to zero, the 
population is practising natural fertility. A ‚justifiable rule of thumb‛ is to take positive 
values of im >.2 as evidence for fertility control, with values below .2 as inconclusive 
(Okun 1994 p.200). Xie and Pimentel (1992 p.977) discuss the development of this 
model into a statistical model via the identity: 
iaiaia BTR   
Where 
iaT  is the total exposure time in woman years and iaB  are the total births for the age 
group 
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In combination, and taking the natural log of both sides we arrive at the following: 
aiiaiaia vmMnTB  )log()log()log(  
 
As Xie and Pimemtel discuss (1992 p.977): Where an and av are known, iM and 
im  can be calculated as the constant and the slope coefficient in a log-linear regression 
of births in age group a, population I on av . The )log( aia nT  term is included in the 
regression with its coefficient restricted to 1. It is assumed that births follow an 
independent Poisson distribution in each age interval. The distribution here will differ 
from family size over all women in the sample, but the legitimacy of assuming a 
Poisson distribution for each sub-sample of ASFRs is untested at this stage. 
  
For each village, wealth group and period combination, I have calculated Age 
specific Marital Fertility Rates (ASMFRs). The periodisation for the demographic 
analysis is based upon year of birth of child, with the dividing year being 
1800.Following this I have measured the level and scale of fertility control via the 
Coale-Trussell index of fertility limitation I use Coale and Trussell’s estimated values 
for an and av  (listed in Xie and Pimentel 1992 p.979). The Stata code for the Poisson 
regression used was deduced from the SAS and S-Plus code discussed in Schmertmann 
1999 http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol1/5/html/3.htm . 
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Section 5A.5: Extra Summary Statistics 
 
Table 5A.15: Summary Characteristics of the Data Set, by Village 
Village Department Region 
Pop. 
1821130 
Total  
Obs. 
Male 
Only 
Obs. 
Female  
Only  
Obs. 
Both  
Wealth  
Obs. 
Cabris 
Alpes- 
Maritime SE 1,737 360 115 147 98 
St. Paul  Dordogne SO 
 
1,692 314 146 126 42 
St. Chely 
 
Lozere SE 1,764 258 85 94 79 
Rosny 
Seine –  
St. Denis NE 822 168 57 57 54 
 
Total  1,100 403 424 273 
 
Table 5A.16: Summary Statistics, by Year of Marriage and Village 
Village 
Male Real 
Wealth 
Age at Death Age at Marriage Children ever  
born Male Female Male Female 
 Year of Marriage  1748-1800 
Cabris 3883.1 70.0 69.9 26.1 22.1 5.2 
St Paul  2575 67.7 59.4 22.4131 20.1 5.8 
St Chely  5207.3 68.3 69.7 27.8 24.5 5.6 
Rosny  2549.2 66.5 69.6 24.9 23.7 5.9 
 Year of Marriage  1801-1819 
Cabris 3848.3 68.5 63.2 29.4 25.2 3.5 
St Paul  2602.3 59 55.2 28.0 22.5 4.3 
St Chely  5601.2 59.5 58.3 30.1 24.8 5.3 
Rosny  8005.4 59.5 61.6 25.2 23.7 3.1 
 
 
                                                
130 Source: Houdaille 1984 p.88. 
131 This unusually low figure is based on 23 observations from St Paul which contain the male age at 
marriage for this period, and the values range from 15-36.  
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Note on Summary Statistics, by Year of Marriage and Village: 
 
The drop in age at death for both male and females between the sample periods reflects 
the sharp drop in Life expectancy during the Napoleonic Wars (Life expectancy from 
birth dropped to under 30 years). For all villages, age at marriage also increases. These 
trends contribute to the declining levels of gross fertility in all of the villages – although 
the decline is more evident for Rosny and Cabris than St Paul and St Chely. The 
following section details regressions designed to detect the wealth effects in cross 
section in each of these villages.  
 
Table 5A.17: Real Wealth Division for Analysis 
Division Min. Max. Mean 
1 0 140.2 27.5 
2 140.3 2,099.6 941.3 
3 2,113.2 120,837.8 11,477.3 
 
 
Table 5A. 18: Observations by Property and Cash Wealth Groupings 
 Cash Wealth Group 
Property Wealth  
Group 
1 2 3 Total 
1 154 45 12 211 
2 59 85 60 204 
3 39 33 135 207 
Total 252 163 207 622 
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Section 5A.6: Village Level Analysis 
The decision to pool the villages into two distinct groups was made after work 
examining the wealth-fertility relationship within each village. This section reports the 
results of the village level analysis. The methodology is identical to that in the main text 
of the chapter, with village level dummies replacing the decline/non-decline 
categorisation used previously. The results are consistent with the analysis in the main 
text and serve to support the categorisation used. 
 
The omitted categories in the following negative binomial regressions are St 
Chely (for Village) and Wealth group 1. The rationale for this is simple: St Chely is the 
closest village in the sample to a community practicing ‚natural fertility‛ (total marital 
fertility is highest here, and the calculated Coale-Trussell measures reveal small 
insignificant and deviations from both level and pattern of fertility (see Figure 5.3). The 
results for the wealth categories listed in tables 11a-c should be read as deviations from 
a sample maximum. The dependant variable is either gross fertility (children ever born) 
or net fertility (children ever born minus children died before 10). The three models are 
applied to each. Village level fixed effects are also included, but not reported.  
 
Table 5A.19: Cash-Wealth Split, Observations 
Wealth 
Group 
1 2 3 Total 
Non-decline Villages  
Cabris 52 74 77 203 
St Paul  101 26 35 162 
Total 153 100 112 365 
Decline Villages    
St 
Chely 
47 65 52 164 
Rosny 30 30 51 111 
Total 77 95 103 275 
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Table 5A.20: Negative Binomial Regressions: Fixed Effects and Interaction Models 
on Gross Fertility 
Model # 1 2 
Year of Marriage 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010* 
(0.004) 
Demographic variables   
Age at Marriage, Female 
-0.065*** 
(0.006) 
-0.062*** 
(0.005) 
Age at Death, Female 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
Age at Death, 
Male 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Event variables   
Revolution 
 0.121 
(0.091) 
0.111 
(0.087) 
Napoleonic Wars 
 0.105 
(0.070) 
0.154* 
(0.076) 
Wealth Effects   
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0  
Wealth Group2 
-0.008 
(0.062)  
Wealth Group3 
-0.162** 
(0.062)  
Village Effects   
Cabris 
 
0.003 
(0.160) 
St Paul 
 
-0.023 
(0.203) 
St Chely (ref.)  0 
Rosny 
 
0.311* 
(0.145) 
Wealth, Village, Period 
Interactions No 
Yes – See  
table11c 
Constant 
 3.255*** 
(0.236) 
2.886*** 
(0.257) 
N 447 447 
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.110 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
* Significant at .05% level 
 
 252 
Table 5A.21: Negative Binomial Regressions: Fixed Effects and Interaction Models 
on Net Fertility 
Model # 3 4 
Year of Marriage 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
-0.010* 
(0.004) 
Demographic variables   
Age at Marriage, Female 
-0.063*** 
(0.006) 
-0.059*** 
(0.006) 
Age at Death, Female 
 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
Age at Death, 
Male 
 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
Event variables   
Revolution 
 0.191* 
(0.097) 
0.180* 
(0.091) 
Napoleonic Wars 
 0.111 
(0.076) 
0.190* 
(0.085) 
Wealth Effects   
Wealth Group1 (ref.) 0  
Wealth Group2 
 -.031 
(0.067) 
 
Wealth Group3 
-0.133* 
(0.067) 
 
Cabris  
0.240 
(0.180) 
St Paul  
0.250 
(0.220) 
St Chely (ref.)  0 
Rosny  
0.500** 
(0.160) 
Wealth, Village, Period 
Interactions 
No 
Yes – See  
table11c 
Constant 
 2.615*** 
(0.215) 
2.150*** 
(0.283) 
N 447 447 
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.106 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
* Significant at .05% level 
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Table 5A.22: Negative Binomial Regressions, Interactions between Village, Period 
and Wealth Group 
  Gross 
 Fertility 
 Net  
Fertility 
Model # 3 6 
Marriage before 1800   
Wealth Group 1 (ref.) 0 0 
Wealth Group 2 0.020  
(0.148) 
0.018 
(0.174) 
Wealth Group 3 0.177 
(0.144) 
0.291 
(0.165) 
Marriage after 1800   
Wealth Group 1 0.228 
(0.190) 
0.242 
(0.215) 
Wealth Group 2 0.297 
(0.175) 
0.254 
(0.200) 
Wealth Group 3 0.111 
(0.188) 
0.078 
(0.215) 
Cabris   
Wealth Group 2, before 1800 -0.140 
(0.201) 
-0.175 
(0.225) 
Wealth Group 3, before 1800 -0.421* 
(0.195) 
-0.520* 
(0.215) 
Wealth Group 1, after 1800 -0.527* 
(0.224) 
-0.563* 
(0.246) 
Wealth Group 2, after 1800 -0.530** 
(0.206) 
-0.532* 
(0.227) 
Wealth Group 3, after 1800 -0.607** 
(0.221) 
-0.578* 
(0.245) 
St Paul   
Wealth Group 2, before 1800 0.139 
(0.277) 
-0.065 
(0.307) 
Wealth Group 3, before 1800 -0.441 
(0.271) 
-0.464 
(0.287) 
Wealth Group 1, after 1800 -0.493 
(0.266) 
-0.641* 
(0.291) 
Wealth Group 2, after 1800 -0.250 
(0.258) 
-0.288 
(0.279) 
Wealth Group 3, after 1800 -0.245 
(0.293) 
-0.408 
(0.324) 
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Table 5A.23 ctd. 
Rosny     
Wealth Group 2, before 1800 -0.384 
(0.215) 
-0.314 
(0.238) 
Wealth Group 3, before 1800 -0.525* 
(0.212) 
-0.514* 
(0.230) 
Wealth Group 1, after 1800 -0.636* 
(0.284) 
-0.677* 
(0.309) 
Wealth Group 2, after 1800 -0.769** 
(0.251) 
-0.723** 
(0.279) 
Wealth Group 3, after 1800 -1.123*** 
(0.252) 
-1.166*** 
(0.287) 
 
*** Significant at .001% level 
** Significant at .01% level 
* Significant at .05% level 
 
Results 
For both gross and net fertility, both female age at marriage and at death are highly 
significant and the coefficients highly consistent across all variations of the model. The 
effects of these variables act in the expected directions. Women who marry later in life 
should have lower fertility for biological reasons, and those women who die before 50 
should contribute significantly to the positive fertility-female age at death relationship. 
The time trend (as measured by year of marriage) is generally significant.  
 
Wealth Effects 
Model 1 constructs gross fertility as a function of the relevant demographic variables, 
village level fixed effects, event dummies (the Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars) 
and categories for wealth (three as discussed previously). Relative to the omitted 
category (the bottom wealth group), the reported coefficients for Wealth groups 2 and 3 
are negative and increase in scale relative to the wealth group – suggesting a negative 
wealth-fertility relationship. However, the coefficient on wealth group 2 fails to be 
significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, we see a large and statistically significant 
effect of wealth group 3 on gross fertility. This effect remains – although its strength 
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diminishes when this model is run with net fertility as the dependant variable (model 
3). Pooling the data results in a significant negative wealth-fertility relationship (at least 
for the top wealth category relative to the bottom).  
 
There is a considerable likelihood that this model misrepresents the true wealth-
fertility relationship. As the period as a whole is one of transition and declining fertility, 
surely there is a need to account for time in this analysis. The included time trend, 
based on year of marriage does not allow for the possibility that the Wealth fertility 
relationship is changing over time. Models 3 and 6 account for period changes in the 
wealth-fertility relationship via interaction terms between wealth group, locality and 
period. Period is categorised by splitting the sample in 2 based on year of marriage 
(1801).  
 
Table 5A.23 reports the specific wealth-village-period effects. These values are 
standardised for female age at marriage (25) and age at death (both 60 for male and 
female) and are net of the effects of the revolution and the Napoleonic wars. They can 
be interpreted as the net wealth effects on marital fertility. These values are a product of 
the regressions and are calculated by adding the coefficients and exponentiating the 
sum. They give the expected number of children for each wealth group by period of 
marriage. For the period as a whole, there is a negative association of wealth and net 
fertility.  
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Table 5A.23: Wealth Effects on Family size 
Village Marriage Wealth 
Group 
1 
Wealth 
Group 
2 
Wealth 
Group 
3 
All All 4.9 (3.3) 4.8 (3.2) 4.1 (2.9) 
Cabris Pre1800 4.8 (3.3) 4.1 (2.2) 3.7 (2.7) 
 Post1800 3.5 (2.4) 3.8 (2.5) 2.9 (2.0) 
St Paul Pre1800 4.7 (3.4) 5.5 (3.2) 3.6 (2.8) 
 Post1800 3.6 (2.3) 4.9 (3.2) 4.1 (2.4) 
St Chely Pre1800 4.8 (2.6) 4.9 (2.7) 5.7 (3.5) 
 Post1800 6.0 (3.3) 6.4 (3.4) 5.3 (2.8) 
Rosny Pre1800 4.4 (3.2) 4.5 (3.2) 4.6 (3.5) 
 Post1800 4.3 (2.8) 4.1 (2.7) 2.4 (1.5) 
 
For some village-period-Wealth group combinations, the negative binomial 
models fit significantly lower numbers of children (both gross and net) than others. For 
period 1, only those in the top wealth division in Cabris and Rosny register a 
significantly lower family size than the reference group. Moving to period 2, the 
variables for which all coefficients (both gross and net) are significant are all the wealth 
groups in Cabris and Rosny. The direction of the wealth fertility relationship is negative 
(at least between the bottom and top wealth groups in Cabris). This result is interesting 
because it suggests that fertility reduction by the top wealth division predicts fertility 
reduction by the rest of the population, in aggregate. This observation also constitutes 
what Gutmann and Watkins term ‚an early warning system‛ for aggregate fertility 
decline – the warning being the lower cross sectional fertility by certain groups, in this 
case the top third of the wealth distribution (1990).  
In aggregate, fertility appears to be negatively related to wealth at death. This is 
revealed by the lower fertility of the top wealth division, Wealth Group 3 and the 
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observation holds for both gross and net fertility. However, the relationship diverges 
between localities, once the calculations are performed for each village individually. For 
Cabris, St Paul and St Chely the relationship appears either negative or flat (more often 
flat when infant mortality is taken into account). The fertility relationship is strongly 
negative in Rosny and Cabris for marriages post 1800. These are also the villages and 
periods where fertility decline has unambiguously taken hold, as the fertility index 
calculations graphed in figure 5.3 indicate. The outlier to the negative/flat fertility trend 
is St Chely, where a strong positive relationship is evident in terms of both gross and 
net fertility. Figure 5.3 also indicates that this village does not experience any decline in 
marital fertility during the sample period. The preliminary observations are stark: 
Where fertility is declining, we observe a negative wealth-fertility relationship. Where 
fertility is not declining, the relationship is strongly positive. This suggests that it is the 
richer groups in each village which reduce their family size first.  
 
Village Level Mechanics 
The pooled sample estimates of the Coale-Trussel fertility control parameters for all 
wealth classes show increasing values for the scale parameter of the age fertility 
schedule, M, along with increasing values for ‘m’ – the fertility control parameter, 
between the earlier and later periods of this analysis. This implies that as fertility is 
increasing at younger ages, the deviation from the natural schedule is increasing 
towards that of a standard controlling population. The decrease in fertility through a 
higher m value outweighs the increase in M, as the total marital fertility rates are falling 
for all wealth classes. The evidence for unambiguous fertility control, as indicated by an 
m value greater than .200, is present for the top wealth categories in the pooled sample, 
Cabris, St Chely, and Rosny (all after 1800)132. For this category in Rosny, fertility 
declines for both older and younger women, according to the movements in the Coale-
Trussel parameters.  
                                                
132 The m coefficient for Wealth group 3 in Rosny is only significant at the 10% level, but can bet taken as 
unambiguous as it is so large (0.703).  
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Table 5A.24:  Summary of Coale-Trussell Measures, by Village 
Whole Sample 
Wealth  
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth  
Group 3 
Year of Marriage before 1800 
Total Marital 
Fertility 
7.67 7.67 7.28 
M 0.841 0.841 0.857 
S.E. (1.092) (1.078) (1.075) 
"m" 0.029 0.027 0.142 
S.E. (0.098) (0.087) (0.084) 
Year of Marriage after 1800 
Total Marital 
Fertility 
6.71 7.66 6.04 
M 0.842 0.945 0.912 
S.E. (1.110) (1.092) (1.100) 
"m" 0.235 0.199 0.555*** 
S.E. (0.123) (0.102) (0.128) 
Cabris    
Year of Marriage before 1800  
Total Marital 
Fertility 
7.23 7.06 6.66 
M 0.888 0.824 0.787 
S.E. (1.155) (1.112) (1.105) 
"m" 0.221 0.127 0.142 
S.E. (0.177) (0.129) (0.117) 
Year of Marriage after 1800  
Total Marital 
Fertility 5.94 6.53 4.60 
M 0.826 0.913 0.736 
S.E. (1.212) (1.185) (1.202) 
"m" 0.425 0.402* 0.690** 
S.E. (0.238) (0.198) (0.251) 
St Paul    
Year of Marriage before 1800  
Total Marital 
Fertility 6.69 8.28 5.80 
M 0.648 0.836 0.606 
S.E. (1.232) (1.240) (1.267) 
"m" -0.177 -0.111 -0.046 
S.E. (0.251) (0.246) (0.281) 
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Table 5A.24 ctd. 
 
Wealth  
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth  
Group 3 
St Paul 
Year of Marriage after 1800 
Total Marital 
Fertility 5.73 7.09 6.03 
M 0.637 0.976 0.973 
S.E. (1.256) (1.228) (1.283) 
"m" 0.049 0.405 0.670 
S.E. (0.261) (0.288 (0.381) 
St Chely    
Year of Marriage before 1800  
Total Marital 
Fertility 8.38 8.50 10.49 
M 0.875 0.896 1.197 
S.E. (1.204) (1.156) (1.152) 
"m" 0.013 -0.025 0.113 
S.E. (0.193) (0.162) (0.158) 
Year of Marriage after 1800  
Total Marital 
Fertility 7.82 9.44 8.92 
M 0.947 1.023 1.231 
S.E. (1.172) (0.128) (1.147) 
"m" 0.164 0.004 0.377* 
S.E. (0.189) (0.141) (0.176) 
Rosny    
Year of Marriage before 1800  
Total Marital 
Fertility 8.51 7.33 6.72 
M 0.959 0.821 0.956 
S.E. (1.205) (1.245) (1.223) 
"m" 0.033 0.069 0.481 
S.E. (0.198) 0.249) (0.255) 
Year of Marriage after 1800  
Total Marital 
Fertility 8.89 5.72 3.47 
M 1.240 0.733 0.563 
S.E. (1.499) (1.354) (1.351) 
"m" 0.536 0.267 0.703 
S.E. (0.459) (0.360) (0.409) 
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Table 5A.25: Age at last birth 
Village 
Marriage 
period 
Wealth 
Group 
1 
Wealth 
Group 
2 
Wealth 
Group 
3 
All Before 1800 39.30 38.73 38.78 
 After 1800 37.26 37.43 34.84 
Cabris Before 1800 39.00 38.48 38.55 
 After 1800 36.64 37.00 34.43 
St Paul Before 1800 40.00 41.28 38.50 
 After 1800 37.70 36.66 34.00 
St Chely Before 1800 38.93 38.50 40.86 
 After 1800 37.40 38.90 36.93 
Rosny Before 1800 39.84 38.00 37.00 
 After 1800 37.75 34.80 32.44 
 
Table 5A.25 reports the age at last birth for women dying after the age of 49 for 
the sample as a whole and also by village and period. The mean age at last birth in 
populations practising ‘natural fertility’ is approximately 40-41 years (Bongaarts (1983) 
as cited by Kohler et al. 2002 p.28).  Only wealth group 3 deviates from this ‘natural’ 
pattern in the pooled sample. By locality, the differentials are stronger. The top wealth 
category in Cabris and St Paul in the post 1800 period and the top 2 wealth categories in 
Rosny in this period have significantly lower ages at last birth than what we would 
expect from a population practising natural fertility. This is strongly suggestive of 
‘stopping’ behaviour. As with completed fertility, the direction of the wealth–age at last 
birth relationship is negative where fertility is declining.  
 
The Coale Trussel fertility control parameter m and the mean age at last birth 
strongly indicate that ‘stopping behaviour’ was employed by those groups in the 
sample who engaged in fertility control.  
 
‘Spacing’ behaviour 
Having established evidence for the presence of parity-specific fertility control amongst 
the wealthiest groups in the sample villages, the question of ‘spacing’ arises. It is far 
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easier to detect ‘stopping’ behaviour in population sub-groups then it is to detect 
‘spacing’ behaviour. One way to detect spacing is to model the birth intervals directly 
using a Cox proportional hazards model. The results will describe the effects of the 
covariate independent variables  in terms of a ‘hazard rate’, which is defined as the 
instantaneous probability of the event in question (in this case a birth), and is therefore 
directly related to the length of the birth interval. As the model is intended to reveal 
differences in spacing behaviour, only closed birth intervals are used. The formulation 
of the birth interval model follows previous analyses by Alter (1988), Bengtsson and 
Dribe (2006) and Van Bavel (2004a, 2004b) and Van Bavel and Kok (2004). After 
consideration of the varying inclusion of demographic factors in these studies, it was 
decided to concentrate on those factors most commonly found to affect the birth 
interval. This was done with the aim of producing a parsimonious model which could 
capture the wealth effects (if any) on the duration of the birth interval. The 
demographic factors included were the age of the mother (in five year age bands), the 
duration of the marriage and the life status of the previous born child. Where a mother 
had a child less than 2 years at the time of conception of her next child this was coded 
for. In common with the analysis by Bengtsson and Dribe, I include shared frailty at the 
individual level to control for unobserved family-specific heterogeneity in the sample 
(2006 p.736). As the previous analyses indicated the importance of period and locality 
in understating the wealth-fertility relationship, the same interactions are included 
again. 
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Table 5A.26: Cox regression on Closed Birth Intervals, Village Level 
 .coeffe  .coeffse  p  
Women's Age   
15-19 0.85 0.20 0.481 
20-24 1.01 0.07 0.850 
25-29 (ref.) 1.00   
30-34 0.89 0.05 0.056 
35-39 0.73 0.06 0.000 
40-44 0.31 0.04 0.000 
45-49 0.05 0.02 0.000 
    
Marital Duration 0.97 0.01 0.000 
Infant Alive  0.18 0.02 0.000 
Villages    
Cabris 0.93 0.15 0.667 
St Paul 1.11 0.26 0.636 
St Chely (ref.) 1.00 - - 
Rosny 1.37 0.22 0.044 
Main Wealth Effects    
WG 1, P 1 1.00 - - 
WG 2, P 1 1.23 0.18 0.166 
WG 3, P 1 1.64 0.25 0.001 
WG 1, P 2 1.34 0.21 0.062 
WG 2, P 2 1.47 0.21 0.008 
WG 3, P 2 1.31 0.20 0.080 
Marginal Wealth Effects    
Cabris, WG 2, P 1 0.80 0.16 0.250 
Cabris, WG 3, P 1 0.62 0.12 0.015 
Cabris, WG 1, P 2 0.64 0.13 0.034 
Cabris, WG 2, P 2 0.51 0.10 0.001 
Cabris, WG 3, P 2 0.44 0.09 0.000 
St Paul, WG 2, P 1 1.02 0.29 0.954 
St Paul, WG 3, P 1 0.41 0.12 0.002 
St Paul, WG 1, P 2 0.55 0.15 0.030 
St Paul, WG 2, P 2 0.63 0.17 0.089 
St Paul, WG 3, P 2 0.80 0.23 0.448 
Rosny, WG 2, P 1 0.87 0.19 0.513 
Rosny, WG 3, P 1 0.46 0.10 0.001 
Rosny, WG 1, P 2 0.51 0.13 0.008 
Rosny, WG 2, P 2 0.31 0.07 0.000 
Rosny, WG 3, P 2 0.25 0.05 0.000 
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Table 5A.27: Net Interaction Hazard Ratios 
Village Marriage Wealth 
Group 1 
Wealth 
Group 2 
Wealth 
Group 3 
Cabris before 1800 0.93 0.92 0.94 
 after 1800 0.80 0.69 0.53 
St Paul before 1800 1.11 1.39 0.74 
 after 1800 0.83 1.04 1.17 
St Chely before 1800 1.00 1.23 1.64 
 after 1800 1.34 1.47 1.31 
Rosny before 1800 1.20 1.47 1.04 
 after 1800 0.94 0.63 0.44 
 
Table 5A.27 reports the net wealth effects on the hazard of a birth within a give interval.  
 
 
 264 
Village Level Regressions based on Year of Birth Periodisation. 
Period 1: Female birth cohort: 1729-1776 
Period 2: Female birth cohort 1777-1829 
 
Table 5A.28: Negative Binomial Regression based on Birth Cohort Periodisation 
Variable Gross Fertility Net Fertility 
Year of Marriage 
-0.016* 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Age at Marriage, Female 
-0.061*** 
(0.006) 
-0.062*** 
(0.006) 
Age at Death, Female 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Age at Death, Male 
0.001*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Revolution 
0.139 
(0.087) 
0.209* 
(0.094) 
Napoleonic Wars 
0.049 
(0.074) 
0.086 
(0.083) 
Wealth Group2, P1 
0.152 
(0.141) 
0.12 
(0.167) 
Wealth Group3, P1 
0.181 
(0.142) 
0.267 
(0.164) 
Wealth Group1, P2 
0.59** 
(0.189) 
0.534* 
(0.217) 
Wealth Group2, P2 
0.57*** 
(0.173) 
0.471* 
(0.199) 
Wealth Group3, P 2 
0.438* 
(0.183) 
0.35 
(0.211) 
Wealth, Village, Time Period 
Interactions 
Yes, see  
next page 
Yes, see  
next page 
Constant 
3.026*** 
(0.249) 
2.386*** 
(0.277) 
N 446 446 
Pseudo R2 0.1083 0.1000 
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Table 5A.29: Interaction Coefficients based on Birth Cohort Periodisation 
Cabris, WG2, P1 
-0.262 
(0.194) 
-0.275 
(0.219) 
Cabris, WG3, P1 
-0.449* 
(0.192) 
-0.525* 
(0.214) 
Cabris, WG1, P2 
-0.654** 
(0.227) 
-0.653* 
(0.252) 
Cabris, WG2, P2 
-0.609** 
(0.207) 
-0.568* 
(0.231) 
Cabris, WG3, P2 
-0.633** 
(0.214) 
-0.557* 
(0.239) 
St Paul, WG2, P1 
0.244 
(0.296) 
0.142 
(0.327) 
St Paul, WG3, P1 
-0.45 
(0.272) 
-0.459 
(0.291) 
St Paul, WG1, P2 
-0.633* 
(0.269) 
-0.726* 
(0.299) 
St Paul, WG2, P2 
-0.409 
(0.258) 
-0.457 
(0.284) 
St Paul, WG3, P2 
-0.219 
(0.294) 
-0.348 
(0.328) 
Rosny, WG2, P1 
-0.481* 
(0.21) 
-0.394 
(0.234) 
Rosny, WG3, P1 
-0.62** 
(0.213) 
-0.609** 
(0.234) 
Rosny, WG1, P2 
-0.785** 
(0.298) 
-0.802* 
(0.329) 
Rosny, WG2, P2 
-0.852*** 
(0.253) 
-0.774** 
(0.283) 
Rosny, WG3, P2 
-1.066*** 
(0.242) 
-1.016*** 
(0.273) 
*  P<.05 
**  P<.01 
*** P<.001 
  
 
The results are consistent with the year of marriage division. 
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Section 5A.7: The Negative Binomial Distribution 
 
The following graphs illustrate how gross fertility and net fertility fits both the Poisson 
and negative binomial distributions: The graphs plot the variable against a Poisson 
distribution with the same mean, and a negative binomial distribution with the same 
mean and variance (Stata Library 2008).  
 
Figures A2 and A3: Gross fertility 
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Chapter 6 – Relative Status, Inequality and Fertility Decline: A Simple Model and 
Empirical Test 
 
‚A promiscuous intercourse to such a degree as to prevent the birth of children seems 
to lower, in the most marked manner, the dignity of human nature‛  
Thomas Malthus 1798 p.13. 
 
Section 6.1: Introduction 
 
Malthus may not have liked the technology employed but he would have been 
overjoyed to witness the widespread implementation of family limitation which 
occurred within a century of the publication of his famous essay. Why the population 
of Europe embarked upon this new strategy is less well understood than how. The 
focus of this thesis has been to re-examine the economic correlates of the decline at the 
aggregate and individual level. This chapter takes a different approach to the preceding 
chapters and presents a new interpretation of the theoretical foundations behind the 
European fertility decline. The variables and relationships behind Becker’s 
microeconomic theory, outlined in depth in chapter 2, are adjusted to reflect the idea 
that parents will aim to maximize both their own, and their children’s relative 
socioeconomic status. The implications of the model are discussed. Following this, a 
joint analysis of the new micro level wealth-fertility datasets is conducted with 
reference to the theory. 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the European Fertility Project (EFP) of the 
1970s and 80s, under the directorship of Ansley  Coale at Princeton University, set out 
to provide an empirical basis for ‘demographic transition theory’. This theory 
attributed the decline in fertility to modernisation, broadly defined. The conclusions to 
the project are published in a summary volume (Coale and Watkins 1986), in which the 
editors strongly reject any causal relationship between modernisation and fertility 
decline. They proposed that cultural forces and the diffusion of new knowledge 
concerning contraceptive techniques were the crucial elements in this story.  
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However the legacy of the EFP has not silenced those who propose economic
 reasons for fertility change. Recently, there has been a revisionist attack upon the 
conclusions to the EFP, with some arguing that the EFP’s methodology was flawed. 
Perhaps the lack of closure in this debate is related to the rejection of demographic 
transition theory and the failure to replace it with any concrete alternative.  
 
‚A massive twenty year project with substantial resources and collabouration by a 
large number of first rate demographers did not result in a substantial improvement in 
theory‛ (Burch 2003 p.25).  
 
The work of Becker has been highly influential in our understanding of how 
utility maximizing parents substitute child quantity for quality. However, as discussed 
in chapter 3 and 5, Becker’s theory relies on the level of income to initiate this ‘trade 
off’. How can we reconcile this with the empirical record? As discussed in chapters 3 
and 5, fertility decline in France preceded that of England by over 100 years. Any 
explanation for the decline in fertility must be able to coherently explain why fertility 
fell first in France. This feature is central to Europe’s demographic transition. 
 
The rest of this chapter is comprised of five sections. Section 6.2 provides an 
account of the intuition behind the simple status fertility model. Section 6.3 is a first 
formulation of the said model. Section 6.4 demonstrates how a fertility decline occurs 
within the model, while section 6.5 examines the micro data introduced in chapters 4 
and 5 for patterns that are either consistent or inconsistent with the simple status 
fertility model. Section 6.6 Concludes. 
 
Section 6.2: The intuition behind the Model 
 
The traditional economic model of fertility as proposed by Becker (1960, 1991), focuses 
on the roles of full income and the cost of children in determining parent’s fertility 
choices. At a certain threshold, the initially positive effect of income acts to depress 
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fertility rates via a quality-quantity trade-off. As I have mentioned, this model offers no 
explanation for why fertility in France declined long before that of her richer and more 
industrial neighbour, Britain. Further, fertility declined in France preceded any 
significant structural change in the economy which could have induced parents to 
substitute child quantity for quality. The evolutionary biology literature on human 
fertility emphasizes the importance of relative status and social competitiveness in 
human fertility decision making (see chapter 2 for a brief literature review). In this 
chapter, I develop an economic model of fertility which includes the role of ‘relative 
socio-economic status’. I propose that parent’s perception of the possibilities for social 
mobility for themselves and their offspring can be proxied by measures for economic 
inequality.  
 
What was the relationship between status or wealth and fertility over the long 
run of human history? Typically, hunter gatherer societies are egalitarian relative to 
settled societies. The adoption of settled agriculture during the Neolithic revolution 10-
12 thousand years ago was accompanied by the introduction of extra somatic wealth 
and its inheritance. This led to a ‚variance in male quality based on the resources each 
could control‛ (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003 p.190). As opposed to depending upon 
natural skill in hunting and surviving, male’s access to brides and their ultimate 
reproductive success now depended upon the resources they could control, their 
wealth. Until a few centuries ago, fertility success was highly related to wealth. 
 
Skirbekk (2008) presents a meta-analysis of the wealth/status-fertility 
relationship consisting of 879 samples from 129 sources, from 1270 to 2005. He 
standardises the data by computing the relative fertility differential of the highest status 
group to the lowest. Pre 1800, the overwhelming trend is of higher reproductive success 
by higher status groups. This trend begins to turn negative by the beginning of the 19th 
century and predates the aggregate decline in fertility. The data relating to the pre-1850 
period and of European origin are graphed in figure 6.1. Before the demographic 
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transition, the status-fertility relationship is overwhelmingly positive. 
 
Figure 6.1:  The Wealth Fertility Differential, 1200-1850 
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Source: Skirbekk 2008. 
The evidence suggests that the attainment of high social status via the 
accumulation of wealth led to higher reproductive success than average. This 
mechanism has been in place since the Neolithic Revolution and has surely influenced 
human psychology in a major fashion. Turke (1989) argues that humans have evolved 
to strive for economic and social success and will ‚nearly always take steps that 
increase their and their children’s‛ relative position (1989 p.66). Starting in France in the 
18th century and in the rest of Europe over a century later, the status-fertility 
relationship is reversed. 
My proposition is that Europe’s fertility transitions were adjustments by 
populations to changes in the socioeconomic environment which made the 
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advancement or preservation of families’ relative status inextricably linked to family 
size. This trend was initiated by the rich in order to preserve their relative status and 
avoid the downward social mobility of their offspring. The trend in the fertility of 
Europe’s ‘super rich’ pre-dated the aggregate declines in European countries by several 
centuries (see figure 6.5). Once the rich adopted a small family size norm, this trend 
diffused down the social order. However, this only diffused once the level of economic 
inequality fell so that it made rational sense for other groups to control their fertility.  
 
If humans are predominantly motivated by increasing their families’ relative 
social status and controlling fertility is a means to achieve this, why wasn’t there a 
fertility transition thousands of years ago? As mentioned previously, hunter gatherer 
societies are very egalitarian, so there is therefore no incentive to decrease fertility. With 
the presence of extra somatic wealth in settled societies, inequality increases and 
substantial fertility differentials are observed between those of different statuses. 
However, unequal settled societies have existed for the past 12,000 years, yet fertility 
has only declined within the past three centuries. I believe the answer is the changing 
level of economic inequality over time. Economic historians generally accept that pre-
modern societies were highly unequal with respect to income and wealth distributions. 
However, historical evidence on this point is thin. Lindert et al. (2007) is the most recent 
study to analyse this issue and conclude that ‚compared with the maximum inequality 
possible, today’s inequality is much smaller than that of ancient societies‛ (p.19) (their 
italics). 
 
In a society with a large rural, landless majority and a small group of elites, the 
prospects for social mobility are limited. It makes no sense to control fertility if family 
size has no impact upon a family’s relative social standing. The economic distance 
between the bottom and the top status groups is too great, and therefore upward social 
mobility is unattainable for the majority of the population. However, changes in the 
distribution of wealth and income between groups in the population reflect a changing 
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environment for the possibility of social mobility. As economic inequality declines, 
fertility is induced to decline also, as parents now realise that social mobility is possible 
and the prospects for it are affected by family size.  
 
In both England and France, inequality was rising during the 19th century. After 
1867, there is suggestive evidence for declining inequality in England, roughly 
simultaneous with the onset of aggregate fertility decline (Lindert 2000 p.187). However 
the data here is weak. During this period, France had a lower level of inequality than 
England133. I propose that despite having a lower level of material income per person 
than England, France entered a sustained fertility transition because economic 
inequality had dropped to a level low enough to stimulate the control of family size as a 
tool to aid families’ relative social advancement. Once a low fertility trend is adopted 
by some members of a socioeconomic group, others must adopt the same strategy if 
their children are to be socially and economically competitive. There is no possibility of 
reversing a fertility transition, even if inequality rises after the transition, and none has 
ever been observed. 
 
In essence, much of this hypothesis does not diverge dramatically from the 
traditional ‘quality-quantity’ trade-off proposed by Becker’s theory134. The crucial 
distinction is the explicit link between fertility control, social ambition and economic 
inequality. I propose that downward shifts in economic inequality stimulate the spread 
of a low fertility trend. Recently, the issue of social mobility and relative status in 
understanding Europe’s fertility decline has been coming to the fore. Skirbekk (2008) 
and Van Bavel (2006) discuss the issue explicitly. Van Bavel finds a negative 
relationship between family size and children’s subsequent socioeconomic status (2006 
                                                
133 This was due to the extremely narrow concentration of land ownership in England (Piketty et al. p.250 
2006). 
134 It is consistent in spirit with Dumont’s social capillarity hypothesis concerning early French fertility 
decline (discussed in the last chapter) and also the Wohlstandstheorie of the early German transition theorists 
(Knodel 1974 p.127). 
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p.15) and suggests that these intergenerational motivations may be important in 
understanding the fertility transition (p.16).  
 
The empirical analyses of chapters 4 and 5 strongly suggested that the 
environment for social mobility was related to the decline in fertility. In England, 
fertility decline was initiated by the poorest members of the top occupational status 
groups. This feature was accompanied by a decrease in the strength of the association 
between status and wealth, suggesting that status driven economic inequality was 
decreasing, and social mobility (via the accumulation of wealth) was increasing. In 
France, it was the wealthiest residents of certain villages who employed fertility control 
consistently. This was associated with lower economic inequality in these villages, and 
also a far lower degree of intergenerational correlation of wealth at death. For both 
England and France, where the underlying level of economic inequality is decreasing, 
and therefore signalling that upward social mobility is more attainable, fertility 
limitation is initiated. 
 
The next section represents a first formulation of a very simple economic theory 
of fertility which relates economic inequality and relative socioeconomic status to 
parent’s decisions concerning family size. The approach is derived Becker’s 
microeconomic theory of fertility (1960, 1991) where rational actors are assumed to 
maximise a utility function which expresses their preferences. The key difference here is 
in the form of this utility function, where I define the nature of the goods differently, 
and hence there is a different interpretation on the cost parameters, and also on the 
interpretation of the relationships in the model. I develop the analysis to explicitly 
formulate the relationship between economic inequality and fertility decisions.  
 
Section 6.3: A First Formulation of a Status-Fertility Model 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis gave a very brief summation of an extensive literature. 
The division in the literature has been discussed in order to highlight the need for 
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further research. With that in mind attention has been turned to economic models of 
fertility, and in particular, the income-fertility relationship. However, I believe that 
existing theory neglects an essential component of people’s welfare, namely their 
relative socioeconomic status. I define this as a person’s desired rank within their desired 
socioeconomic group. In relation to fertility decisions, parents also hold a desired social 
rank for their offspring. Designing a utility function with these two ‘goods’ in mind, 
and dropping the assumption that parents always wish to maximise family size, I 
develop this analysis, and relate it to economic inequality in this section.  
 
Quite simply, this theory supposes that parents will try to maximize their own, 
and their children’s relative socioeconomic status. The utility function takes the form: 
),( cp SSUU   
Where S  = relative socioeconomic status, and the subscripts p and c  denote parents and 
their children. Relative socioeconomic status is defined as the desired rank of parents, 
for themselves and for their offspring, relative to other members of their community or 
population. Subject to available income and price constraints, parents will strive to 
maximize these ‘goods’. The natural contrast is with Becker’s model, which supposes 
parents maximize both quantity and quality of children, and also quantities of other 
goods, irrespective of relative status.  
),....,,,( 1 mZZqnUU   
Where n is the number of offspring, q is ‘child quality’ (or expenditure per child) and 
mZZ ,....,1  represent a range of competing purchases (such as consumer goods, lifestyle 
expenditures etc. The analogies in this adjusted model are as follows: 
),....( 1 mp ZZfS   
)(qfSc   
In Becker’s model, utility increases with n , the number of children. Today 
parents are the richest in human history, yet net fertility rates are also the lowest in 
history. Is it reasonable to assume that utility always increases with n, the number of 
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offspring? Here we leave the Beckerian world. I propose that this is not necessarily true. 
Evolutionary thinking can move us away from rigid and perfectly rational economic 
actors towards actors who aim to maximize their family’s relative status, pS  and cS . 
This theory is designed to accommodate the reasonable hypothesis that parents will 
choose n to maximize their and their children’s socioeconomic (relative) status. Family 
size, n  is chosen where )( , cp SSU is maximized, subject to the family size being greater 
or equal to one: 
),( cp SSUU  s.t. 1n  
The budget constraint is represented by: 
YnSPSP cp  21  
Where 1P represents the cost of a unit of pS (this could mean a consumer good/luxury 
expenditure), and 2P represents the cost of a unit of cS (such as education, training, etc). 
The fixed cost of children, the bare minimum required to raise a live child via 
expenditure on food, shelter and clothing is represented by 12 cSP , where 0cS but 
is very small. 
 
Proposition: n is chosen where pS  and cS are maximized. 
Where parent’s are free to choose n , the budget constraint can be re-arranged to
express the factors determining the choice of family size: 
 
c
A
c
p
SP
Y
SP
SPY
n
22
1


   
Where  pA SPYY 1  (available income). 
In words this corresponds to: 
The desired number of offspring is equal to the amount of income available after parent’s 
consumption and relative statuses desires have been satisfied, divided by the total cost of getting 
a future child to the desired socioeconomic status. 
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The number of children demanded ( n ) depends on the surplus income once parents 
have satisfied their own social status desires. Where this is rising, the quantity of 
children demanded will rise. This can account for the overwhelming positive wealth-
fertility association (pre-1800) described by Skirbekk (2008). Similarly, we have an 
identity for the determination of cS : 
nP
Y
S
A
c
2
  
Parents do not simply maximize cS  in the usual way; because if they did, the 
optimal number of children to maximize cS  would equal 1. However, because of the 
interplay between cS , 2P  and 
AY , cS  is not simply maximized in a linear fashion. 
Instead parents choose a level of cS  based upon the minimum level of status 
investment required for their children to join the desired socioeconomic class. The 
value cS of demanded depends upon discrete values of 2P . The relationship is 
nonlinear. For example, take a hypothetical three class society with an ascending level 
of socioeconomic status from I-III. Figure 6.2 illustrates the relationship between 2P  and 
cS  for each of the classes, and the accompanying table provides a numerical example.  
 
Consider the case of highly altruistic parents of class I. They will strive to 
increase their children’s status subject to the constraints discussed in order for their 
children to become members of class II or III. However, they will only be able to this if 
AII YScP 2 . In this hypothetical example, parents in class I can afford to invest in 
II
cS  
as A
II
c YnSP 2  ( 1n ) but cannot afford to invest in 
III
cS as 
AIII
c YnSP 2  ( 1n ). In 
this situation, parents of class I will choose 
II
c
A
SP
Y
n
2
 . They will only then choose to
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Figure 6.2: Example of the Interplay of the Variables in the Model 
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maximize their offspring, subject to the minimum cost of obtaining a suitable status for 
each child and the available income.  
 
Depending on preferences, individual parents ( j  ) of class i  will choose a level 
of cS that satisfies the identity 
1 iij
i ScScSc . They will invest at least as much in 
their children as is required to keep them in the status group of their origin and at most 
will invest as much in their children that will ensure upward social mobility (simplified 
to a ‘1’ unit increase in their socioeconomic class here). Further investment beyond 
1iSc  is avoided as this will not appreciably raise the status of their children. This 
results in a threshold upon child investment and explains why 1n . In the example 
parents belonging to class I will choose a level of cS greater or equal to 
I
cS and less 
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than or equal to
II
cS .  
 
In combination with individual preferences, parents will choose a level of 
fertility subject to 
1
22


i
c
A
i
c
A
SP
Y
n
SP
Y
 and 
1
2


i
c
A SPY . In words:  
Parents will choose a level of family size that allows an appropriate level of child investment for 
each child to stay in the status group of origin at a minimum, and allows each child to increase 
their relative social status level, at a maximum. 
In this example, parents of class I can afford to raise 2-8 children (2 with maximum 
status investment, 8 with minimum), class II can afford 4-10 and class III can afford 10. 
Assuming constant preferences amongst the social classes, this will result in a positive 
wealth fertility relationship. The interplay of 2P , cS and 
AY are key to understanding 
how fertility declines, and this will be illustrated with similar numerical examples later 
in this section. 
 
Maximizing Utility 
Applying the method of Lagrange by introducing the multiplier , the Lagrangian 
function is 
)()( 21, YnSPSPSSUL cpcp    
s.t. 1n  
Further it is assumed that 
,0
pp SS
MUu  ,0
pc SS
MUu  
The first order derivatives are interpreted as the marginal utilities, and the
identities above state that utility increases with higher values of relative socioeconomic 
status.  
,0
ppSS
u  ,0
ccSS
u  
The second derivatives indicated in the identity above show that the law of diminishing 
marginal returns applies to increments in relative socioeconomic status.  
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Further, ,0
cpSS
u if parents and children’s relative socioeconomic status are 
substitutes, ,0
cpSS
u  if they are complements and 0
cpSS
u if they are unrelated. The 
optimal choice for *
**
,, nSS pc  and the multiplier,
* , will satisfy the three first-order 
conditions135.  
021  YnSPSPv cp  
ppp SSS
PMUv   1  
cxc SSS
nPMUv   2  
Where  denotes the shadow price136 of either parents/children’s relative 
socioeconomic status. In this model, parents choose pS , cS and n , whereas 21, PP and 
Y are determined by the market. The crucial difference between this model and that of 
Becker’s is the notion that parents choose family size, *n  in order to maximise 
*
cS and 
*
pS , subject to 1
* n . Parents will choose *n  where 
*
cS and 
*
pS are maximized.  The 
above system results in the following identity for the number of children: 
c
p
c
p
x
p
S
S
S
S
S
S
nP
P
u
u
MU
MU





2
1  
c
p
S
S
nP
P



2
1  
The optimum family size, which maximises both parents and children’s relative 
socioeconomic status, is a function of the ratio of the respective shadow prices and the 
actual (market) prices. The shadow price can be interpreted as the maximum price that 
parent’s will pay for an extra unit of either pS or cS . Assuming that parents are 
altruistic, we can interpret 
p
c
S
S


 as the degree of parental altruism ( 1 A
pc SS
 ) 
we can rewrite the above identity as: 
                                                
135 0*   is implied by the first derivative conditions.  
136 The shadow price can be interpreted as the rate at which the maximised value of the utility function 
increases with increments to either parents or children’s relative socioeconomic status.  
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AnP
P 1
2
1   
1
2
P
nP
A   
2
1*
P
P
An   
The optimal choice for the number of offspring depends on the degree of altruism and 
the ratio of price of obtaining status for parents and children. There is an inverse 
relationship with the price of obtaining children’s status, 2P . This ‘price’ can also be 
interpreted as a measure of the likelihood of relative social position enhancement 
(relative to parents). This likelihood is judge by parents at time t , and is positively 
related to the level (and rate of change) of the degree of economic inequality between 
the parents socioeconomic group, and that which it aspires to join, at time t . 2P  
represents parents perception of the cost of raising their offspring’s relative social status 
by one unit. 
 
As introduced above, 2P  represents parents perception of the cost of raising 
their child’s relative socioeconomic status. This is analogous to ‘child quality’ in the 
Becker model (see chapter 2), and may reflect the cost of education amongst other 
things. This ‘price’ is estimated by parents, and in this model, it is positively related to 
the degree of economic inequality between the parents, and the socioeconomic group to 
which they aspire to join. Further, it may also reflect institutional barriers to social 
mobility, which may or may not be related to actual (measurable) economic inequality.  
 
Proposition: The price parents perceive for increasing status is directly related to the level of 
economic inequality in their society. 
 
The proposition here is that both 1P  and 2P  are directly related to the level of economic 
inequality and the degree of social mobility within a society. Formally,  
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)(1 gfP  
),(2 ggfP   
Where g is a measure of income inequality, and
dt
dg
g  , the time trend of 
inequality. The effects of changes in g on 1P  and 2P are not the same. I propose that 
parents actively estimate a value for 2P , which represent the perceived costs of raising 
children’s relative socioeconomic success at time nt  by one unit, which is based on 
the rate of change of g at time t .  
)( 2PfS ntc    
),(2 tt ggfP    
),( ttntc ggfS    
Parents judge the current change in income inequality as perfectly equal to the 
future change. They dynamically adjust their forecast of 2P . The price parents pay for 
one unit of relative socioeconomic status enhancement ( 1P ) is directly related to the 
level of income inequality between the parents and the socioeconomic group to which 
they aspire to belong to. The price parents pays for one unit of relative socioeconomic 
enhancement for their children ( 2P ) is directly related to the level of Income inequality 
at time t and the trend in income inequality ( tg ). 2P  is related to tg because parents 
actively integrate their perception of trends in income differentials into their 
perceptions of the cost of raising their children’s relative socioeconomic status. This 
observation is important in understanding how parents increase their investment in 
their children as economic inequality decreases and is discussed further later in this 
section. 
 
Section 6.4: How the Model can Explain Fertility Decline  
 
Returning to the interplay of cS , 2P  and 
AY , this section explains how this simple 
status model of fertility can explain how fertility declines. Numerical examples are 
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employed to illustrate the effects. These numbers are, of course, arbitrary. It is a matter 
of empirical observation for the validity of these hypotheses. The demographic 
evolution of the hypothetical three class community in this simple model is described in 
three stages: a pre- transitional stage, an early transitional stage and finally a 
transitional stage.
 
Stage 1: The Pre-Transitional Society 
As discussed in the intuition section of this chapter, historical societies were typically 
very unequal. Societies were dominated by small groups of elites and a mass of 
peasants. This type of society is illustrated in figure 6.3. 
 
The distribution of economic status ( AY ) is spectacularly unequal. There is no 
‘middle class’. The top class has 20 times the level of income as the bottom class. 
Parents of class I can not afford to invest in upward social mobility for their offspring 
as AI
III
YP 2 . Therefore they will only invest in what they can afford ( 12 
IScP , the 
bare minimum required to raise a living child). No further investment is made as there 
will be no extra gain from this expenditure in terms of social status. The numerical 
example above indicates that parents in this example will choose 5 children. Parents of 
class III are able to afford 10 children with satisfactory status investment. This example 
predicts a strongly positive status-fertility relationship and fertility is high for the 
society as a whole. The empirical basis for this is the overwhelming positive status-
fertility relationship presented by Skirbekk’s (2007) metanalysis, which is illustrated in 
figure 6.1. Further, the evolutionary ecology of human reproduction predicts a positive 
wealth fertility relationship (Mace 2000 p.391, Mace and Gurmu 2008 p.340). Those who 
have access to more resources than others should be able to reproduce more. Some are 
extraordinarily successful. The Y chromosome haplotype of Genghis Khan is found in 
one out of 200 of the World’s men (Mace 2000 p.393).  
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Figure 6.3: The Pre-Transitional Society 
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Stage II: The Early Stages of the Fertility Transition 
Over time, changes in the distribution of wealth and status, and the price of obtaining it 
for offspring occur. The environment now is more equal, and a ‘middle’ class has 
arisen.  Now, all classes in society can invest in upward mobility for their offspring. 
Parents of class I can afford a range of 4-12137 children, parents of class II can afford a 
range of 2-10 children, and parents of class III can afford 3 children. Parents in the top 
status group have to restrict their fertility in order for the satisfactory investment per 
child, and the status-fertility relationship is sharply negative. Aggregate fertility does 
                                                
137 They can afford 40, but let’s take 12 to mean that they can afford to have as many children as they like. 
12 is a realistic (average) maximum in a historical society. 
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not decline as the proportion of the population that are members of class III is too small 
to move the average rate. 
 
Figure 6.4: The Early Transitional Society 
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Empirically, it is demonstrated and universally accepted that the pioneers of 
fertility decline in European society were the aristocratic class, the bourgeoisie – the top 
income/wealth bracket. Figure 6.5 is derived from Livi-Bacci’s chapter in the summary 
volume of the EFP (1986). The trend in the completed family size of Europe’s super rich 
and elites is clear. From apx. the 17the century, family size is being reduced. As a whole 
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Europe is entering an ‘early transitional stage’. Aggregate fertility is still high, but there 
are groups (the super rich) who are initiating family limitation138. 
 
Figure 6.5: The Fertility of Europe's Elites, 1500-1900 
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Source: Livi-Bacci, 1986 p.185 
 
The results of chapter 4A also support this hypothesis. Around about 1800, the  
‘super-fertility’ of the rich, which had existed for at least four centuries prior, declined 
to equal that of the poor. In addition, chapter 4 demonstrated how the pioneers of the 
English fertility decline were the poorest members of the top occupational status 
classes, strongly suggesting a process of social status preservation similar to process 
stated in this simple model. For France, the first segments of society to reduce their 
fertility were the richest members of the decline regime villages. 
                                                
138 Another intriguing possibility is the relative level of intergenerational transfers from parents to 
offspring. Perhaps the level of inequality in the past allowed a small elite to pass on large transfers of 
wealth to a large family. Movements in the underlying level of inequality in a society may result in certain 
families choosing lower fertility in order to maximise this intergenerational transfer and therefore 
maximise the relative status of their descendants (hypothesis derived from Mace 2000 p.393).  
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Stage III: The onset of Sustained Fertility Decline 
 
In the next stage, the relative cost of children has risen for all classes. Parents of class I 
can now afford a range of 1-5 children, parents of class II can afford a range of 1-3 
children and parents of class III can afford 2 children. The status fertility relationship 
will be approximately flat. All groups in the population, (apart from some members of  
the bottom status group) will restrict fertility in order to preserve or increase status 
obtainment for their offspring. Aggregate fertility decline has taken hold. Empirically, 
this stage corresponds to the late 19th century in Europe.  
 
Figure 6.6: The Transitional Society 
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In relation to evolutionary arguments, Richerson and Boyd  state ‚Natural 
selection has shaped the psychology of social learning so that we are predisposed to 
imitate people with prestige and material well being‛ (2005 p.177). My theory proposes 
that this effect will only happen when parents judge the act of family limitation to be 
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economically justified. In other words, they will only adjust their fertility when they 
judge this adjustment to have a realistic effect of increasing their or their children’s 
relative socioeconomic status.  
 
In the literature on Europe’s fertility decline, many authors express the 
sentiment that relative status concerns were a central causal force in the limitation of 
family size. Concluding his analysis of the Belgian fertility transition, Lesthaeghe states 
‚The mechanism of social capillarity was probably at work‛ (1977 p.224). Schneider and 
Schneider’s account of the fertility transition in Sicily describes the late decline of the 
bracciante (day Labourers); ‚the majority in this class began to contracept after 1950 in 
order to have a decent life and because decency had become a target worth pursuing‛. 
Further, they did so for ‚social betterment‛ (1996 pp.258, 262, my italics). On the social 
mobility environment, Lesthaeghe and Wilson write; ‚In nineteenth century Western 
Europe, the system of social status and associated income levels was gradually replaced 
with a new hierarchy: the traditional status system based on ascribed status yielded 
reluctantly to a newer one based on achieved status‛ (Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1886 
p.267). Fertility decline in nineteenth century Europe was coincident with the 
appearance this new ‚social status system‛ (Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1886 p.268).  
 
2P is extraordinarily expensive in Pre-Transition times – i.e. it is next to 
impossible for parents in the vast majority of the population to influence children’s 
chances of social  ‘success’ ( cS ). Parents cannot afford to buy any ‘units’ of cS , which 
means 0cS for the pre-Transition case, hence the term 0cS . For the vast majority of 
human history, available income Y has been stagnating. As society develops, 
Y surges. At the moment YP 2 , parents invest in cS . As 
c
A
SP
Y
n
2
 , when cS  
increases, fertility n  is reduced. The threshold moment for the fertility transition is the 
time YP 2 , and this is illustrated in figure 6.7 (broken line). 
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Figure 6.7: The Evolution of the Variables over Time 
  
When 2P is very large (pre-Transition reality), and the term cSP2 is close to zero, 
parents will maximise their fertility. As discussed, in the pre-transition setting cSP2 is 
close to zero, therefore n  is maximised. However, as an economy develops, 2P declines, 
therefore ‘units’ of cS bought by parents increase. Table 6.1 summarises the differences 
between a Pre-transitional Society (PT) and a Transitional society (T) with respect to the 
variables in the model. 
 
The same points made previously can be underlined with an analysis of the budget 
constraint and indifference curves. Figure 6.8 illustrates the cases of a Pre transitional 
society (PT) and a transitional society (T).  
 
Table 6.1: The Values of the Variables in Pre Transition and Transition 
 Minimum Maximum PT T 
2P  Y  Y  Max Min 
cS  1   Min Max 
n  1 12 (apx.) Max Min 
Y  Subsistence   Min Max 
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Figure 6.8: Graphical Budget Constraint Analysis 
 
The slope of the utility function, it is steep and reflects parental altruism. Also, it 
is the same shape in the pre-Transition era as it is in the Post-Transition era, where 
preferences between purchase of parental social ‘success’ and offspring social ‘success’ 
is held constant. The next point to make concerns the slope of the pre-Transition budget 
constraint. As 2P  is huge ( YP 2 ), the slope is virtually 0 (but crucially not = 0, as some 
investment towards cS is made through the feeding and care of children (analogous to 
Becker’s fixed cost of children)). The slope is not perfectly horizontal because of this, yet 
the number of ‘units’ of cS  purchased 0 . 
 
The crucial event which pushes the budget curve up to point T from PT, along 
with the increase in Y, is the changing slope of the budget constraint, which primarily is 
a function of the declining cost parameter 2P . The process of modern economic growth 
has an impact on the income distribution of the population. This causes the parameters 
1P and 2P to change. However, the change in 2P is greater than the change in 1P , 
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meaning that the (absolute value of)139 slope coefficient for the pre-Transition (PM) 
budget constraint is less than that for the Post-Transition (M) case. 
2211 , PPPP
TT   
12 PP   
TT
T
nP
P
nP
P
2
1
2
1   
(Please see the previous discussion on the relationship between 21 , PP  and changing 
income inequality for the reasons why 12 PP  ). Therefore both cS and pS increase. 
However, pc SS  , because 12 PP  . 
 
Holding altruism constant, and considering that the transition from a PT to T 
stage involves changing 1P and 2P , the logic indicates the following 
2
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The intuitive explanation for this result is that as the economy shifts to a 
transitional stage, the changing relationship between the prices of parents and 
children’s relative socioeconomic status results in an increase in the quantity demanded 
of each, but the increase is greater for children’s status. In the Pre transitional 
equilibrium, the quantity demanded of children’s status was low as the price was high. 
As the price decreases (in tandem with shifts in income inequality), the identities 
                                                
139 The slope is negative. 
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calculated via the economic analysis of the social status fertility model indicate that 
fertility will decrease. This is because once investment in children’s status is greater 
than zero; family size suddenly becomes relevant in determining the success of this 
investment. In other words, when the price of increasing children’s socioeconomic 
status is too high (and hence the quantity demanded is very small/close to zero), the 
choice of family size does not have an impact on the future likelihood of increased 
status for offspring. As the price lowers, and becomes affordable, parents quickly adjust 
their behaviour with regards to family size. This is because they can now afford to buy 
units of the ‚good‛ future offspring status. Once the demand for these goods is greater 
than zero, it becomes rational (in the sense of utility maximisation as explored in the 
model) to reduce fertility.  
 
The difference between this model and the classical micro economic theory of 
fertility is that it specifies how fertility can decrease with decreases in the price of 
children’s relative socio economic status. This price (referred to as 2P in the model) is 
not a normal price, but is a reflection of parents’ expectation with regards to the returns 
to child investment. Further, the maximization of children’s status is not a linear 
function, but operates at discreet values related to the price of obtaining this status. This 
price is a function of the degree of economic inequality in society. More specifically, I 
have linked this price to parent’s perception of the trend in economic inequality. When 
economic inequality is changing, both prices for status change. However, because 
parents are rational and dynamically forecast ‘ 2P ’, this change in this price will be 
greater than the price for parents status. The crucial thread here is my argument that 
shifts in economic inequality itself can initiate fertility decline. 
 
The simple theory has been stated. In order for this theory to mean anything, 
testable hypotheses must be constructed. In my view the primary testable hypothesis is 
the relationship between the fertility rate and the level of economic inequality in a 
society. Where inequality is high, fertility is high, and vice versa. The empirical test is to 
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examine fertility declines in a comparative context and look for differences in the level 
of economic inequality between the societies. If the evidence shows that fertility decline 
occurred irrespective of changes in inequality, or that it declines in highly unequal 
societies before more equitable societies, then the theory is falsified. The next section 
will examine the fertility declines in England and France, at both the aggregate and 
micro level, with respect to simple model and theory outlined here. 
 
Section 6.5: Empirical Section - England and France compared 
 
This section compares the fertility decline in England and France in the light of the 
simple status-fertility model. After a brief macro level description, the new micro data 
is analyzed to test for the patterns expected by the status-fertility model. Figure 6.9 
charts the time trend in the index of marital fertility (right axis) and the level of GDP 
per capita (left axis) in England and France over the 19th century up to the eve of the 
First World War. 
 
Fertility decline in England lagged behind that in France by over a century. Chapter 
3 estimated a sustained fertility decline beginning in 1776 for France and 1877 in 
England (see chapter 3). As has been previously pointed out, the level of GDP per 
capita in England was substantially above that of France in this period. A simple 
modernisation cause of fertility decline does not work in explaining Europe’s fertility 
decline as it cannot explain this pattern. The simple status-fertility model introduced in 
the last section proposes that inequality, through it’s affect on parent’s willingness to 
invest in improving their offspring’s status, is highly related to the fertility decline.  
 
Figure 6.10 plots the gini coefficient (right axis) and the index of marital fertility for 
England and France for the same period as figure 6.9. This figure presents a very 
different modernisation – fertility decline picture than figure 6.9. Economic inequality, 
as measured by the gini coefficient, is lower in France than it is in the UK. This 
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Figure 6.9: Fertility and Income per capita in England and France, 1830-1913 
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Figure 6.10: Fertility and Inequality in England and France, 1820-1910 
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relationship is predicted by the simple status-fertility model introduced earlier. Further, 
fertility decline in both countries follows the trend in the gini coefficient closely (at least 
from this superficial visual inspection). Is it possible that France entered into an earlier 
fertility transition because economic inequality fell from a very high pre transitional 
level, to a level where parents’ believed that child investment could pay off, and 
therefore they restricted their fertility?  
 
In addition to the levels and trends for both countries in fertility and inequality 
being in agreement with the theory, the 20 year plateaux in French fertility, from 1850-
1870, is associated with a large increase in the level of inequality. This decline is 
discussed further in the appendix to this chapter, but there is a likelihood it is related to 
the sharp increase in inequality over the same period. 
 
What can the Micro Data tell us about the early decline of fertility in France and the 
late decline in England? 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 described in detail the source and characteristics of the individual
level data collected for this thesis. In this section, both datasets are analysed side by 
side in a consistent fashion. Both datasets record estimates of wealth and net fertility. 
The French data has a far richer demographic description than that available from the 
English wills. That extra information is discarded here so that calculated estimates may 
be directly comparable between the samples.  
 
For complete wealth comparability, francs were converted to 1850 British
pounds using an exchange rate of 25.31 francs to the pound. This value is reported as 
the mean exchange rate of the pound in Francs over the 1847-1873 period (Boyer-
Xambeu et al 1997 p.118). Even before the era of the classical Gold Standard, the pound-
franc exchange rate was remarkably stable. From 1820-1870, the exchange rate varied 
 295 
between 25 and 26 francs (with ‚two limited exceptions‛) (Marcuzzo et al 1997 p.108). 
Figure 6.11 reports the evolution of the average level of total wealth in the samples.  
 
Figure 6.11: The Trend in Real Wealth by Year of Death, for both Samples 
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So that the graph may be easily assessed in terms of trends the square root of 
real total wealth is used (1850 British pounds). Wealth at death is far higher in the 
English sample140. This is partly a result of the fact that the English economy was richer 
than the French at this time, but it is also the result of a selection bias in the English 
data. Only those who made a last will and testament were recorded in the English 
sample, whereas the French sample recorded everybody. This means that the English 
sample over represents the wealthier members of society. There are limitations to the 
comparison undertaken here, but care is taken to ensure comparability. 
 
                                                
140 The declining average value in real wealth of death in England may be related to an increase in the 
proportion of males leaving wills – see chapter 4. 
English Sample 
French Sample 
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Before any adjustments are made, the first step is to compare the occupational 
distributions of the samples. The 1911 occupational class schema described in detail in 
chapter 4 is used for this purpose. This scale descends in occupational class from I 
(professionals and elites), through II (farmers and shopkeepers), III (the skilled working 
class, carpenters etc.) and classes IV and V (the semi-skilled and unskilled working 
classes). The TSA augmented Henry demographic database for France was analyzed 
with respect to Stevenson’s 1911 occupational classifications and a comparison of the 
results of this exercise is reported in figure 6.12. 
 
Figure 6.12: The Occupational Distribution of the Samples 
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 The English sample over represents the top three occupational classes. The 
French sample is difficult to estimate because only 2/3rds of the Henry sample males 
have a recorded occupation. This may explain why occupational class II is so highly 
represented. There may have been a reluctance to report occupation if the occupation 
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was of a low class. Therefore, the French estimates are likely to over estimate certain 
‘prestigious’ classes. Of the sample analysed here, no occupation is recorded for 37%. If 
we take the extreme assumption that none of these men were members of occupational 
class II (the middle classes), this puts a lower bound of 47.93% of the labour force 
categorized as middle class, compared to 40% of the English sample (which over 
represents this class too). The contrast is interesting as we should expect to find a 
higher representation of the middle classes in the English sample. However, the French 
sample is considerably more middle class than the English! 
 
The next step in this comparison is to run identical regressions on family size for 
each of the 2 samples. Due to the selection bias in the English sample towards richer 
men, wealth quartiles are constructed on a relative basis. In other words, males in the 
sample were sorted into wealth categories based on the wealth distribution within 
their own sample. The top wealth quartile in France are the richest Frenchmen relative 
to the other Frenchmen. The bottom quartile in England are the poorest English men 
relative to the other Englishmen141.  
  
 The methodology is identical to that followed in chapters 4 and 5 previously. 
Negative binomial regressions are run, with interaction coefficients built in to the 
model. The interaction in England is for urban and rural dwelling whilst the interaction 
for France is between non-decline and decline regimes. These regimes are characterized 
as such based on the aggregate time trend of village level fertility over the sample 
period. In addition to the wealth categories and interactions, an additional regression is 
run with occupational class as independent variables.  
 
The models to be estimated are: 
   tileWealthQuarNetF n  
                                                
141 Similar regression using absolute levels of wealth were run, but this pooling did not result in any 
coherent patterns (regression unreported here). 
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   alClassOccuaptiontileWealthQuarNetF nn  
As the English sample exhibited evidence for a selection bias towards childless men, the 
regressions are performed upon all married men who have at least one child. The 
results of these regressions are reported in table 6.2. 
 
The results of the regressions roughly replicate the results of the separate 
analyses in chapters 4 and 5142. The comparative viewpoint is illuminating. In relation to 
model 1 (Wealth effects only), there are significant and large wealth effects on net 
fertility in both England and France. In England, the countryside is still under a cross 
sectional Malthusian rule. Net fertility increases with wealth. The same is true for 
France, for those villages where aggregate fertility is high and non-declining. 
Examining the interaction coefficients, the wealth fertility relationship breaks down. In 
the English towns, the standard errors for these interaction coefficients are large, 
resulting in coefficients that fail to be significantly different from zero at the standard 
levels. For the ‘decline’ villages in France, the top wealth group show clear and strong 
evidence of fertility limitation.  
 
Model 2 adds categorical variables representing occupational status, in 
descending order from class I-V. The wealth effects in both samples are robust to the 
addition of these status variables, and the coefficients are consistent. The most striking 
result of this model is the large and highly significant association of status and lower  
net fertility for the high status groups in England. In France, status is not significantly 
related to net fertility. 
 
Interpreting these two models together, we can say the following: To 
understand the English fertility decline, occupational status and wealth is central. It is
                                                
142 The results are slightly different as both regressions here omit certain variables used in the separate 
analysis. The goal here is to produce comparable coefficients between the samples. This exercise also serves 
as a robustness check for the results of chapters 4 and 5. If they coefficients here are wildly different from 
those reported earlier, this would be a source of concern. Thankfully they are not. 
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Table 6.2: Identical Regression Results for Both Samples 
 England France England France 
 1 2 
Relative Wealth Group 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
1 0 
(ref.) 
0 
(ref.) 
0 
(ref.) 
0 
(ref.) 
2 0.059 
(0.097) 
0.190 
(0.117) 
0.086 
(0.097) 
0.149 
(0.148) 
3 0.172* 
(0.086) 
0.125 
(0.127) 
0.201* 
(0.086) 
0.027 
(0.145) 
4 0.202* 
(0.089) 
0.285* 
(0.126) 
0.259** 
(0.091) 
0.273** 
(0.162) 
     
Urban/'Decline' Effect 0.081 
(0.088) 
0.163 
(0.112) 
0.072 
(0.089) 
0.145 
(0.134) 
Urban/'Decline' Interactions   
2 -0.122 
(0.128) 
-0.188 
(0.152) 
-0.128 
(0.128) 
-0.281 
(0.187) 
3 -0.216 
(0.120) 
-0.257 
(0.157) 
-0.228 
(0.120) 
-0.239 
(0.177) 
4 -0.154 
(0.120) 
-0.474** 
(0.158) 
-0.154 
(0.120) 
-0.567** 
(0.194) 
Occupational Class     
I 
  
-0.391*** 
(0.111) 
0.422 
(0.257) 
II 
  
-0.376*** 
(0.107) 
0.163 
(0.210) 
III 
  
-0.290*** 
(0.112) 
0.253 
(0.229) 
IV 
  
-0.278 
(0.121) 
0.011 
(0.441) 
V 
  
0 
(ref.) 
0 
(ref.) 
     
Constant 1.142*** 
(0.065) 
1.294*** 
(0.092) 
1.453*** 
(0.118) 
1.229*** 
(0.221) 
Observations 856 413 856 263 
Pseudo 2R  0.003 0.007 0.007 0.021 
*** P <0.05 
**  P <0.01 
*   P <0.001     
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the poorest members of the highest status groups who are exhibiting the lowest net 
fertility. In France, the group who initiate low fertility are the richest residents of the 
‘decline’ villages. For France, status is irrelevant, and does not predict fertility decline. 
It is clear that the process of fertility transition is different in England and France. 
 
The simple status-fertility model introduced earlier in this chapter directly 
linked the level of economic inequality and the cost of child investment to the 
determination of family size. Together with the cost of obtaining status, it is relative 
wealth in a society which matters for fertility differentials, not absolute wealth. How 
can this inform the different fertility transitions in England and France? 
 
The results of the identical regressions indicate that fertility decline was 
differentiated along wealth and status lines. The group which demonstrate the largest 
and most significant reduction in net fertility is the wealthiest quartile of the decline 
villages in France. The wealthiest quartile in England have a higher net fertility than the 
reference group (the poorest quartile, both urban and rural). If fertility decline is related 
to the level of wealth, then we should expect that the richest groups should reduce their 
fertility first. This is not the case as the richest English quartile is far richer than the 
richest French quartile. The results of this relative wealth analysis strongly suggest that 
in order to understand fertility decline, we must look at the relative wealth of 
individuals rather than the absolute.  
 
The simple status-fertility model predicts that we should see differences in the 
level of economic inequality between the subgroups which differ in the level of fertility. 
The first test of this model at the individual level is to construct a summary measure of 
the degree of inequality in real wealth both between and within the samples. Table 6.3 
reports the gini coefficient for both samples, with and urban/rural division for England 
and a decline/non decline division for France. As the English sample was based upon 
testators (who always left assets greater than zero), two ginis are constructed: one for 
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the entire wealth distribution (only possible for France) and another for those who died 
with greater than zero wealth at death.  
 
Table 6.3: The Degree of Economic Inequality in the Samples 
 All >0 
England 
Urban - 0.77 
Rural - 0.75 
 
France  
Non Decline 0.79 0.78 
Decline 0.71 0.67 
 
The distribution of the calculated gini coefficients in table 6.3 correspond to the 
theoretical relationship proposed by the model. For England, where fertility decline is 
not detected between rural or urban divisions, the gini is high and similar. For France, 
the gini is significantly lower where fertility is declining. Taking both countries 
together, we see that the division with the lowest level of inequality is also the division 
which demonstrates the largest decline in fertility in the sample period. 
 
Another way to examine the level of inequality in a society is to look at the 
relationship between occupational status and wealth. The regression results indicated 
that net fertility was lower for the poorest members of the top status groups in England, 
while for France the status-fertility relationship was non-existent. The next test of the 
simple status-fertility model is to examine the relationship between wealth and 
occupational status. If occupational status is highly related to wealth, this suggests that 
the level of economic inequality is higher than would be the case where the relationship 
is relatively lower. In the former case, the accumulation of wealth is highly related to 
occupational status. Where this relationship breaks down, a fertility decline can occur 
because it implies a lower level of economic inequality and a more even wealth 
distribution. Table 6.4 reports the results of a simple regression of the categorical 
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variables representing occupational status on the dependent variable, the square root of 
real wealth. 
 
Again, interaction coefficients are included, but in this instance only for decline 
regime France. Table 6.4 indicates a strong and ascending relationship between 
occupational status and the level of real wealth143. For all occupational classes above the 
unskilled working class, the level of expected real wealth increases, and is highly 
significant for occupational classes I and II (P<0.001). Despite this high average 
association, it is the poorest members of this group who are reducing their fertility as 
revealed in table 6.3.  
 
For France, the relationship between status and wealth is far nosier. Apart from 
the top occupational class, who have a very large and significant positive association 
with wealth, none of the occupational class variables have a statistically significant 
association with the level of real wealth. Interestingly, there is suggestive evidence that 
the strong wealth association for the top occupational class is different between the non 
decline and decline villages. The interaction coefficient for this group is large and 
negative and reduces the effective coefficient by apx. 83% (an effective coefficient for 
the non decline villages of 63.3, versus an effective coefficient for the non decline 
villages of 63.3+ (-53.1) =10.2. However, the number of observations belonging to the 
top occupational status class in the French ‘decline’ villages is very small. Hence, the 
standard error is large, and the estimated interaction coefficient is statistically 
insignificant from zero (P>0.05). 
 
Excluding the top occupational status class, the results of the regression of 
occupational class on real wealth support the hypothesis of fertility decline presented 
earlier in this chapter. Where status and wealth are linked, fertility is high – as is the
                                                
143 Included as a square root in the model so as to avoid the distortion of extremely high values on the 
average relationship. 
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Table 6.4: Regression on the Square Root of Real Wealth 
 England France 
Occupational 
Status 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
I 24.008*** 
(5.185) 
63.325*** 
(16.797) 
II 17.501*** 
(4.977) 
7.841 
(11.964) 
III 8.655 
(5.287) 
1.424 
(14.001) 
IV 4.776 
(5.628) 
-1.728 
(22.57) 
V 0 
(Ref.) 
0 
(Ref.) 
   
Decline Regime 
- 
5.648 
(29.796) 
Decline Regime 
Interactions   
I 
- 
-53.174 
(35.08) 
II 
- 
-2.347 
(30.149) 
III 
- 
-0.404 
(32.244) 
IV - - 
   
Age at Death 1.05 
(0.755) 
0.167 
(0.949) 
Age at Death 2  -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
Constant  -22.134 
(25.12) 
27.658 
(32.48) 
   
Observations 743 239 
Pseudo 2R  0.059 0.062 
*** P <0.05 
**  P <0.01 
*   P <0.001   
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case in England. Where the relationship has broken down, fertility is lower – as in 
France. The next test of the model is to look at the changing relationship of occupational 
status and wealth over time. The hypothesis predicts that where the occupational class - 
wealth relationship is declining, fertility will be restricted as the status-fertility 
relationship is highly related to the degree of economic inequality. Figure 6.13 
illustrates the proportion of total wealth held by occupational class for both samples, 
before and after 1780144.  
 
The evidence presented in figure 6.13 must be taken sceptically as the number of 
observations for the top occupational class in France is very small. However, the 
patterns are clear.  Intriguingly, figure 6.13 reveals strikingly similar patterns between 
both the English and French samples. The first feature to note is the large drop from 
before 1780 to after 1780 in the proportion of real wealth for the top occupational 
classes in both samples (I). Secondly, this is accompanied by increases in the proportion 
of wealth held for all occupational classes below class I. Finally, the increase in the 
proportion of wealth held of occupational classes II-IV is greater in France than it is in 
England. The pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that it is changes in the relative  
distribution of wealth within in a society which are central in understanding the decline 
of fertility. 
 
This time pattern and the spatial pattern revealed by the regression results 
presented in table 6.4 suggest strongly that the decline in fertility is associated with an 
evening of the wealth distribution. Not only is the relationship between occupational 
class and wealth far weaker in France than it is in England, it is significantly weaker 
within France between those villages where fertility is high and non-declining and 
those where a fertility transition is well underway. 
                                                
144 Year of birth based. 1780 was used as an arbitrary divider as it split both samples into sample sizes with 
appropriate observations for this analysis. 
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Figure 6.13: The Proportion of Wealth held by Occupational Class, before and after 
1780 
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The final test of the model is to examine the relationship between father and 
son’s wealth at death. Where economic inequality is high, and social mobility is low, 
father’s wealth should be a strong and significant predictor of son’s wealth. Where this 
relationship breaks down, the model suggests that fertility is restricted as economic 
inequality has declined. To test for this the following regression was estimated: 
  )()( fS WWIn  
Where SW is son’s wealth, fW is father’s wealth,   is a constant,   is an error term 
and In  is the natural logarithm. The relationship between father and son’s wealth is 
captured by the estimated coefficient  . Table 6.5 reports the results of estimating this 
coefficient for both samples, with a separate estimate for the non decline and decline 
villages in France. 
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Table 6.5: The Relationship between Father and Son's Wealth in the Samples 
 
England 
(Pre 1858) France 
 Non-Decline Decline 
  
(standard error) 
0.55 
(0.041) 
0.75 
(0.269) 
0.13 
(-145) 
 
 
The pattern of the results agrees with the stated hypotheses. Where fertility is 
declining, the intergenerational relationship of wealth has broken down. The value of 
this estimate for the ‘decline’ villages in France is a small proportion of the estimates for 
the rest of the sample.  
 
The comparative micro analysis presented here provides empirical foundations  
for the simple status-fertility model presented earlier in this chapter. In answer to the 
question ‘Why did fertility decline in France first?’, I can propose the following: 
 
Fertility declined in France before anywhere else in the world through a particular interaction of 
available income ( AY ) and the price of obtaining social status advancement ( 2P ). The moment 
available income exceeded the price of obtaining social status advancement ( 2PY
A  ), fertility 
decline started. The reason that it occurred in France, and not England first (a country with a 
higher level of available income), is because the level of economic inequality ( g ), and therefore 
the price of obtaining social status advancement was lower in France ( ),(2 ggfP  ). 
 
Section 6.6: Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced a very simple status-fertility model in order to explain how 
fertility declined in Europe. The model is deliberately parsimonious and is intended to 
abstract from a deeply complex behavioural process in order to generalize a particular 
feature of Europe’s fertility decline which has yet to be fully understood. Utility 
                                                
145 Interaction – all coefficients significant at P<.10. 
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maximizing parents choose a family size based on social status concerns. They do not 
simply maximize their family size, but do so only when they can provide each child 
with an appropriate level of social status investment. As the price of this investment is 
so high in pre transitional societies, parents choose not to invest in it and instead 
maximize their fertility subject to available income. Over time, available income 
increases, and economic inequalities decrease. These changes make child stratus 
investment possible and altruistic parents quickly choose to decrease their family size 
and increase their investment per child. The novel feature of this model is the direct 
link between the level of economic inequality and the fertility rate. 
 
The empirical basis for this model was examined with respect to England and 
France. The newly collected individual level data was examined for the relationship 
between economic inequality and fertility decline. Three tests were performed, a gini 
coefficient analysis, a regression on occupational status and wealth and finally a 
regression on the strength of the intergenerational transmission of wealth. In all tests, 
the group which exhibited the strongest fertility decline in the sample, the richest 
quartile of the ‘decline’ villages in France had measures of inequality significantly 
below those of the rest of the sample. These tests provide strong support for the validity 
of the theorized relationships in the model being relevant for understanding Europe’s 
fertility transition. 
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Appendix to Chapter 6 
‘Stylised impression’ of the historical trend in income inequality and fertility 
 
Empirical graphs 
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Norway
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 Urbanisation/Population density 
 Urbanisation Rates 10,000+ Urbanisation Rates 5,000+ 
 
England and 
Wales 
France England and 
Wales 
France 
1700 13.2 8.7 14.6 12.3 
1750 16.4 8.7 22.3 12.5 
1800 22.3 8.9 29.9 12.5 
1870 43.0 18.1 49.6 21.6 
 
Source: Malanima and Volckart 2009.) 
 
More Inequality and fertility discussion 
 
 
 
The X axis represents the cumulative proportion of the population (the above 
representation is in deciles), while the Y axis represents the share of total income. The 
above graph conveys a distribution where the 50% of the population hold 10% of the 
total wealth, 90% hold 40% of all wealth and 10% hold 60% of all wealth.  
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Now, suppose group 1 represent the 10th decile of the population, that is they are the 
top 10% of the population with respect to share of income. Group 2 are the second 
(corresponding to 40% of the population, and group 3 represent the bottom half of the 
population with respect to share of income.  
 
The proposition: 
Group 2 (indicated by deciles 5-9) will only imitate /control/adopt the fertility trend of 
group 1 when economic inequality between the 2 groups reaches a certain threshold. At 
this point it is economically rational to control fertility behaviour. This threshold is 
indicated by the point
*g . The area 
*
g BC represents the threshold degree of economic 
inequality, below which members of group 2 will begin to adjust their fertility. The area 
*
g BC represents the degree of economic inequality between the socioeconomic groups 
labelled 1 and 2 (denoted 12g ). 12g acts as a proxy for 2P , and 2P  is inversely related to 
family size, as was discussed in the last section.  
 
An upward shift in the Lorenz curve, indicating a decline in economic inequality, 
occurs between times 1t and 2t
146. The area ABC is less than the area A’BC, therefore 
economic inequality between the socioeconomic groups 1 and 2 falls ( 12g ). The area 
A’BC is less than the threshold value of economic inequality (
*
g BC), 
therefore
*
1212 gg  . Once economic inequality fall below a certain threshold value, the 
members of group 2 reduce in parallel  their dynamic forecast of the value for the cost 
parameter of children’s relative socioeconomic status, 2P . As they seek to maximise 
their offspring’s relative socioeconomic status, they adjust their family size to meet this 
goal. As discussed previously, family size is not maximised for its own sake but is an 
endogenous variable with respect to maximisation of relative socioeconomic status. As 
                                                
146 This also corresponds with a decline in the absolute value of the Gini coefficient, which measures the 
area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient =1 in a situation of 
perfect inequality, and 0 in a situation of perfect economic equality.  
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group 1 have initiated fertility control, group 2 imitate this pattern as it now makes 
rational economic sense to do so (the level of economic inequality has reached its 
threshold level, and hence 2P has become affordable). The trend for family size 
‘diffuses’ along socioeconomic strata; in this simple model from group 1 to group 2, 
when the economic inequality between groups 1 and 2 falls to a certain threshold level. 
Similarly, the trend diffuses between groups 2 and 3 when the economic inequality 
between groups 2 and 3, falls to a certain threshold level.  
 
Graph showing the similar trend in England and France of 19th century fertility 
Graph showing the very different income fertility relationship in England (right) and 
France (left) 
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Scatter Plot of Income per capita and the Index of Marital Fertility in France (left) and 
England (right) 
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Two Declines 
Examining Weir’s estimates of Coale’s marital fertility index (Ig) for France, over the 
period 1740-1911, it is possible to distinguish an initial decline around 1790 which 
continues until about 1850. Rather curiously, a 25 year plateau is observed before 
fertility begins a sharper decline after apx. 1875. The Franco-Prussian war (1870-1) 
provokes a sharp dip in the trend, with a recovery phase over the following years 
(Bonneuil 1997 p.90).  
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The Rate of Fertility Decline in 19th Century France 
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Rates of decline147 
Period Number of years % Decline per annum 
1776 -1850 74 0.52 
1850-70 20 -0.39 
1870-1912 42 0.86 
 
The plateau in the decline of fertility (which lasted nearly a generation) raises some 
fundamental questions about the innovation hypothesis for fertility decline. It is 
argued, by Knodel and van de Walle for example, that pre-modern populations always 
desired low fertility, and it was the absences and ignorance of effective techniques to 
limit family size which prevented its achievement. The diffusion of new knowledge 
about fertility control was the main reason for the decline in fertility levels in Europe, 
according to this argument. What then, could have cause this diffusion effect to 
effectively pause for a generation? I argue that this ‘pause’ in the fertility transition was 
                                                
147 My own calculations, based on Weirs estimates for Ig,  (1994 p.330-1). 
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closely related to the sharp rise in economic inequality which occurred at exactly the 
same time. 
OLS regression on the Square Root of Real Wealth 
 England France 
Year of Birth -0.356** 
(.138) 
-0.523 
(0.565) 
Age at Death 0.128 
(1.456) 
0.991 
(6.756) 
Age at Death 2  0.001 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
Constant 684** 
(264) 
898 
(1033) 
Observations 392 14 
 
In England, the real Wealth of the top status group is decreasing significantly: 
Real Wealth of Top Occupational Status Group in England, 1750-1860 
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Table reporting the numbers used in figure 6.14: Mean wealth by Occupational Class 
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 England France 
 
Rural Urban Non Decline Decline 
Mean % Mean % Mean % Mean % 
I 6737.19 0.48 5076.09 0.36 2713.14 0.80 259.00 0.19 
II 3497.73 0.25 4656.81 0.33 288.61 0.08 379.58 0.28 
III 1420.36 0.10 1658.58 0.12 133.94 0.04 293.03 0.22 
IV 1888.73 0.13 2235.47 0.16 63.47 0.02 154.30 0.11 
V 600.32 0.04 636.89 0.04 203.07 0.06 258.30 0.19 
 
Figure 6.14 reports the mean levels of real wealth held for all the occupational 
classes for both samples. Here, I split each sample into its spatial division: For England, 
and urban/rural divide and for France, a decline/non decline divide. 
 
Figure 6.14: The Spatial Differences in Average Wealth, by Occupational Class 
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Figure 6.14 reports the mean level of wealth per occupational class, not the 
proportion of wealth held, and thus serves as a visualization of the regression results 
presented in table 6.4  This is why the average level of wealth is so much lower for 
every occupational class in France. Disregarding the level differences between the 
samples, we can see clear differences in the pattern of the occupational class and wealth 
relationship between the spatial divisions. In England, there are strong associations for 
both spatial locations between wealth and occupational status. In France, the 
relationship is non existent below the top occupational class. For the decline villages in 
France, the mean wealth by occupational class is almost the same for every class. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion to the Thesis 
 
Our understandings of historical fertility transitions are empirically and theoretically 
incomplete. Therefore, this thesis has asked: Why did fertility decline in Europe? 
Through synthesising the microeconomic theory of fertility and insights from 
evolutionary biology, together with the analysis of existing macro and newly collected 
micro level data, this thesis argues that fertility declined in 19th century Europe because 
the environment for social mobility changed.  
 
 The world of the early 21st century is the result of the onset of modern economic 
growth and the simultaneous great divergence of the level of economic development in 
different regions of the globe. Today, lesser developed countries have higher fertility 
rates than the most developed countries. The least developed countries have the 
highest fertility rates of all. Demographers forecast that these trends will converge via 
the onset of fertility transition in those regions where fertility is still high. Despite these 
strong economic-demographic correlations, there is no consensus for why fertility 
declined in the first place. The field is splintered by those who propose non-economic 
innovative-diffusion hypotheses and those who insist on an underlying economic and 
rational adaptation. The results of the European fertility project condemned the simple 
causal mechanisms proposed by demographic transition theory.  
 
Europe’s fertility decline occurred against the backdrop of a rapidly changing 
economic system. The long night of the pre-industrial era was characterised by 
stagnation in material living standards, which were oscillating, but never rising 
consistently, from the Neolithic revolution to the end of the 18th century. Human 
societies moderated their fertility (and therefore the growth rate of their population) 
through access to marriage. Within marriage, individuals appear to have maximised 
their fertility. A mere two centuries ago humans began to practice family limitation on a 
wide scale. The technology employed was not new, but ancient. The timing of this 
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change does not match well the timings of economic change in the countries of Europe. 
For France, it predated modern economic growth. For England, the fertility transition 
followed the industrial revolution by over a century. In addition to the economic 
transformation, the fertility ‘revolution’ is still poorly understood. 
 
Economic models of fertility place decreases in infant and child mortality as 
central and causal forces in the decline of fertility. If parents do not respond to changes 
in the early life mortality of offspring, then all economic or rational models of fertility 
behaviour are lost. The highly aggregated nature of the European Fertility Project 
meant that the true relationship between infant mortality and fertility was blurred. At 
the individual level, my research indicates that child mortality decline was highly 
related to the decline of fertility in France. Precise child mortality measures were not 
calculated for England. However, both analyses focused upon net reproduction. The 
calculated differentials displayed significant reductions in realised family size for the 
forerunners and early pioneers of the fertility transition. Therefore, I chose to look for 
reasons why net reproduction was declining, taking reductions in infant mortality as 
related, but not central, to these new family size preferences. 
 
 In this thesis, I have assessed the individual economic correlates of the French 
and English fertility transitions. This required the collection and analysis of new 
individual level data on economic status and fertility life history. For England, 
thousands of wills were read and coded. For France, existing demographic data were 
linked to newly collected wealth at death estimates from official records. The period of 
fertility transition was captured by the thesis data. The principal finding was the strong 
association of wealth and fertility both before and during the demographic transition. 
The pre transitional phase was characterised by a strong positive wealth-fertility 
relationship in both England and France. At the onset of the fertility decline, it is the 
richest groups of the four French sample villages which displayed the lowest fertility in 
cross section. They were the pioneers of family limitation in France. In England, the 
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interaction of status and wealth is crucial in understanding the fertility decline. It is the 
poorest members of the highest status groups who have the lowest fertility at the onset 
of the fertility transition there.  The identification of these large and significant 
economic-demographic differentials is the primary empirical contribution of this thesis. 
However, if the fertility transition was non-economic in origin, how come we have such 
strong individual level economic correlates of low fertility at the genesis of the 
demographic transition? 
 
 To answer this question, I have re-examined the economic model of fertility and 
adjusted it to reflect insights from evolutionary disciplines concerned with human 
nature. No man is an island. Every decision we make is a result of our own internal 
desires. However, our internal desires can be shaped by our culture. In this thesis, 
culture is no black box explanation. We can interpret culture as the aggregate influence 
of the wants and needs of an individual’s social group. We are strongly conditioned to 
strive for high social status. By definition, increased social status is a relative measure, 
not absolute. In pre-modern societies, wealth was typically very unevenly distributed. 
A small group of elites dominated the majority of the population, who lived close to 
subsistence.  In this environment, family size had no impact upon relative social status 
as the economic distance between the elites and everyone else was so large. A peasant 
could choose to restrict fertility and have three children instead of six. In both 
situations, all of these children would remain peasants, as would their parents.  
 
 I propose that changes in the environment for social mobility will suddenly 
make family size relevant in the determination of relative social status. This will act 
through a threshold level of economic inequality, which signifies the economic distance 
between societal sub groups. Parent’s will adapt and rationally adjust their fertility 
preferences to reflect this environmental change. The new demographic regime will 
originate amongst the elites and then spread down the wealth distribution. The wealth 
fertility relationship will switch from strongly positive, to negative and finally flat over 
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the complete transitional phase. This economic change may be coincident with the 
growth of per capita income in a country, or it may precede it. The crucial 
socioeconomic triggers for the fertility transition are the level of economic inequality 
and the social mobility environment it implies.  
 
 The simple status fertility model I propose in this thesis is elementary and 
unsophisticated. This I believe is its greatest strength. There are more things in heaven 
and earth that influence human fertility than could ever be captured by any economic 
model. However, the beauty of economics is to abstract from the chaos of the world 
around us and to generalise the relationships of the principal components in the 
determination of human decision making and behaviour. Through testing theories 
against the historical record, we can reformulate original hypotheses and improve our 
understanding of specific historical events, and also how people fundamentally work. 
The ideas presented in this thesis are close in many respects to existing theories, for 
instance Becker’s quantity-quality trade-off, Oded Galor’s increased investment in 
human capital explanation148 for the fertility decline and Arsene Dumont’s ‘social 
capillarity’ hypothesis. However, I am unaware of any previous work which explicitly 
relates the environment for social mobility and the level of economic inequality to the 
determination of human fertility as I have done in this thesis.  
 
The population ‘time bomb’ paranoia of the 1970s has receded from policy 
makers’ priorities, and concern in the developed world is now focused upon the 
implications of low fertility. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, the fertility transition has 
yet to occur and demographers have concentrated on the impact of the AIDS epidemic. 
The interaction between the economy and the demographic characteristics of the 
population are of crucial importance for economic development. The immediate and 
long run effects of the fertility level on the population and on the economy are 
profound. Understanding how people determine their family size is not only important 
                                                
148 As part of Unified Growth Theory. 
 322 
in an academic sense, but is important for present and future policy makers. This thesis 
has re-examined the world’s first fertility transition with respect to its economic 
correlates. The idea that social mobility is a motivating factor in people’s fertility 
decisions has received strong support from the empirical data collected. Further 
research with detailed individual level data and the appropriate theoretical approach 
can illuminate the many unresolved paradoxes of fertility transitions. 
 
 323 
Bibliography 
 
Alter, George. 1988. Family and the Female Life Course: The Women of Verviers, Belgium, 
1849- 1880. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
________ . 1992. ‚Theories of Fertility Decline: A Non-specialist's Guide to the Current 
Debate on European Fertility Decline.‛ in John Gillis, Louise Tilly and David 
Levine, eds., The European Experience of Declining Fertility, 1850-1970. Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell: 13-27. 
Alter, George, Muriel Neven and Michel Oris. 2005. ‚Economic Development and 
Differential Fertility in Rural and Urban Eastern Belgium, 1812-1899.‛ Chaire 
Quetelet. 
Anderson, Barbara A. 1986. ‚Regional and Cultural Factors in the Decline of Marital 
Fertility in Western Europe.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The 
Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised proceedings of a conference on the Princeton 
European Population Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 293-313. 
Anderson, Michael & Ronald D. Lee. 2002. "Malthus in state space: Macro economic-
demographic relations in English history, 1540 to 1870." Journal of Population 
Economics,15(2):195-220. 
Baines, Dudley. 1998. ‚European Demographic Change since 1945.‛ in Schulze, M.S. 
(ed.), Western Europe: Economic and Social Change since 1945. London: Longman: 161-
76. 
Bairoch, Paul. 1968. ‚The working population and its structure.‛ vol 1. of Tilo 
Deldycke, H. Gelders and Jean M. Limbor, eds., International Historical Statistics. 
Brussels: Universite Libre. 
Bairoch, Paul and Goertz, Gary. 1986 ‚Factors of Urbanisation in the Nineteenth 
Century Developed Countries: A Descriptive and Econometric Analysis.‛ Urban 
Studies, 23(4): 283-305. 
Banks, James A. 1978 ‚The Social Structure of 19th Century England as seen through the 
Census.‛ in Richard Lawton, ed., The Census and Social Structure London: 
Routledge: 79-224 
Baum, Chrostopher  F. 2005. ‚Stata: The language of choice for time-series analysis?‛ 
Stata Journal, 5(1): 46-63. 
Becker, Gary S. 1960. ‚An Economic Analysis of Fertility.‛ in Ansley J. Coale, ed., 
Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press: 209-40. 
________ . 1991.  A treatise on the family. Enlarged ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press. 
Bengtsson, Tommy and Martin Dribe. 2006. ‚Deliberate control in a natural fertility 
population: Southern Sweden, 1766–1864.‛ Demography, 43(4): 727–746. 
Birdsall, Nancy. 1980. ‚Population Growth and Poverty in the Developing World‛ 
Population Bulletin, 35(5). 
Bledsoe, Caroline. 1994. "'Children are like young bamboo trees': Potentiality and 
Reproduction in Sub-Saharan Africa." in Kerstin Lindahl-Kiessling and Hans 
 324 
Landberg, eds., Population, Economic Development, and the Environment. New York: 
Oxford University Press: 105-138. 
Bledsoe, Caroline, Fatoumatta Banja, and Allan G. Hill. 1998. "Reproductive Mishaps 
and Western Contraception: An African Challenge to Fertility Theory." Population 
and Development Review, 24(1):15-57. 
Borgerhoff  Mulder, Monique. 1998. ‚The demographic transition: are we any closer to 
an evolutionary explanation?‛ Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 13(7): 266-270 . 
Bongaarts, John. 1983. ‚The proximate determinants of natural marital fertility.‛ in 
Rodolfo A. Bulatao and Ronald. D. Lee, eds., Determinants of Fertility in Developing 
Countries New York: Academic Press: 103–138. 
________ .  2002. ‚The end of the fertility transition in the developed world.‛ Population 
and Development Review, 28(3): 419-444 . 
Bongaarts, John and Susan Cotts Watkins. 1996. ‚Social interactions and 
contemporary fertility transitions.‛ Population and Development Review, 22(4): 639-
682. 
Bonneuil, Noël. 1997. Transformation of the French Demographic Landscape 1806–1906. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Bourdieu, Jérôme, Gilles Postel-Vinay and Akiko  Suwa-Eisenmann. 2004. ‚Défense 
et illustration de l’enquête 3000 familles.‛ Annales de démographie historique: 19-52. 
Bourguignon, François, and Christian Morrison. 2002. ‚Inequality Among World 
Citizens: 1820-1992.‛ The American Economic Review, 92(4): 727-44. 
Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Bradford S. Jones. 2004. Event History Modelling: A 
Guide for Social Scientists. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Boyer-Xambeu, Marie T., Christian Deleplace and Lucien Gillard. 1997. ‚’Bimettalic 
Snake’ and Monetary Regimes: The Stability of the Exchange Rate between London 
and Paris from 1796 to 1873.‛ in Maria Cristina Marcuzzo, Lawrence H. Officer and 
Annalisa Rosselli, eds., Monetary Standards and Exchange Rates. London: Routledge: 
106-49 
Brown, John C. and Timothy W. Guinnane. 2003. "Two Statistical Problems in the 
Princeton Project on the European Fertility." Economic Growth Center atYale 
University Working Papers 869.  
________ . 2007. ‚Regions and Time in the European Fertility Transition: Problems in 
the Princeton Project’s Statistical Methodology.‛ Economic History Review, 60(3): 
574-595. 
Bulato, Rodolfo A. and Lee, Ronald D.  1983.  Determinants of Fertility in Developing 
Countries. New York: Academic Press. 
Burch, Thomas K. 1995. ‚Icons, Strawmen and Precision: Reflections on Demographic 
Theory of Fertility Decline‛ University of Western Ontario Discussion Paper, 94 (4). 
________ .  2003. ‚Data, models, theory and reality: the structure of demographic 
Knowledge.‛ in Francesco C. Billari and Alexia Prskawetz, eds., Agent-Based 
Computational Demography: Using Simulation to Improve Our Understanding of 
Demographic Behaviour. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag: 19-40. 
 325 
Caldwell, John C. 1976. ‚Toward a restatement of the demographic transition theory.‛ 
Population and Development Review 2(3/4): 321-66. 
________ .  2004. ‚Fertility control in the classical world: was there an ancient fertility 
transition?‛ Journal of Population Research, 21(1): 1-17. 
Castro, Nina and Neil J. Cummins. 2006. ‚The Relationship between Socioeconomic 
Status and Marital Fertility in 18th Century France.” Unpublished University of 
Michigan (ICPSR) Summer Training Program  Project. 
Carlson, Gosta. 1969. ‚The Decline of Fertility: Innovation or Adjustment Process.‛ 
Population Studies, 20(2): 149-74. 
Casterline, John. B. 2001. ‚The pace of fertility transition: National patterns in the 
second half of the 20th century.‛ in Rodolfo. A. Bulatao and John B. Casterline, 
eds., Global Fertility Transition, Population and Development Review. 27(Suppl 17):17-
52. 
Chesnais, Jean C. 1992. The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns and Economic 
Implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clark, Gregory. 1998. ‚Land Hunger: Land as a Commodity and as a Status Good in 
England, 1500-1910.‛ Explorations in Economic History, 35(1): 59-82. 
________ . 2002. "Shelter from the Storm:  Housing and the Industrial Revolution, 1550-
1912."  Journal of Economic History, 62(2): 489-511 
________ . 2005. ‚The Condition of the Working-Class in England, 1209-2004.‛ Journal of 
Political Economy, 113(6): 1307-1340. 
________ . 2005a. ‚The Condition of the Working-Class in England, 1209-2004.‛ Journal 
of Political Economy, 113(6): 1307-1340. 
________ . 2005b. ‚Human Capital, Fertility and the Industrial Revolution.‛ Journal of 
the European Economic Association, 3(2-3): 505-515. 
________ .  2007.  A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Clark, Gregory and Gillian Hamilton.  2006.  ‚Survival of the Richest.  The Malthusian 
Mechanism in Pre-Industrial England.‛ Journal of Economic History, 66(3): 707-36. 
Cleland, John. 1985. ‚Marital fertility decline in developing countries: theories and the 
evidence.‛ in John Cleland and John Hobcraft, eds., Reproductive change in 
developing countries: insights from the World Fertility Survey. London: Oxford 
University Press: 223-52. 
Cleland, John and Christopher Wilson. 1987. ‚Demand Theories of the Fertility 
Transition: An Iconoclastic View.‛ Population Studies, 41(1): 5-30. 
Cleves Mario. A., William W. Gould and Roberto G.  Gutierrez. 2004. An Introduction 
to Survival Analysis Using Stata Revised Edition. College Station (TX): Stata Press. 
Coale, Ansley J. 1986. ‚The Decline of Fertility in Europe since the Eighteenth Century 
as a Chapter in Human Demographic History.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. 
Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised proceedings of a conference 
on the Princeton European Population Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press: 1-30. 
 326 
Coale, Ansley J., Barbara Anderson and Erna Harm. 1979. Human Fertility in Russia 
since the 19th Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Coale, Ansley J. and Roy Treadway. 1986. A Summary of the Changing Distribution of 
Overall Fertility, Marital Fertility, and the Proportion Married in the Provinces of 
Europe.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in 
Europe: The revised proceedings of a conference on the Princeton European Population 
Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 1-30. 
Coale, Ansley J. and Susan. C. Watkins. 1986. The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The 
revised proceedings of a conference on the Princeton European Population Project. 
Princeton. Princeton University Press. 
Crafts, Nick and Mills, Terence. 2009. "From Malthus to Solow: How the Malthusian 
Economy Really Evolved." Journal of Macroeconomics, 31(1): 68-93. 
Daunton, Martin J. 1989. ‚’Gentlemanly Capitalism’ and British Industry 1820–1914.‛ 
Past & Present, 122(1):119-158. 
________ . 1991. ‚Gentlemanly Capitalism‛ and British Industry 1820-1914: Reply Past 
and Present, 122(1):119-170. 
Demeny, Paul. 1972. "Early Fertility Decline in Austria-Hungary: a Lesson in 
Demographic Transition." In Population and Social Change, Glass, David V. and 
Roger Revelle ,eds., New York, Crane, Russak and Co., Inc.: 153-72. 
De Santis, Gustavo and Massimo Livi-Bacci. 2001. ‚Reflections on the economics of 
the fertility decline in Europe, paper presented at conference‛, The second 
demographic transition in Europe, Bad Herrenalb, Germany, 23-28 June (available at 
http://www.ds.unifi.it/ricerca/interessi/demografia/bassafecondita/messina/pubblic
azioni/ pubblicazioni.htm). 
Docquier, Frédéric. 2004. ‚Income Distribution, Non-convexities and the fertility-
Income Relationship.‛ Economica, 71(282): 261-73. 
Drake, Michael et al. 2001. Decline of Infant Mortality in England and Wales, 1871-1948 : a 
Medical Conundrum; Vaccination Registers, 1871-1913 [computer file]. Colchester, 
Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], SN: 4127. 
Dumont, Arsene. 1890. Dépopulation et civilisation: étude démographique. Paris: Lecrosnier 
et Babé. 
Depoid, Pierre. 1941. ‚Reproduction nette en Europe depuis l’origine des statistiques 
de l’état civil‛ Études et Documents Démographiques, no.1. 
Dyson, Tim and Mike Murphy. 1985. ‚The Onset of Fertility Transition.‛ Population 
and Development Review, 11(3): 399–440. 
Easterlin, Richard A. 1975. ‚An Economic Framework for Fertility Analysis.‛ Studies in 
Family Planning, 6(3): 54-63. 
Easterlin, Richard A. and Eileen M. Crimmins, 1985. The Fertility Revolution: a supply-
demand analysis. Chicago, Illinois, University of Chicago Press. 
Ehrlich, Isaac and Francis T. Lui. 1991.  ‚Intergenerational Trade, Longevity, 
and Economic Growth.‛ Journal of Political Economy, 99(5): 1029-59. 
Flora, Peter et al. 1983. State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975, a Data 
Handbook. London: Macmillan. 
 327 
Forrest, Jaqueline D. 1975. ‚Fertility Decline in Austria, 1880-1910.‛ Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation. Princeton University. 
Freedman, Deborah. 1976. ‚Fertility, Aspirations, and Resources: A Symposium on the 
Easterlin Hypothesis: Introduction.‛ Population and Development Review, 2(3/4): 411-
5. 
Galloway, Patrick R. 1988. ‚Basic Patterns in Annual Variations in Fertility, Nuptiality, 
Mortality and Prices in Pre-industrial Europe.‛ Population Studies, 42(2):275-302. 
Galloway, Patrick R., Eugene H. Hammel and Ronald D. Lee. 1994. ‚Fertility Decline 
in Prussia, 1875-1910: A Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Analysis.‛ Population 
Studies, 48(1): 135-58. 
Galor, Oded. 2004. "From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory." CEPR 
Discussion Papers 4581. 
Galor, Oded and David N. Weil.  1996.  ‚The Gender Gap, Fertility and Growth.‛  
American Economic Review, 86: 374-387. 
________ .  2000.  ‚Population, Technology and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to 
the Demographic Transition and Beyond.‛  American Economic Review, 90: 806-828. 
Galor, Oded and Omer Moav.  2002.  ‚Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic 
Growth.‛  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 1133-1192. 
Garret, Eilidh et al.  2001. Changing Family Size in England and Wales: Place, Class and 
Dempgraphy, 1891-1911.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Garrett, Eilidh. and Ros Davies. 2003. ‚Birth spacing and infant mortality on the Isle of 
Skye, Scotland, in the 1880s: a comparison with the town of Ipswich, England.‛ 
Local Population Studies, 71: 53-74.  
GBHGIS (Great Britain Historical GIS). 2009. ‚English Administrative Counties, 1910 
and English Urban/Rural Areas 1910.‛ downloaded from 
http://borders.edina.ac.uk/ukborders/action/restricted/textgeosearch. 
GRO [General Register Office]. 1923. Fertility of Marriage, Part 2 Census of England 
and Wales, 1911. Vol. 1, London: HMSO. 
________ . 1872. Census of England and Wales, 1872. London: HMSO 
________ . 1923. Census of England and Wales, 1911. London: HMSO 
Guinnane, Timothy W., Carolyn M. Moehling and Cormac O’Grada. 2006.  ‚The 
fertility of the Irish in the United States in 1910.‛ Explorations in Economic History, 
43(4): 465-485. 
Guinanne, Timothy W., Barbara S. Okun and James Trussell. 1994. ‚What Do We 
Know About the Timing of Fertility Transitions in Europe?‛ Demography, 31(1): 1-
20. 
Gujarati, Damador. Basic Econometrics. 1995. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Guttmann, Myron P. and Susan C. Watkins. 1990. ‚Socio-Economic Differences in 
Fertility Control. Is There an Early Warning System at the Village Level?‛  European 
Journal of Population, 6(1):69-101. 
Hadeishi, Hajime 2003. ‚Economic Well-Being and Fertility in France: Nuits, 1744–
1792.‛ Journal of Economic History, 63(2): 489-505. 
 328 
Haines, M. 1989. ‚Social class differentials during fertility decline. England and Wales 
revisited.‛ Population Studies 43: 305-323. 
Hansen, Bruce E. 2001. ‚The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in 
U.S. labour Productivity.‛ The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4):117-28. 
Hansen, G. and Prescott, Edward C.  2002.  ‚Malthus to Solow.‛ American Economic 
Review, 92(4): 1205-1217. 
Henry, Louis. 1972. ‛Fécondité des mariages dans le quart sud-ouest de la France.‛ 
Annales E.S.C, 27: 612-39, 977-1023. 
________ .  1978. ‚Fecondite des mariages dans le quart sud-est de la France.‛ Population 
(French Edition,) 33: 855-83. 
Henry, Louis and Jacques Houdaille. 1973. ‚Fécondité des mariages dans le quart 
nord-ouest.‛ Population (French Edition), 28: 873-924. 
Hirschman, Charles. 1994. ‚Why Fertility Changes.‛ Annual Review of 
Sociology, 20: 203-33. 
Hollingsworth, Thomas. H. 1957. ‚A demographic study of the British ducal families.‛ 
Population Studies, 11(1): 4-26. 
Houdaille, Jacques. 1976. ‚Fécondité des mariages dans le quart nord-est de la France 
de 1670 a 1829.‛ Annales de Demographie Historique: 341-92. 
________ . 1984. ‚La mortalité des enfants dans la France rurale de 1690 a 1779.‛ 
Population, 1: 77-106 
Hughes, Austin. L. 1986. ‚Reproductive success and occupational class in eighteenth-
century Lancashire, England.‛ Social Biology, 33: 109-115. 
Innes, John W. 1938. Class Fertility Trends in England and Wales 1876-1934. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
James, William H. 1987. ‚The Human Sex Ratio. Part 1: A Review of the Literature.‛ 
Human Biology, 59(5): 721-752. 
Jones, Larry E. and Michèle Tertilt.  2006.  ‚An Economic History of the Relationship 
Between Occupation and Fertility – U.S. 1826-1960.‛ Unpublished Manuscript, 
Stanford University. 
Kaplan, Hillard S. and Jane B.Lancaster. 2003. ‚An Evolutionary and Ecological 
Analysis of Human fertility, Mating Patterns, and Parental Investment.‛ in 
Kenneth W. Wachter, and Rodlofo A. Bulatao, eds., Offspring: Human Fertility 
Behaviour in Biodemographic Perspective. Washington: The National Academies Press: 
170-223. 
Kaplan, Hillard S., Jane B. Lancaster, John A. Bock and Sara E. Johnson. 1995. ‚Does 
Observed Fertility Maximize Fitness Among New Mexican Men? A Test Of An 
Optimality Model and a New Theory of Parental Investment in the Embodied 
Capital of Offspring.‛ Human Nature 6:325-360. 
Kirk, Dudley. 1996. ‚Demographic Transition Theory.‛ Population Studies, 50(3): 361-87. 
Kohler, Hans Peter. 2001. Fertility and Social Interactions: An Economic Perspective. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 329 
Kohler, Hans-Peter, Francesco C. Billari, and José Antonio Ortega.  2002. ‚The 
emergence of lowest-low fertility in Europe during the 1990s.‛ Population and 
Development Review, 28(4): 641–680. 
Knodel, John E. 1974. The Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871-1939. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
________ .. 1986. ‚Demographic Transitions in German Villages.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and 
Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised proceedings of a 
conference on the Princeton European Population Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press: 337-389. 
Knodel, John B. and Etienne van de Walle. 1986. ‚Lessons from the Past: Policy 
Implications of Historical Fertility Studies.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. 
Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised proceedings of a conference 
on the Princeton European Population Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press: 390-419. 
Knodel, John and Etienne van de Walle. 1979. ‚Lessons From the Past: Policy 
Implications of Historical Fertility Studies.‛ Population and Development Review, 5(2): 
217-45. 
Kunitz, Stephen. J. 1983. ‚Speculations on the European Mortality Decline.‛ Economic 
History Review, 36(3): 349-64. 
Landry, Adolphe. 1934. La Revolution Demographique. Paris: Sirey. 
Lee, Ronald D. 1985. ‚Population Homeostasis and English Demographic History.‛ 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 15(4): 635-60. 
________ . 2003. ‚The Demographic Transition: Three Centuries of Fundamental 
Change.‛ Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4): 167-90 
Leasure, J. William. 1963. ‚Factors involved in the Decline of Fertility in Spain 1900-
1950.‛ Population Studies, 16(3): 271-85. 
Lesthaeghe, Ron J. 1977. The Decline of Belgian Fertility, 1800-1970. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Lesthaeghe, Ron and Chris Wilson. 1986. ‚Modes of Production, Secularization, and 
the Pace of the Fertility Decline in Western Europe, 1870-1930.‛ in Ansley J. Coale 
and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised proceedings 
of a conference on the Princeton European Population Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press: 261-292. 
Levy-Leboyer, Maurice and François Bourguignon. 1990. A Macroeconomic Model of 
France during the 19th Century: An Essay in Econometric Analysis. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lindert, Peter H. 2000. ‚Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America.‛ In 
Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook of Income 
Distribution, volume 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier: 167-216. 
________ .  2004.  Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth 
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lindert, Peter H. , Branko Milanovic and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2007. ‚Measuring 
Ancient Inequality.‛ NBER Working Paper 13550. 
 330 
Livi-Bacci, Massimo.  1968. [A]. "Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Spain from the 
Late 18th to the Early 20th Century: Part I." Population Studies, 22(1):83-102. 
________ . 1968. [B]. "Fertility and Nuptiality Changes in Spain from the Late 18th to the 
Early 20th Century: Part I." Population Studies, 22(2): 211-34 
________ . 1968. ‚Fertility and Population Growth in Spain in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries.‛ Daedalus, 97(2): 523-35. 
________ . 1971. A Century of Portuguese Fertility. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
________ . 1977. A History of Italian Fertility during the Last Two Centuries. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
________ . 1986. ‚Social-group forerunners of fertility control in Europe.‛ in Ansley J. 
Coale and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised 
proceedings of a conference on the Princeton European Population Project. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 182-200. 
________ .  1997. A concise history of world population. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lucas, Robert E.  2002.   ‚The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future‛ in Lectures on 
Economic Growth.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Mace, Ruth. 2000. ‚An adaptive model of human reproductive rate where wealth is 
inherited: why people have small families.‛ in Lee Cronk, Napoleon Chagnon and 
William Irons, eds., Adaptation and human behaviour. NY: Aldine de Gruyter: 261-
282. 
Macura Miroslav, Alphonse L. MacDonald and Werner Haug, eds., 2005. The New 
Demographic Regime: Population Challenges and Policy Responses United Nations, 
Economic Commission for Europe. 
Maddison, Angus. 2003. The world economy: historical statistics Paris: OECD. 
Malanima, Paulo and Oliver Volckart. 2009. ‚Urbanisation, 1700-1870.‛ in Steven 
Broadberry and Kevin O’ Rourke, eds., An Economic History of Modern Europe 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Malthus, Thomas R. Essay on the Principal of Population 1798. 1st edition available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPop.html 
Mason, Karen. O. 1997. ‚Explaining fertility transitions.‛ Demography, 34 (4):443-54. 
________ . 2001. ‚Gender and family systems in the fertility transition.‛ In Rodolfo A. 
Bulatao and John B. Casterline, eds., Global Fertility Transition. New York: 
Supplement to Population and Development Review, 27: 160-176. 
McDonald, Peter. 2000. ‚Gender equity in theories of fertility transition.‛ Population and 
Development Review, 26(3): 427-440. 
McNown, Robert, and Cristobal Ridao-Cano. 2005.  ‚A time series model of fertility 
and female labour supply in the UK.‛ Applied Economics, 37(5): 521-32. 
Mincer, Jacob. 1963. ‚Market Prices, Opportunity Costs and Income Effects.‛ in Carl F. 
Christ et al. Measurement in Economics Stanford: Stanford University Press: 67-83. 
Mitchell, Brian R. 2003. International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000 New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 331 
Mokyr, Joel and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2009. ‚Understanding Growth in Early Modern 
Europe,‛ in Stephen Broadberry and Kevin O’Rourke, eds., Cambridge Economic 
History of Europe. Vol. 1 Cambridge University Press. 
Morrison, Christian. 2000. ‚Historical Perspectives on Income Distribution: The Case of 
Europe‛ in Anthony B. Atkinson, and François Bourguignon, eds., Handbook of 
Income Distribution. Vol. 1 Elsevier: 217-60. 
Mosk, Carl. 1978. "Rural-Urban Differentials in Swedish Fertility 1880-1960." Working 
Paper no.123 Dept. of Economics: University of California at Berkeley. 
Murphy, Michael J. 2008. Selected Tables Relating to Fertility from 1911, 1951 Censuses of 
England and Wales and 1946 Family Census [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK 
Data Archive [distributor], May 2008. SN: 5754. 
Murphy, Michael J. and Timothy P.G. Dyson. 1986. Vital Statistics Time Series, 1749-
1982 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor]. SN: 2093. 
Murphy, Tommy and Sandra Gonzalez-Bailón. 2008. ‚When Smaller Families Look 
Contagious: A Spatial Look At The French Fertility Decline Using An Agent-Based 
Simulation Model.‛ Oxford Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History series 71. 
Matthiessen, Paul C. 1984. "Some Reflections on the Historical and Recent Fertility 
Decline in Denmark." Scandanavian Population Studies, 6(2): 43-51. 
Nagarajan, K.V. 1980. ‚Testing for a Possible Non-Linear Relationship between Income 
and Fertility Implied in the Theory of Demographic Transition: The US Case, 1909-
1957.‛ Genus 36(3/4):159-69. 
Nelson, Charles R. and Charles I. Plosser. 1982. ‚Trends and Random Walks in 
Macroeconomic Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications.‛ Journal of Monetary 
Economics, (10): 139-62. 
Newsholme, Arthur and Thomas H. C. Stevenson. 1906. ‚The decline in human 
fertility as shown by birth rates.‛ Royal Statistical Society Journal, 69: 34-38. 
Newsom, Lesley, Tom Postmes, Stephen G. Lea and Paul Webley. 2005. ‚Why Are 
Modern Families Small? Toward an Evolutionary and Cultural Explanation for the 
Demographic Transition.‛ Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9(4): 360-375. 
Notestein, Frank. 1945. ‚Population; the Long View‛ in Theodore W. Schultz, ed., Food 
for the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 36-57. 
Okun, Barbara. 1994. ‚Evaluating Methods for Detecting Fertility Control: Coale and 
Trussell's Model and Cohort Parity Analysis.‛ Population Studies, 30: 193-222. 
ONS [Office for National Statistics]. 2009.  Consumer Price Indices, Table 3.6 : 
Composite Price Index and annual change 1800 to 2007 (CDKO) downloaded from 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/TSDSeries1.asp 06/03/2009. 
Owens, Alastair, David R. Green, Craig Bailey and Alison C. Kay.  2006.  ‚A measure 
of worth: probate valuations, personal wealth and indebtedness in England, 1810-
40.‛ Historical Research, 79(205): 383–403. 
Pamuk, Sevket. 2005. ‚Estimating Economic Growth in the Middle East, 1820-1950.‛ 
Unpublished.  
Perron, Pierre. 1989. ‚The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock and the Unit Root 
Hypothesis.‛  Econometrica 57: 1361-1401. 
 332 
Pérusse, Daniel. 1993. ‚Cultural and reproductive success in industrial societies: 
Testing the relationship at the proximate and ultimate levels.‛ Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences, 16(2): 267-322. 
Piketty, Thomas, Gilles P. Vinay and Jean L. Rosenthal. 2006. ‚Wealth concentration 
in a developing economy: Paris and France, 1807-1994.‛ American Economic Review, 
96(1): 236-256. 
Population Reference Bureau. 2004. ‚Transitions in world population.‛ Population 
Bulletin, 59(1):1-40. 
Potts, Malcom.  1997. ‚Sex and the birth rate: Human biology, demographic change, 
and access to fertility-regulation methods.‛ Population and Development Review, 
23(1):1-39. 
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. 2000. ‚International Comparisons of Real Product, 
1820-1990, An Alternative Data Set.‛ Explorations in Economic History, 37(1): 1-41. 
Razi, Zvi. 1980. Life, Marriage and Death in a Medieval Parish: Economy, Society and 
Demography in Halesowen, 1270-1400. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Razzell, Peter and Christine Spence.  2006. ‚The hazards of wealth: adult mortality in 
pre-twentieth-century England.‛ Social History of Medicine, 19(3): 381-405.  
Razzell, Peter, Ros Davies and Eilidh M. Garrett. 2007. ‚Sociological Study of Fertility 
and Mortality in Ipswich, 1872-1910.‛ [computer file]. Colchester, Essex: UK Data 
Archive [distributor]: SN: 5413.  
Richards, Toni. 1983. ‚Statistical Studies of Aggregate Fertility Change: Time Series of 
Cross Sections.‛ in Rodolfo A. Bulato and Ronald D.Lee Determinants of fertility in 
Developing Countries Vol. 2:696-736. 
Richerson, Peter and Richard Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Rindfuss, Ronald R., Karen B. Guzzo and S. Phillip Morgan. 2003. ‚The changing 
institutional context of low fertility.‛ Population Research and Policy Review, 22(5-6): 
411-438. 
Robinson, Warren C. 1992. ‚Kenya enters the fertility transition.‛ Population 
Studies,46(3): 445-57. 
Rothenbacher, Franz. 2002. The European Population 1850-1945 [DATA CD-Rom]. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Rubenstein, William D. 1977.  ‚Wealth, Elites and the Class Structure of Modern 
Britain.‛ Past and Present, 76: 99-126. 
________ . 1991. ‚’Gentlemanly Capitalism’ and British Industry 1820-1914.‛ Past and 
Present, 132:150-170. 
Sardon, Jean-Paul. 1996. ‚Coale's Indices, Comparative Indices, Mean Generation, 
Total Fertility Rate and Components‛ Population: An English Selection, 8: 252-7. 
Schmertmann, Carl P. and André J. Caetano. 1999. ‚Estimating Parametric Fertility 
Models with Open Birth Interval Data.‛ Demographic Research, 1(5). 
Schneider, Jane and Peter T. Schneider. 1996. Festival of the poor: fertility decline & the 
ideology of class in Sicily, 1860-1980. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. 
 333 
Schofield, Roger & David Reher. 1991. ‚The Decline of Mortality in Europe.‛, in Roger 
Schofield, David Reher, and Alain Bideau, eds., The Decline of Mortality in Europe 
Oxford:Clarendon Press: 1-17. 
Schultz, Theodore P. 1981. Economics of Population. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. 
________ . 1985. ‚Changing World Prices, Women's Wages, and the Fertility Transition: 
Sweden 1860-1910.‛ Journal of Political Economy, 93(6): 1126-1154. 
Scott, Wolf. 1958. ‚Fertility and social mobility among teachers.‛ Population Studies, 
11(3): 251-61. 
Scott, Susan and C. J. Duncan. 2000. ‚Interacting effects of nutrition and social class 
differentials on fertility and infant mortality in a pre-industrial population‛ 
Population Studies, 54(1): 71-87. 
Sharlin, Allan. 1986. ‚Urban-Rural Differences in Fertility in Europe during the 
Demographic Transition.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The 
Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised proceedings of a conference on the Princeton 
European Population Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 234-260. 
Shoenmaeckers Ronald C. and Edith Lodewijckx. 1997. ‚Changes in demographic 
behaviour in Europe: some results from FFS-country reports and suggestions for 
future research.‛ paper prepared for the 23rd IUSSP International Conference, 
Beijing (mimeo). 
Siampos, George S. and Vas G. Valaoras. 1971. "Long-Term Fertility Trends in 
Greece." In: International Union for Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP). 
International Population Conference, London, 1969. Liege, Belgium: IUSSP, 1: 598-611. 
Skirbekk, Vergard. 2008. ‚Fertility trends by social status.‛ Demographic Research, 18(5): 
145-180. 
Stata Library. 2008. ‚Analysing Count Data‛  UCLA: Academic Technology Services, 
Statistical Consulting Group from 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/library/count.htm. 
Stevenson, Thomas H.C. 1920. ‚The Fertility of Various Social Classes in England and 
Wales from the Middle of the Nineteenth Century to 1911.‛ Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, 83(3): 401-444 . 
Strulik, Holger and Siddiqui Sikander. 2002. ‚Tracing the income-fertility nexus: 
Nonparametric Estimates for a Panel of Countries‛ Economics Bulletin, 15:1-9. 
Tamura, Robert. 1996. ‚From Decay to Growth: A Demographic Transition to 
Economic Growth.‛ Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20(6-7): 1237-61. 
Teitelbaum, Michael S. 1984. The British Fertility Decline: Demographic Transition in the 
Crucible of the Industrial Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Thompson, Francis M.L. 1992. ‚Stitching it all together again.‛ Economic History Review, 
45(2): 362-75. 
Thompson, Warren S. 1929. ‛Population.‛ American Journal of Sociology, 34(6): 959-75. 
Thompson, Warren S. and David T. Lewis. 1965. Population Problems. New York: 
McGraw Hill. 
Turke, Paul W. 1989. ‚Evolution and the Demand for Children.‛ Population and 
Development Review, 15(1): 61-90. 
 334 
Tsui, Amy O. 2001. ‚Population policies, family planning programs, and fertility: The 
record.‛ in Rodolfo. A. Bulatao and John B., eds., Global Fertility Transition. New 
York: Population and Development Review 27(Suppl.): 184-204. 
UNDB. 2008. ‚Human Development Report 2007/2008.‛ available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_Tables.pdf . 
United Nations. 2005.  Population Challenges and Development Goals New York, United 
Nations. 
United Nations. 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. Population Division 
of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 
http://esa.un.org/unpp. 
US Census Bureau. 2009.  World population Clock available at 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.html . 
Van Bavel, Jan.  2002.  ‚Dectecting Stopping and Spacing Behaviour in Historical 
Fertility Transitions: A Critical Review of Methods.‛  Working Paper: Department of 
Sociology,  KU Leuven. 
________ . 2004. "Deliberate birth spacing before the fertility transition in Europe: 
evidence from nineteenth-century Belgium." Population Studies, 58(1): 95-107. 
________ . 2006. ‚The effect of fertility limitation on intergenerational social mobility: 
the quality-quantity trade-off during the demographic transition.‛Journal of 
Biosocial Science, 38(4):553-569. 
Van Bavel, Jan & Jan Kok. 2004. ‚Birth spacing in the Netherlands. The effects of 
family composition, occupation and religion on birth intervals, 1820-1885.‛ 
European Journal of Population, 20(2): 119-140. 
Van de Kaa, Dirk J.  1996. “Anchored Narratives: The Story and Findings of Half a 
Century of Research into the Determinants of Fertility.‛ Population Studies, 50(3): 
389-432. 
Van de Walle, Etienne. 1974. The Female Population of France in the Nineteenth Century. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
________ . 1978. ‚Alone in Europe: The French Fertility Decline until 1850.‛ In Charles 
Tilly, ed., Historical Studies of Changing Fertility, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press: 257–88. 
Van de Walle, Francine. 1980. "Education and the Demographic Transition in 
Switzerland." Population and Development Review, 6(3):463-72. 
________ . 1986. ‚Infant Mortality and the European Demographic Transition.‛ in 
Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The 
revised proceedings of a conference on the Princeton European Population Project. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 201-233. 
Vining, Daniel R. 1986. ‚Social versus reproductive success: The central theoretical of 
human sociobiology.‛ Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 9: 167-187. 
Watkins, Susan C. 1986. ‚Regional Patterns of Nuptiality in Western Europe, 1870-
1960.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The Decline of Fertility in 
Europe: The revised proceedings of a conference on the Princeton European Population 
Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 314-336. 
 335 
________ . 1986. ‚Conclusions.‛ in Ansley J. Coale and Susan. C. Watkins, eds., The 
Decline of Fertility in Europe: The revised proceedings of a conference on the Princeton 
European Population Project. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 420-451. 
Weir, David R. 1984a. ‚Life Under Pressure: France and England, 1670-1870.‛ Journal of 
Economic History, 44(1): 27-47. 
________ .  1984b. ‚Fertility Transition in Rural France, 1740-1829.‛ Journal of Economic 
History, 44(2): 612-4. 
________ .  1994. ‚New Estimates of Nuptiality and Marital Fertility in France, 1740-
1911.‛ Population Studies, 48(2): 307-331. 
________ . 1995. ‚Family Income, Mortality, and Fertility on the Eve of the 
Demographic Transition: A Case Study of Rosny-Sous-Bois.‛ Journal of Economic 
History, 55(1): 1-26. 
Wetherell, Charles. 2001. ‚Another look at Coale's indices of fertility, If and Ig.‛ Social 
Science History, 25(4): 589-608. 
Wilson, Chris and Robert Woods. 1991. ‚Fertility in England: A Long-Term 
Perspective.‛ Population Studies, 45(3):399-415. 
Winegarden, Calman R. and Wheeler, Mark. 1992. ‚The role of economic growth in 
the fertility transition in Western Europe: econometric evidence.‛ Economica , 
59(236):421-35. 
Woods, Robert. 1982. ‚The structure of mortality in mid-nineteenth century England 
and Wales.‛ Journal of Historical Geography,  8(4): 373-394. 
________ . 2000. The Demography of Victorian England and Wales. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wrigley, Edward A. 1969. Population and history. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
________ .  1985. ‚The Fall of Marital Fertility in Nineteenth-Century France: Exemplar 
or Exception? (Part I).‛ European Journal of Population, 1(1): 31-60. 
Wrigley, Edward.A, and Roger Schofield. 1981.  The Population History of England 1541-
1871.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wrigley, Edward A., Ros S. Davies, James E. Oeppen and Roger S. Schofield. 1997. 
English Population History from Family Reconstitution 1580-1837 . Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
World Bank. 2008.  World Development Indicators 09 April 2008 available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/SI5SSGAVZ0. 
UNU/WIDER. 2008. World Income Inequality Database 09 April 2008 Available at: 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. 
Xie, Yu and Ellen E. Pimentel. 1992. ‚Age Patterns of Marital Fertility: Revising the 
Coale-Trussell Method.‛ Journal of the American Statistical Association, 87: 977-84. 
Zivot, Eric and Donald W. K. Andrews.  1992. ‚Further evidence of the great crash, the 
oil-price shock and the unit-root hypothesis.‛ Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics, 10(3): 251-70. 
 
 
 
 336 
Primary Sources 
Chapter 4 
 
Post 1858 Wills (1969 collected) 
Principal Registry of the Family Division, First Avenue House, High Holborn, WC1 
6NP, London 
 
Individual enumerator’s returns from the 1841-1901 Census of the United Kingdom, 
downloaded from www.ancestry.co.uk 
 
Pre 1858 Wills (947 collected) 
http://yourarchives.nationalarchives.gov.uk/index.php?title=Category:Probate_transcri
pts (259) Will transcripts uploaded by amateur genealogists and family researchers 
 
Essex Record Office, Wharf Rd, Chelmsford, CM2 6YT, Consistory Court Wills, 1550-
1857 (345) 
 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/wills.asp (343), accessed at the 
National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU. For these wills the gross 
probate valuation was sourced separately. The ‘Probate Act Books’ from 1820-39, also at 
Kew were used for this purpose. The references are PROB 8/213-33. 
 
Each testator used in the database has individually assigned source information and/or 
a weblink to a sit where the will can be accessed. This information is freely available to 
anyone who is interested: Please contact the author.  
 
Linked Sources 
UK Census returns at www.ancestry.co.uk 
 
 
Chapter 4A 
 
Primary Sources of Wills 
Essex Record Office, Chelmsford - Consistory Court Wills, 1550-1857 
London Metropolitan Archive - Consistory Court Wills, 1600-1857  
Public Record Office, Kew – Canterbury Court Wills, 1600-1857 
Suffolk Record Office - Consistory Court Wills, 1550-1857 
Probate Department of The Principal Registry Family Division: Probate Search Room, 
First Avenue House, 42-49 High Holborn, London – all wills 1858-1914. 
 
Published Transcripts of Wills 
Allen, Marion E.  1989.  Wills of the Archdeaconry of Suffolk, 1620-24.  Woodbridge, 
Suffolk:  Boydell Press for the Suffolk Records Society, Vol. XXXI. 
 337 
Allen, Marion E.  1995.  Wills of the Archdeaconry of Suffolk, 1625-26.  Woodbridge, 
Suffolk:  Boydell Press for the Suffolk Records Society, Vol. XXXVII. 
Allen, Marion E. and Evans, Nesta R.  1986.  Wills of the Archdeaconry of Suffolk, 1629-36.  
Boston : New England Historic Genealogical Society. 
Allen, Marion E. and Evans, Nesta R.  1986.  Wills of the Archdeaconry of Suffolk, 1637-40.  
Boston : New England Historic Genealogical Society. 
Emmison, F. G.  1990-2004.   Essex Wills, 1558-1603.  Vol.s 1-11.  Chelmsford: Essex 
Record Office. 
Evans, Nesta R.  1987.  The Wills of the Archdeaconry of Sudbury, 1630-35.  Suffolk Records 
Society, Vol. 29.  Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press. 
Evans, Nesta R.  1993.  The Wills of the Archdeaconry of Sudbury, 1636-38.  Suffolk Records 
Society, Vol. 35.  Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press. 
Webb, Cliff.  1996-2005. Surrey Will Abstracts, Vol.s 1-41.  Surrey, England: West Surrey 
Family History Society. 
 
Webb Abstracts of Wills 
Earls Colne, Essex.  Will transcripts and links to parish records, 1490-1857. 
 http://linux02.lib.cam.ac.uk/earlscolne/probate/index.htm   
Kent Will Transcipts.  Will abstracts from Kent pre 1858. 
http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~mrawson/wills.html 
Sterry One-Name Study.  Will transcipts and links to parish records.  
http://www.sterryworldwide.com/ 
Surrey Plus Wills Index.  Will abstracts from Surrey, Middlesex, and Kent.  
http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~engsurry/ 
Chapter 5 
 
Archives Départementales de la Alpes-Maritime, serie Q3, Tables Des Successions et 
Absences. 
Archives Départementales de la Dordogne, serie Q3, Tables Des Successions et Absences. 
Archives Départementales de la Lozere, serie Q3, Tables Des Successions et Absences. 
Archives Départementales de la Seine - St. Denis, serie Q3, Tables Des Successions et 
Absences. 
 
